Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — HOUSING

Prefabricated Bungalows

Captain Pilkington: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will make a statement about the future of prefabricated bungalows; and to what extent these are now in need of repair, in particular as regards the gutters.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. W. F. Deedes): No, Sir. Local authorities are responsible for maintenance. Conditions vary. No general statement could therefore be made about the need for repair. My right hon. Friend has had no particular complaints about gutters.

Captain Pilkington: Can my hon. Friend say whether he has any idea how long the need for these prefabricated bungalows will continue?

Mr. Deedes: As was said on Second Reading of the Requisitioned Houses and Housing (Amendment) Bill, some of these prefabricated bungalows will be required for some time, but their maintenance remains the responsibility of the local authorities.

Captain Pilkington: Can the Minister define "some time"?

Mr. Deedes: That would depend in each case on local circumstances.

Purchase Guarantees (Circular No. 42)

Mr. Wyatt: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what powers local authorities have to vary the

terms of Circular No.42 of 4th May, 1954; and what steps he takes to ensure uniformity throughout the country in the implementation of the provisions of this circular.

Mr. Deedes: The circular makes it clear that approval will be forthcoming to the two guarantee schemes outlined in Appendix II. My right hon. Friend is also prepared to consider sympathetically applications for his approval to any similar schemes that local authorities may care to submit. He does not think uniformity on guarantees is essential. Some uniformity is desirable, however, in the conditions applying to advances by local authorities for house purchase.

Mr. Wyatt: Is the Minister aware that, alone of all the councils in the Midlands, the Sutton Coldfield Town Council is not complying with the recommendations of the Ministry, and is declining to approve loans to working-class people from working-class districts of Birmingham, whilst allowing them to other persons from more fashionable areas.

Mr. Deedes: The main point made by the hon. Member arises out of a subsidiary question. Broadly speaking, the circular is often made the subject of conferences in all the counties concerned. In order to get some kind of uniformity they have county conferences, and these have produced satisfactory results.

Mr. Wyatt: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what reply he has received from the Sutton Coldfield Council concerning the advice he gave it in his Circular No. 42, of May, 1954.

Mr. Deedes: The council has informed my right hon. Friend that it proposes to restrict its liability for guarantees to building societies to that part of the advance which is in excess of 75 per cent. of the value of the property.

Mr. Wyatt: Is the Minister aware that in several cases, after a building society has approved an advance and the valuation, and after the applicant has paid survey fees, the council, meeting in secret, has nevertheless suddenly declined to proceed any further with the application, on the ground that the persons concerned are working-class people whom they do not want in the smart area of Sutton Coldfield?

Mr. Deedes: Perhaps the hon. Member can let me have particulars of any instances which he has in mind.

Field Farm and Hampden Estate, Oxfordshire

Mr. Hay: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government (1) whether, in view of the urgent need to rehouse the occupants of Field Farm and Hampden Estate hutted camps in Oxfordshire, and the inability of the Bullingdon Rural District Council to construct sufficient permanent houses for this purpose until approval of the redevelopment plan for Field Farm is given, he will expedite his authorisation to the county council to grant planning permission for this scheme;
(2) whether he is aware of the unhealthy and unsatisfactory living conditions which exist at Field Farm and Hampden Estate hutted camps, Oxfordshire; and what action he is taking to expedite the rehousing of the occupants.

Mr. Deedes: My right hon. Friend is arranging for the alternatives mentioned in his reply to my hon. Friend's question of 22nd February to be discussed with the local authorities.In the meantime I understand that the rural district council plans to start rehousing the occupants of the camps this year by building 100 houses in other parts of its district.

Mr. Hay: Does the hon. Member realise that the conditions in this camp are quite appalling, and that the allocation made, while very welcome, is not enough to enable this local authority to rehouse the people in these two hutted camps? Will he give the most urgent consideration to approving this scheme as soon as he possibly can?

Mr. Deedes: Yes. I have studied the particulars of this case, and I have sympathy with my hon. Friend.It is felt that the Oxford City Council could help in this matter, and it is proposed to discuss it with that council and with the Bullingdon Rural District Council.

Subsidy

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will now review the Exchequer subsidy to local authorities for housing to compensate them for the additional costs

resulting from the recently increased Bank Rate.

Mr. Gibson: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he is aware that the recent increase in the Bank Rate will entail an increase in the cost of loans to local authorities, whether from the Public Works Loan Commissioners or in the money market; what estimate he has made of the additional burden so imposed on the finances of local authorities; and what steps he proposes to take, by promoting legislation or otherwise, to ease that additional burden.

Mr. Jay: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if, in view of the present difficulties of local authorities in their loan arrangements, he will reconsider his decision to reduce the housing subsidy on 1st April.

The Minister of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Duncan Sandys): I am not satisfied that any special action is called for at present.

Mr. Lewis: Can the Minister explain why he is not satisfied? Can he give some reasons?

Mr. Sandys: Interest and building costs have frequently changed up and down in the past without any immediate adjustment being made, and I see no reason to depart from that procedure.

Mr. Dalton: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that his predecessor in office won a notable victory over the Treasury upon this issue? Will not he try to repeat that victory?

Mr. Sandys: I prefer to win my victories over other people.

Mr. Gibson: Is the Minister aware that my Question is quite a different one from No.14? Are we to take it that no sort of estimate of any kind was made of the impact which the rise in the Bank Rate would make upon local government finances and, in particular, that no sort of estimate was made of the extra money that it might cost housing authorities, and its effect upon rent? That is what my Question is concerned about.

Mr. Sandys: Of course, on the wider issue, the Equalisation Grant comes into the picture and I cannot go into that matter in answer to a supplementary


question. With regard to the point about housing, there is a Question on the Order Paper about that, which I shall be answering later.

Mr. I. O. Thomas: The Minister just mentioned that he prefers to win his victories over other people. Does his range of territory include local authorities?

Mr. Sandys: Certainly not. I have found them always most co-operative.

Mr. Blenkinsop: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will issue a new Order cancelling the Housing (Review of Contributions) Order, 1954, in view of the increase in interest rates recently announced.

Mr. Sandys: I have no power to cancel such an Order, except by making a new Order, fixing a revised subsidy rate.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Will not the right hon. Gentleman consider making such a revised Order, in view of the fact that unless he does so local authorities will be bound to raise rents of council houses quite considerably?

Mr. Sandys: I have power only to reduce the subsidy and not to increase it. That is presumably not what the hon. Gentleman wants.

Mr. Jay: Why was it that when interest rates were raised in 1952 the Government increased the subsidy, whereas this year, when interest rates are raised, the Government are reducing the subsidy?

Mr. Sandys: Increasing the subsidy requires legislation.

Mr. Jay: In that case, would the right hon. Gentleman advise local authorities to increase rents because of Government policy, or rates?

Allocation, Northfleet

Sir R. Acland: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government how far the reduction in his allocation of council houses at Northfleet, from 80 in 1954 to 65 in 1955, is made in accordance with a general change of policy applicable to all areas; and what special features relating to the situation in Northfleet make such a reduction necessary.

Mr. Sandys: My information is that the council is not asking for any further allocations for the present.

Sir R. Acland: That may very easily be the case, but does that preclude the Minister from answering the Question? This is a subject in which I am interested.

Mr. Sandys: I should perhaps have added, "Therefore the other part of the Question does not arise."

Improvement Grants

Mr. Remnant: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government how many local authorities in England have declined to make any improvement grants.

Mr. Sandys: Up to the end of last year 927 local authorities in England and Wales had made improvement grants. It does not follow that the others have decided against making grants.

Mr. Remnant: I thank my right hon. Friend for answering a Question which I did not put to him. Will he consult the 927 local authorities to which he has referred as to what difficulties they are experiencing in making these improvement grants, and ask them in what way they consider that he can help them?

Mr. Sandys: I am making inquiries into this problem, and I have sought the views of representative local authorities upon it. I have also taken a number of other steps in order to try to encourage local authorities to take full advantage of the powers given to them under the Act.

Mr. Hargreaves: Is the Minister aware that his predecessor gave a promise to make a periodical report to the House of the progress made among local authorities in their extension of the use of the Act of 1949 in relation to improvement grants?

Mr. Sandys: I believe there is another Question to which that supplementary question is more relevant.

Ex-Service Camps (Closures)

Mr. Remnant: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government how many ex-Service camps, used for temporary housing accommodation, were closed in the last six months of 1954

Mr. Sandys: Eighty-four.

Mr. Remnant: Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance that when fixing


these quotas, either temporary or permanent, he takes into account fully the number of ex-Service camps the occupants of which have to be rehoused?

Mr. Sandys: That is the kind of consideration which is taken into account.

Private Enterprise Dwellings (Letting)

Mr. Hay: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether, in view of the answer given by his predecessor on 11th February, 1954, he will now say what is his estimate of the proportion of houses built for letting by private builders in 1954.

Mr. Deedes: The information on which my right hon. Friend's predecessor's estimate was based has not been available since the end of 1953. No estimate can, therefore, be made for 1954.

Mr. Hay: Can my hon. Friend be more specific? I am asking for some very important information. What is the basis on which the former Minister of Housing and Local Government was able to give the information which is not now available?

Mr. Deedes: I have not the basis of that information. The conditions which governed licences were altered at the beginning of 1954.This information could not be obtained while licensing continued, until November, 1954, so we have no means of making an estimate.

Regular Service Men

Mr. Bottomley: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government for what purpose he requires local authorities to give him reasons for not putting retiring Regular Service men in the housing list.

Mr. Sandys: For information.

Mr. Bottomley: In view of the earlier remark by the Minister that he always finds local authorities most co-operative, could he not agree, on reflection, that it would be better to ask for this information by letter instead of requesting it by circular? Is he aware that our democracy makes provision for both central Government and local government, and that one is not subservient to the other?

Mr. Sandys: It was by circular letter.

Mr. Bottomley: Altogether wrong.

Mr. Sandys: I shall be glad to send the right hon. Gentleman a copy of the circular, which he will find is extremely courteously worded.

Mr. Bottomley: I have seen the circular. It is customary to treat local authorities as separate entities and not as subservient to the Ministry. Perhaps when the Minister has been in office long enough he will appreciate that.

Mr. Sandys: I do not understand the right hon. Gentleman's point. It is customary and usual, and has been done by every Minister, to ask local authorities by circular for information on certain points of general interest. To judge from the reception given to my statement the other day, this point is most certainly of general interest.

Programme (Future Needs)

Captain Pilkington: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government how many more houses he estimates the country needs.

Mr. Sandys: It is quite impossible to make any reliable estimate.

Captain Pilkington: How long will it take people at present on the waiting list to be housed, in view of the fact that the Government are providing an average of 302,000 houses a year as compared with 169,000 by the Labour Government?

Mr. Sandys: All I can say is that it will be quicker than under the Labour Government.

Local Authority Sales (Circular No. 64)

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government how many houses have been sold by local authorities, following the issue of Circular No. 64 of 1952.

Mr. Deedes: Three thousand one hundred and twenty up to the end of last month.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Bearing in mind that there are about 1,500 local authorities, would not the Minister agree that this method of creating a property-owning democracy has been a tremendous flop?

Mr. Deedes: This is not the only channel of home ownership.

Loan Charges (Interest Rate)

Mr. H. Hynd: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government the additional cost of a £2,000 house built by a local authority on money borrowed at the new rates of interest from the Public Works Loans Board.

Mr. Sandys: This is the question to which I was referring earlier in replying to the hon. Member for Clapham (Mr. Gibson). The increase in loan charges on £2,000 will be about £4 a year.

Mr. Hynd: In that case, does the Minister propose to take steps to increase the subsidy to local authorities in order to prevent an increase in rents?

Mr. Sandys: I do not think the hon. Member was in the House earlier when I answered a Question on that subject.

Mr. Gibson: Is the Minister aware that this will mean an increase of about Is. 6d. a week in rent, if the loss is not to be borne by the local rates?

Mr. Blenkinsop: If the right hon. Gentleman cannot take action by means of an Order—I agree that that may be so—why is he not prepared to introduce legislation to meet this point?

Mr. Sandys: I know that the hon. Member was not here earlier when I dealt with several questions on this subject.Perhaps he will look it up in Hansard.

Management Sub-Committee (Recommendations)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what further steps have been taken, consequent on the Report of his Housing Management Sub-Committee, to deal with the problem of applicants for housing accommodation in virtually fully built-up areas and the need for certain local authorities to amalgamate their lists of urgent cases; and, in particular, if he is aware that this problem is acute in the Borough of Leyton and in similar areas.

Mr. Deedes: My right hon. Friend has recommended to local authorities the adoption of one of the sub-committee's proposals, and he is considering what action should be taken in regard to the others.

Mr. Sorensen: Are we likely to have some constructive recommendations in the

very near future, in view of the fact that in constituencies like mine there are literally hundreds of families with no hope of ever having a house in their home constituencies?

Mr. Deedes: My right hon. Friend appreciates the need for haste in this matter, but thinks it better that the Government's attitude to the sub-committee's recommendations should be considered first.

Mr. Sorensen: When will that be?

Mr. Deedes: As soon as possible.

Fitness Standards (Court Judgment)

Mr. Blenkinsop: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether his attention has been called to the judgment in the case of Fullerton versus Wallasey Corporation, as it affects the standards of fitness prescribed under the Housing Repairs and Rents Act, 1954, governing the issue of certificates of disrepair; and what action he proposes to take.

Mr. Sandys: I have considered this judgment, but I do not see that it calls for any action by me.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the views expressed in this case are in direct conflict with the interpretation of his predecessor and, in the view of many local authority officials, may have a very serious effect on housing standards generally and on the implementation of the Act? Will he not look at the matter again?

Mr. Sandys: There is no point in my looking at it again. I have looked at it. I agree with the hon. Member that there is a conflict with the interpretation given in a Departmental circular, but I do not propose to venture an opinion at this moment as to who was right and who was wrong.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Will the right hon. Gentleman at any rate agree that this is a matter of great concern that affects very seriously the work of the local authorities throughout the country, and would he not at least give the local authorities some advice on it?

Mr. Rankin: Does the right hon. Gentleman not realise that if he were to take a second look it might give him a new look?

Oral Answers to Questions — LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Planning Applications (Publicity)

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will send a circular to all local authorities advising them that applications for planning and development permission should not be disclosed to the Press or to unauthorised persons.

Mr. Sandys: No, Sir.

Mr. Jeger: Does not the Minister appreciate that disclosure to the Press or to unauthorised people of information of this kind can cause grave harm to businesses, even to St. James's Theatre, when application is made by someone who has no connection whatever with the concern in question?

Mr. Sandys: The Press are the eyes and ears of the people.

Mr. Jeger: But does not the Minister agree that clerks in offices should not disclose to the Press confidential information which they obtain in the course of their work? Have they not an obligation, in the same way as civil servants, to keep their mouths shut about what goes on in their offices?

Mr. Sandys: Publication is essential so that other parties who may be affected can be informed and make objection if they wish to do so. We cannot inform the public without also informing the Press.

Reorganisation

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he is now able to announce his proposals for the reorganisation of local government.

Wing Commander Bullus: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he is now in a position to make a statement on the question of local government reorganisation.

Captain Pilkington: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will now make a statement on the future of local government.

Sir F. Medlicott: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if

he is now able to make a statement on the future of local government.

Squadron Leader Cooper: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he is yet in a position to make a statement on local government reform.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government when he will introduce legislation for the reform of local government.

Mr. Sandys: I expect to be in a position to make a statement very shortly.

Rating (Agriculture and Industry)

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government (1) whether he will now introduce legislation by which agricultural land, which is now exempt from taxation, will pay its normal quota of local rates which at present have to be borne by the rest of the community to the extent of over £20 million per annum;
(2) whether he will now introduce legislation by which industrial premises will pay their full amount of rates in place of the 25 per cent. as at present as a result of which over £40 million per annum has now to be borne in rates by the rest of the community.

Mr. Sandys: No, Sir.

Mr. Freeman: In view of the fact that old-age pensioners, blind people, cripples, and people in receipt of pensions of one kind or another, have to pay their full rates, and even have to bear an extra burden in this regard, does not the Minister think that the time has come to relieve these older people of such heavy responsibilities which should be borne by the farming community and the big industrialists, who are in a position to pay their share?

Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member's Questions raise very large and wide issues of national policy which it would be inappropriate for me to attempt to answer in replying to supplementary questions.

Mr. Godber: Would not the Minister agree that to do as the hon. Member for Newport (Mr.Peter Freeman) requests would be to put up the prices of food to those very people for whom he is pleading? It would undoubtedly result in an increase. Would not the Minister further


agree that when agricultural derating took place all local authorities received a block grant fully recompensing them, and that, therefore, they would be no better off were rating reimposed?

Mr. Freeman: In view of the fact that the farming industry probably receives more by way of subsidies, allowances, grants and guaranteed prices than any other industry, and yet has not succeeded so far in reducing the price of food, would the Minister give similar subsidies to all the other trades and industries?

Council Members (Travelling Expenses)

Mr. Wyatt: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he is yet in a position to introduce legislation to allow members of the councils of boroughs and urban districts to be relieved of the burden of the expense of travelling in the performance of approved duties within the area of the council.

Mr. Sandys: No, Sir.

Mr. Wyatt: Would not it be appropriate if the Minister could take some action in this matter as in several areas, as a result of the recent decision of the courts, councillors who have previously been entitled to free passes on municipal transport so as to be better able to carry out their duties—which are often expensive, on account of the amount of travelling required—now have to pay their fares? Cannot the Minister do something instead of replying with a flat "No"?

Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member should not blame the courts. The trouble arises from the 1948 Act, which was passed by the Government of which the hon. Member was a member, and which authorised travelling expenses to county and rural district councillors but not to borough and urban district councillors.

War-Damaged Areas (Rating)

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he is aware of the hardships being caused to severely bombed boroughs by the high rates they have to levy; that this will be made worse by the proposals contained in the Requisitioned Houses and Housing (Amendment) Bill and the increased Bank Rate; and what action he proposes to take to assist these financially embarrassed local authorities.

Mr. Sandys: It is misleading to generalise about the position of severely bombed boroughs. Their rates and other circumstances differ widely. They cannot, therefore, be considered as a group.

Mr. Lewis: I hope that I can thank the Minister for that reply. Do I understand that he will look at the position of individual councils and consider whether or not, on their merits, they can be assisted in the future as they have been in the past—especially the County Borough of West Ham, the position of which he knows?

Mr. Sandys: I have no reason to suppose that the County Borough of West Ham will be less well treated in the future than it has been in the past.

Mr. Gibson: Has the Minister yet arrived at any conclusion about the formula to be used in the Requisitioned Houses and Housing (Amendment) Bill for dealing with special hardship problems of borough councils?

Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member is a member of the Standing Committee which is discussing the Bill, and he will have a better opportunity of raising the point there.

Mr. Lewis: I thank the Minister for the reply which he gave to my supplementary question.

Pennine Way (Diversion)

Mr. G. Darling: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what consideration led him to consent to the request of the Manchester Corporation for the diversion of the Pennine Way.

Mr. Sandys: I was advised that the use by the public of a part of the route originally approved would under certain circumstances cause additional risk of pollution to the Manchester Corporation's water supply.

Mr. Darling: Is the Minister aware that all the expert evidence given at that inquiry is in complete opposition to the statement which he has just made? Is he further aware that the prospect of pollution from hikers going over these streams is infinitesimal compared with the pollution that now goes on from buildings alongside the railway and the reservoir? Does he realise that he has routed the Pennine Way through a bog,


and that in wet weather hikers will have to go back to the original route if they dc not want to go up to their knees in mud?

Mr. Sandys: I do not know anything about the bog. I realise that the alternative route is regarded as being less attractive, but I felt that the additional risk to health, however small it may be, was something which I had not the right to accept.

Mr. Darling: On a point of order. In view of that unsatisfactory answer, which goes against all the expert advice, I beg to give notice that I shall try to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Private Street Works

Mr. Gower: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what steps he will take to accelerate the completion of private streets, particularly those which have remained in an unmade condition since before the 1939–45 war; and if he will bear in mind that the disappointment of the people affected by the condition of such streets is aggravated by the prompt completion of new roads, often in proximity to these private streets.

Mr. Deedes: This is a matter for local authorities. They need to apply for my right hon. Friend's consent only when they wish to raise a loan for the work. My right hon. Friend is always ready to consider such applications where streets are in a bad condition.

Mr. Gower: Is the Minister aware that there are signs that the machinery for dealing with this problem is inadequate? For example, is he aware that, in the Whitchurch area of my constituency, people have been living for more than 20 years in houses which abut on roads which are in a deplorable condition? They are quite willing to pay the charges but are not able to get the work done.

Mr. Deedes: If my hon. Friend will let me have particulars of this case, I shall be glad to look into it.

Compulsory Purchase Order, Leeds (Result of Inquiry)

Miss Alice Bacon: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government when he expects to publish the result of the inquiry, held in September, 1954, of

the compulsory purchase of the Louis Street area of Leeds, the Compulsory Purchase Order for which was made in April, 1954.

Mr. Deedes: As soon as possible.

Miss Bacon: Does not the Minister think there has been sufficient delay in dealing with this matter? It was delayed for some considerable time because the local Conservatives had a temporary majority on the City Council. Now it is delayed by a Conservative Government. When does the Minister expect to be able to give us a decision?

Mr. Deedes: As the hon. Lady knows, this is a very big scheme. I have already studied it. It involves criteria for approval of the local authority's conversion scheme. My right hon. Friend is now studying it, and will give his decision as soon as he possibly can.

Montague Street Garden, Holborn (Derequisitioning)

Mrs. L. Jeger: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will extend the requisitioning of Montague Gardens, Holborn, due to expire on 31st March, to at least as long as houses backing on to the gardens continue to be requisitioned.

Mr. Deedes: I have invited representatives of the Holborn Borough Council to discuss the provision of children's play-spaces in Holborn, and the release of Montague Street garden. I shall be meeting them tomorrow, and my right hon. Friend must take account of the views they express in reaching a decision.

Mrs. Jeger: Why is it intended to derequisition these gardens?

Mrs. Jeger: Why is it intended to derequisition these gardens?

Mr. Deedes: I do not want to anticipate consideration of this question. I shall have an opportunity of hearing the views of the deputation tomorrow.

Oral Answers to Questions — BANKSIDE POWER STATION (SOOT EMISSION)

Mr. Isaacs: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he is aware of the increase in the nuisance caused by soot and dirt deposits from the Bankside old Power Station in Southwark, which this winter has increased by


approximately 50 per cent. over the corresponding period of the previous 12 months; that the recording instruments used by the Southwark Borough Council show that in the latest recorded month approximately 76 tons of dirt were deposited in one area of roughly a square mile as against57 tons in the corresponding month in the previous year; that observation shows concentration of sulphur dioxide in the air in addition to deposits of sulphur compounds; and, in view of the danger to health and interference with business in Southwark, when he will take action to end this nuisance.

Mr. Sandys: I have seen no evidence to show that the soot emitted from the Bankside old power station has increased in the last 12 months.

Mr. Isaacs: Is the Minister aware that the figures given by the borough council are official figures, recorded by it? Is he also aware that we are suffering a nuisance not only in the winter months but in the summer months, because in July of last year the deposit weighed 62 tons and in July of this year 67 tons? In view of the talk about nuclear energy, cannot we have some new clear atmosphere?

Mr. Sandys: I do not think the figures which the right hon. Gentleman has quoted are related to the soot emitted from this power station but are more general calculations. However, in view of the right hon. Gentleman's Question, I have, in co-operation with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Fuel and Power, arranged for inspectors to view the power station and ascertain exactly the position. They will be doing so within the next week or two.

Mr. Isaacs: I thank the Minister for taking that step. So that he may be fully in possession of all the information which we possess, I shall take an early opportunity of raising the matter on the Adjournment.

Oral Answers to Questions — DEVELOPMENT VALUE (CERTIFICATES)

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government the reason for the delay in obtaining certificates showing the unexpended balance of established development value in terms of Section 48 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1954.

Mr. Deedes: The Central Land Board states that up to 25th February there have been 102 applications for certificates under Section 48 (1) in England and Wales. In 50 cases the certificates have been issued and in 41 cases new apportionments of development value are needed before the certificates can be issued. Section 48 requires the issue of notices of the apportionment to all affected interests and provides a minimum period of two months for objection to the Board and appeal to the Lands Tribunal. There would not appear, therefore, to have been any avoidable delay.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: If I supply my hon. Friend with the particulars, will he look into the case, a perfectly straightforward case, of an application to the district valuer five weeks ago, to which there has been no answer, and in which the prospective purchasers who required the land for urgent purposes have now lost interest in it?

Mr. Deedes: Yes. My hon. Friend will be aware that the Central Land Board has been under very heavy pressure during the last two months because of this Part of the Act. However, I shall be happy to look into any case of which my hon. Friend will let me have particulars.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL SMOKE ABATEMENT SOCIETY

Mr. Noel-Baker: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will arrange for a subsidy of £3,000 per annum to be paid from Government revenues to the Smoke Abatement Society.

Mr. Sandys: Most useful work is being done by the National Smoke Abatement Society, but it does not necessarily follow that a Government subsidy is called for.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Is it not a fact that the Society's work could be very usefully expanded by means of a subsidy of this kind? Since the annual loss to the nation is £300 million a year, and since the Society has achieved very appreciable results in the past, would it not be a very sound investment?

Mr. Sandys: I am not unsympathetic to the right hon. Gentleman's point of view, but there are so many deserving causes to which subsidies could be given.

Mr. Noel-Baker: In view of the urgency of this matter, would it not be a good plan for the Minister to win a victory over the Treasury upon it?

Mr. Hastings: Is not this organisation already receiving large sums from firms which make smokeless fuel?

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that thousands of taxpayers would like to win a victory over the right hon. Gentleman opposite?

Oral Answers to Questions — EMPLOYMENT

Engineering Workers, Midlands (Advice)

Mr. J. Johnson: asked the Minister of Labour in what way his officers in the West Midlands region are advising, under the provisions of the Notification of Vacancies Order, engineering workers who are seeking employment in other engineering factories.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and National Service (Mr. Harold Watkinson): The advice that would be given would depend upon a number of circumstances such as the nature of the work that the applicant had been doing, what he would like to do, his general experience and ability, and the relative importance of vacancies for which he would be suitable.

Mr. Johnson: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for that answer, may I ask whether he is aware that some members of the Coventry Confederation of Employers have, apparently, a tacit agreement not to employ certain engineering workers from the Rugby factories? Would he not agree that it is a bad thing that some workers should not have mobility to change their jobs and thus to better themselves?

Mr. Watkinson: I certainly think that it would be a very bad thing if either employers or trade unions stood in the way of getting the right men into the right jobs in the national interest.

Remploy Factories

Miss Herbison: asked the Minister of Labour how many Remploy factories employ only persons disabled as a result o f tuberculosis; and where they are situated.

Mr. Watkinson: Seven Remploy factories employ only tuberculous persons. These are at Bermondsey, Birmingham, Bristol, Hull, Leeds, Portsmouth and Sheffield.

Miss Herbison: Does the hon. Gentleman not realise that not one of those factories is situated in Scotland; and as the incidence of tuberculosis is much higher in Scotland, and as it is much more difficult to find light work in many places in Scotland, does the hon. Gentleman not think that there is a very big need for one of these factories to be situated there? What steps will he take to ensure that it will be?

Mr. Watkinson: I realise that, and I can tell the hon.Lady that when Remploy is in a position to build some more factories a factory for tuberculous workers in Scotland will have very high priority.

Miss Herbison: When does the hon. Gentleman think that Remploy will be in that position? Is it not the case that if the Government, who have talked so much about the matter, had done some more, Remploy would have been in that position two or three years ago?

Lowestoft

Mr. Edward Evans: asked the Minister of Labour how many persons, men and women, respectively, were on the unemployment register in Lowestoft at the latest convenient date; how many of these are disabled persons; and how the introduction of new industries into the area has affected the position.

Mr. Watkinson: On 14th February last, 542 males and 78 females were registered as unemployed at the Lowestoft employment exchange, and on 21st February, 78 disabled males and eight disabled females were registered as unemployed and fit for employment under ordinary conditions. Unemployment in the area has fallen substantially in recent years, and the establishment of new industries has largely contributed to this. It is estimated that since 1947 about 2,000 additional jobs have been provided in this way.

Mr. Evans: On a point of order. It was quite impossible to hear the Parliamentary Secretary.

Mr. Speaker: There is rather a lot of conversation in the House. I think the hon. Member who asked the Question is entitled to hear the answer.

Mr. Evans: I heard no part of the answer.

Mr. Watkinson: With your leave, Mr. Speaker, I will read it again, although I am afraid it is rather a long answer.

Mr. Evans: Does the Minister regard this figure of over 600 unemployed, with a considerable number of disabled persons almost permanently unemployed, as satisfactory? In view of these figures, does he agree with the assertions which have been made in the area lately that the saturation point in new industries has been reached? Will he do all he can to try to stimulate the employment of disabled persons in that area?

Mr. Watkinson: Yes. We are certainly doing what we can but, looking at comparative figures, I see that unemployment in the area has been halved since 1951.

Bus Workers, Medway Towns

Mr. Bottomley: asked the Minister of Labour what steps he is taking to bring to an end the strike of busmen in the Medway towns.

Mr. Watkinson: I understand that work was resumed on Sunday, 6th March and that negotiations will now take place through the machinery for the settlement of disputes which is available within the industry.

Factory Inspectors (Radioactive Substances)

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Labour how many members of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Factories are specially qualified to deal with the effect of the use of radioactive substances.

Mr. Watkinson: Six officers at headquarters with appropriate qualifications and experience have made a special study of the problem from the medical, scientific and technical angle, and the Chief Inspector of Factories draws freely upon the expert advice of members of the Radiological Advisory Panel, of the Statutory Advisory Committee appointed under the Radioactive Substances Act, 1948, of the Radiological Protection Service of the Medical Research Council

and of the Atomic Energy Authority itself. Instruction has been given to all inspectors in the precautionary methods to be adopted in the use of radioactive substances.

Mr. Willey: While fully appreciating what has been done, in view of the increasing use of radio-active substances in industry and medicine, may I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to see that this training is expanded rapidly so that it matches the increasing use of these substances?

Mr. Watkinson: Yes. I agree with the hon. Gentleman; this is very important, and we will certainly try to do as he suggests.

Accrington

Mr. H. Hynd: asked the Minister of Labour how much short-time working is now taking place in the area of the Accrington employment exchange; and if he will give comparable figures for the same date a year ago.

Mr. Watkinson: I regret that statistics of short-time working in local areas are not available. The number of persons registered as temporarily stopped at the Accrington employment exchange at 14thFebruary, 1955, was nine, compared with 33 at 15th February, 1954. These figures, however, do not include persons who were at work on those dates but were stood off on other days of the week.

Mr. Hynd: Is the Minister aware that the gravity of this situation is being disguised by the fact that firms are keeping workers on, although they do not really need them, in order not to lose them? Will he bear that in mind when considering the general position in that area?

Mr. Watkinson: Yes. That is always an unknown factor but, on the figures, the unemployment position at the moment is better than it was at this time last year.

Asbestos Dust (Lung Cancer)

Mr. Awbery: asked the Minister of Labour if, in view of the high incidence of lung cancer deaths among men employed for over 20 years in conditions exposing them to asbestos dust, he will make a special inquiry into the incidence of this disease among men of long standing in the asbestos industry and in industries using asbestos fibre.

Mr. Watkinson: No, Sir, such an inquiry is not necessary. The information required for preventive purposes has for many years been obtained by my Department by detailed investigations into fatal cases of cancer of the lungs following prolonged exposure to asbestos dust. These investigations are continuing year by year.

Mr. Awbery: Is the Minister aware that a body of doctors recently held an inquiry among the men who have been working in this industry for over 20 years and found, as they stated, 10 times more men suffering from lung cancer in this industry than they had expected? This is a serious position. Will the hon. Gentleman make a special inquiry into the circumstances of men who have been working in this industry for a long time?

Mr. Watkinson: I should be very glad if the hon. Gentleman would let me have that information. We keep the industry very carefully under review because its dangers are well known, and we can at any time, therefore, regard ourselves as being reasonably up to date with our research and with development in the industry.

Mr. Boardman: Can the Minister say whether there is a periodic examination of these men in this dusty industry?

Mr. Watkinson: I think that is so.

Oral Answers to Questions — CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER

Mr. Jay: asked the Prime Minister the co-ordinating functions of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): I have been asked to reply.
No specific field of co-ordination is now assigned to my noble Friend.

Mr. Jay: Is it part of the functions of the Chancellor of the Duchy to consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer before putting up expensive and misleading posters in the country about prosperity and Conservative freedom and so forth? [HON MEMBERS: "Answer."] Is it?

Mr. H. Morrison: It is well known that the direct functions of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster have some importance but that they are limited, and

clearly are not those of a full-time post. The right hon. Gentleman has said that the Chancellor of the Duchy has no co-ordinating function. Then what, may I ask, is he doing for his salary? Are we to understand that his salary is being paid to him for doing nothing other than the work of Chairman of the Conservative Party organisation? If that is so, is that a proper use of public funds?

Mr. Crookshank: I think that the right hon. Gentleman would be well advised to read the remarks of the Leader of the Opposition in the debate on 6th May, 1952, when he dealt with the question of disclosing to Parliament the work which senior Ministers do. I dare say that the functions undertaken by my noble Friend are somewhat similar—for all I know—to those undertaken by the right hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) when he held the same position, and when no replies were given to similar Questions which were then addressed.

Mr. Dalton: But does the right hon. Gentleman recall that I was not at that time performing, nor was it ever suggested that I was, any function on behalf of the party machine? That appears to be all that the present occupant is now doing—for the Tory Party machine.

Mr. Crookshank: I must suggest that, perhaps, the right hon. Gentleman also would like to read the Report of the debate to which I have referred his right hon. Friend.

Mr. Jay: Why is the Lord Privy Seal so suspiciously coy on this matter? Can he confirm or deny that the Chancellor of the Duchy is responsible for those misleading posters?

Mr. Crookshank: I was only answering the Question on the Paper dealing with the official duties of my noble Friend.

Mr. H. Morrison: The right hon. Gentleman has said, in effect, that the Chancellor of the Duchy is doing nothing—he has no co-ordinating functions. It is well known that the duties of the post of the Chancellor of the Duchy do not take up a great deal of time. Is not the answer that the Chancellor of the Duchy is utterly unemployed, except for his work for the party machine? I want to know, with my right hon. Friend, how


long it has been that the State, the taxpayer, the citizen, has had to pay out of public funds for the maintenance of the Conservative Party organisation.

Mr. Crookshank: The right hon. Gentleman is trying to play a very pretty game of party politics, but apparently he did not hear the original reply, which was to the effect that no specific field of co-ordination is now assigned to my noble Friend. That is the situation.

Mr. Jay: On a point of order. Owing to the frivolous and malicious refusal—

Hon. Members: Oh.

Mr. Speaker: Order.I did not hear what the right hon. Gentleman said.

Mr. Jay: Owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter at the earliest opportunity.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL SERVICE

Immigrants

Mr. Burden: asked the Minister of Labour if he will introduce the legislation necessary to ensure that all immigrants ordinarily resident in this country, and who are not nationals of or resident in any other country, shall be made subject to the provisions of the National Service Act

Mr. Watkinson: No, Sir. I think we should create more difficulties than it is worth while if we attempted in peace-time to call-up compulsorily men who are not British subjects.

Mr. Burden: Is my hon. Friend aware that a Bill has recently been passed through the House in order to close the gaps through which British citizens have been evading call-up? Does he not think it scandalous that young men who come to live here, who have no other country, who enjoy the full benefits of all our services, including education, and who certainly will become British citizens when they are no longer liable to call-up, are not doing their duty in the same way as British citizens do theirs?

Mr. Watkinson: I can see the difficulties of the special type of case which my hon. Friend has raised and I will undertake to look at it again, but I cannot promise him that we can find a way of dealing with it.

Agricultural Workers (Suspension of Call-Up)

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: asked the Minister of Labour whether, in view of the difficulties caused to farmers by bad weather in the last months of 1954 and in February, 1955, he will arrange for the suspension of call-up of agricultural workers in order to help farmers catch up the arrears of work.

Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir. In consultation with my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, I have agreed to suspend until 14th May the call-up of agricultural workers after the Army intake next Thursday and the Royal Air Force intake next week.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: Is my hon. Friend aware that this decision will be very welcome in all parts, and will be of great assistance to the agricultural community generally?

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that although this limited concession will be of value, the only way of stopping the constant drift from the land which has been going on ever since October, 1951, is to suspend the call-up of agricultural workers altogether?

Mr. Watkinson: This was not to stop the drift from the land. It was to try to help hard-pressed farmers to get their work up to date in difficult weather conditions.

Oral Answers to Questions — SCOTLAND

Health Visitors

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that the Deputy Chief Medical Officer of Health for Scotland has officially assessed the minimum requirement of health visitors at one for every 2,500 of the population; and in how many, and which Scottish areas, the number of health visitors falls short of that minimum, and by how much.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. James Stuart): No, Sir. This assessment related to the theoretical requirements for all services operated from a comprehensive health centre. Few areas are staffed on that scale, the average population per health visitor in Scotland being just over 4,000.

Mr. Hughes: Does the Secretary of State realise that it is essential to increase the number of health visitors in Scotland for the purpose, amongst others, of relieving pressure on the hospitals? What steps is he taking in that direction?

Mr. Stuart: The number of health visitors has risen from 1,000 in 1946 to 1,225 in 1954. The necessity for them, or their importance, varies in different areas, and I do not think we get a proper picture if we take an average figure.

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that health visitors are required to possess two more obligatory qualifications than hospital sisters but receive less remuneration than hospital sisters; and what steps he is taking to improve the salaries, pensions, and conditions of service, of health visitors.

Mr. J. Stuart: Yes, Sir, but the salaries and conditions of service of health visitors are determined by the Nurses and Mid-wives Whitley Council. Health visitors' salaries are being considered by the Council in the light of a recent award of the Industrial Court for increased salaries for hospital nurses.

Mr. Hughes: Are the people concerned likely to know what the result of that consideration will be?

Mr. Stuart: I am afraid that I cannot give an exact, precise date or answer. The matter is being investigated. The Minister of Health replied to the hon. and learned Member on 21st February on this subject. I should like to quote another reply of a man perhaps greater than myself. He said, "There will be an interval of time but there will be no delay."

Mr. Steele: In view of the return to the House of the right hon. Gentleman—whom we are all very pleased to see again—could he give us the name of his health visitor?

Mr. Stuart: It depends whether I am in Scotland or in London. For some part of the time I was in my constituency, in spite of some Press reports which said I was not in Scotland or in London.

Slaughterhouses (Report)

Major Anstruther-Gray: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he has now considered the Report of the

inter-Departmental Committee on Slaughterhouses, Scotland; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. J. Stuart: I have asked the associations of local authorities for their views on the Report, and it will be necessary to have discussions with them and the other interests concerned before any decisions can be taken.

Housing (Regular Ex-Service Men)

Mr. N. Macpherson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what guidance was given to local authorities in 1950 and 1952 regarding the housing of Regular Service men with families on their release from the Forces; and the nature and extent of the inquiries he made recently on this matter.

Mr. J. Stuart: A circular issued in 1950 recommended that in the letting of local authority houses, a Service man should be treated as having been resident in the district throughout his period of service. A further circular, of March, 1952, suggested that no application from a Service man or his family should be refused on residential grounds, and asked authorities to make arrangements accordingly.
A sample inquiry made in June, 1954, showed that of 59 local authorities, the majority either gave special consideration in varying degrees to Service men or had no Service applications. In addition my Department, by special arrangement with Scottish Command, takes up with the local authorities concerned any cases of difficulty.

Mr. Macpherson: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that answer, may I ask whether he is aware that there is a wide disparity in treatment by local authorities, and that quite often there are no ex-Service applications on his list at a given time? Since this is a matter of national rather than local importance, does my right hon. Friend not consider that it is vital for him to give clear guidance to local authorities in the matter?

Mr. Stuart: I can say for once with a clear conscience—[Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."] It is very comforting to have a clear conscience. I know that my predecessor had issued a circular, but


owing to representations which were made to me personally in my constituency from the regimental depot of the Seaforth Highlanders, I took up this matter personally and issued a circular in March, 1952. I think the position is perfectly clear to local authorities, and I do not think that there are grave difficulties. If there are any cases of difficulty, I shall be very glad to do my best in the matter.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE, SCOTLAND

Sheep Stealing

Major Anstruther-Gray: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the number of cases of sheep stealing reported during the past year; in how many cases proceedings were taken; and in how many a conviction resulted.

Mr. J. Stuart: I am obtaining the information asked for and will send it to my hon. and gallant Friend as soon as possible.

Clynelish Farm, Brora (Production Grant)

Sir D. Robertson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that the holding of Clynelish, Brora, Sutherland, was graded as marginal under the Marginal Agricultural Production Scheme for the cropping year 1954, and was excluded from the benefits of the scheme in 1955 without notice and after the tenant had purchased lime, manures and seeds; and, in view of the fact that every other holding in the district continues to qualify for the grant, why Clynelish has been excluded from grant.

Mr. J. Stuart: It was possible for the Northern Agricultural Executive Committee, when making its offers of assistance in 1953 and 1954, to raise its rates of grant and to extend the scope of eligibility under the Marginal Agricultural Production Scheme to include a number of additional farms of which Clynelish, Brora, Sutherland, was one. Unfortunately the response to offers was such that the funds available would not permit the extended scope of the scheme to be maintained in 1955. The Committee has felt it necessary, therefore, to restrict eligibility again, and Clynelish farm is one of those that have been excluded. I understand on inquiry that

the tenant was informed of his exclusion when he telephoned the Committee's office in December last.

Sir D. Robertson: In view of the fact that agriculture is a long-term job, was it not wholly wrong that a subsidy was taken from this farmer without notice after he had incurred a considerable amount of expenditure on lime, manures and seeds? Would it not be fair to repay him the amount of money he is out of pocket?

Mr. Stuart: If my hon. Friend would care to write to me on that point, I shall be glad to give him an answer. In the whole country there are 21 farms which have been removed from the Committee's marginal list. The agricultural executive committee did get an increase of funds for this scheme in 1953 and, as a result, increased its rates of assistance for 1954.I regret that owing to the increased number of applications it has not been able to cover the whole list.

Storms, North of Scotland (Sheep Losses)

Mr. Grimond: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has any further statement to make on sheep losses during the recent storms in the north of Scotland; and if he will institute some immediate scheme for assistance over fodder and losses.

Mr. J. Stuart: It is still too soon to make any final assessment of sheep losses in the north of Scotland, but early reports based on a large and well spread sample indicate that actual percentages lost are small. I realise of course, that some farmers, and particularly some small farmers, may have experienced disproportionately heavy losses. Where early replacement is practicable, it is open to farmers in this position to apply to the Department of Agriculture for Scotland for loans under the Livestock Replacement Scheme. The general position is being further examined.

Mr. Grimond: Whilst agreeing with the Secretary of State that final information is not yet to hand, may I ask if he is aware that my information is that in some parts of Shetland losses are heavy? Will he consider taking urgent action to save sheep which are still alive? He could,


for instance, issue coupons for food or give grants to farmers, as there is great need of assistance with fodder.

Mr. Stuart: I can assure the hon. Member that throughout it has been our desire to save all the sheep we could, and certainly those which are still alive. I have always feared, and am most afraid, that the serious damage will be to the number of lambs that are thrown.

Land Drainage (Legislation)

Mr. N. Macpherson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the points of disagreement that are holding up the preparation of legislation for land drainage in Scotland.

Mr. J. Stuart: The difficulties which stand in the way of devising legislation to deal comprehensively with agricultural drainage in Scotland are financial. They relate to the meeting of that part of the capital cost not met by Government grant and to the meeting of subsequent maintenance costs. In view of these difficulties, recent discussions with the agricultural interests concerned have been concentrated on the possibility of a useful measure dealing with the problem in a less comprehensive way. These discussions are proceeding.

Mr. Macpherson: Can my right hon. Friend give any indication of how long these discussions are likely to require, and whether legislation will be brought in at the earliest possible moment?

Mr. Stuart: I am afraid that, like the right hon. Member who occupied my present office before me, I must say that it will take some time.I do not wish there to be delay but there may be an interval of time.

Mr. Manuel: Is the Secretary of State aware that these discussions with the National Farmers' Union and other interests in Scotland have been going on for many years? Is he aware that vast quantities of agricultural produce are being lost annually? Is he further aware that many schemes are ready, and that local authorities are prepared to start them and to go forward with urgent drainage work? Could he not give some

promise that he will tell them what is actually holding up agreement?

Mr. Stuart: I have just replied to that question in the original answer—

Mr. Manuel: No, the right hon. Gentleman has not.

Mr. Stuart: Yes, I have. In case the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel) did not listen to my original answer, I should say that, strange to say, the difficulties are concerned with finance and who is to pay for the beastly business.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the experience of the past—that limited schemes often lead to greater trouble than if there were no scheme and, therefore, the thing should be done from start to finish if money is not to be wasted?

Mr. Stuart: I agree. We want a comprehensive scheme and the Government are prepared to contribute. The difficulty—not for the first time—is to get people to contribute a share.

Mr. Ross: Does the answer of the right hon. Gentleman mean that he has given up all hope of getting a comprehensive scheme?

Mr. Stuart: No, Sir, General Election or no General Election, it does not mean that. It is very important to get a scheme, and therefore we are considering a more limited scheme.

Mr. John MacLeod: Would my right hon. Friend say what is the percentage of grant being offered to local authorities at present that is holding up this scheme?

Mr. Stuart: Perhaps my hon. Friend would ask me that question another day.

Mr. Rankin: Can the Secretary of State tell us if the Treasury is forcing a more limited scheme on him?

Mr. Stuart: We are all anxious to get a scheme agreed. In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Ross and Cromarty (Mr.John MacLeod), I apologise for my failure to answer just now. The Treasury contribution is 50 per cent.

MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND FORMOSA STRAITS

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Anthony Eden): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a statement on my recent journey.
A journey of 16,000 miles in 16 days, including a conference of three days' duration, and important discussions in several capitals can clearly not be surveyed in a brief statement to this House. It may therefore be convenient if I compress the account of my voyaging and deal with it under three main headings: the Middle East, South-East Asia and the Formosa Straits.
I found in the Middle East a general acceptance of the need to organise a safe shield of defence to protect the area from aggression from without. There is also a recognition that the security and prosperity of the area cannot be fully realised so long as the present disruptive relations persist between the Arab States and Israel, now unhappily aggravated by further recent incidents. Thirdly, all the States I visited, Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq and the Lebanon, were anxious to be able to pursue the plans for economic development on which they have embarked. Her Majesty's Government are in sympathy with all these aims and are ready to help in so far as they can to realise them.
While in Bagdad I discussed with the Prime Minister of Iraq the questions which would arise if Her Majesty's Government were to accede to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. I hope before long to give the House further information on this subject. Our aim is to forge a new association with Iraq which will bring our relations into line with those which already exist with Turkey and our other partners in N.A.T.O. New weapons and changed political conditions should be reflected in a fresh approach to our joint arrangements for resisting external aggression in this area. Our common needs can now best be provided for in different and more up-to-date ways than those which were embodied in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty more than twenty years ago.
The first meeting of the Council of the Manila Treaty of the countries of South-East Asia was held in Bangkok from

23rd to 25th February. I told the House, when we discussed the Treaty on 8th November, that this first meeting would be chiefly concerned with setting in hand the arrangements for military and other planning for the defence of the Treaty area. So it was. But it was none the less important for being concerned mainly with questions of organisation.
Our decisions have been set out in the full communiqué published by the Council, which I have arranged to make available to the House. Permanent representatives are being appointed to maintain consultation when the Council is not in session, and they will be assisted by a small permanent secretariat in Bangkok. Military advisers will be attached to the Council. These have already held their first meeting and have made the necessary arrangements for their further work. Their duty will be to plan how the resources available for the common defence of the area can be used to the best advantage should the need arise. There are also to be early meetings of experts to discuss economic questions and measures for meeting the danger of subversion.
Full use will be made of existing agencies such as the Colombo Plan, the importance of which is increasing steadily. For this reason we decided that it was not necessary to set up any permanent economic organisation within the Manila Treaty.
Another example of the work now going on is the excellent co-operation which has been established between the police authorities in Malaya and in Siam to deal with problems created by Communist terrorists on either side of the common frontier.
To sum up, the Bangkok Conference worked out an acceptable programme for defence policies and economic problems between the countries who are member States; it also did nothing to hinder the subsequent association of other countries in this area. However this may develop I have confidence that we shall see steadily improving relations between all the free countries in this part of the world whether members of S.E.A.T.O. or not. And that is the result we want to see.
But we recognise that this work of regional co-operation represents only one means of strengthening peace and stability in South-East Asia.
Another essential contribution to the same end was the agreement concluded at Geneva last summer which ended the fighting in Indo-China and established the independence of the three Associated States. The Governments represented at the Bangkok Conference reaffirmed their determination to support these States in maintaining their freedom and independence.
When I went on to Singapore after the Bangkok meeting, I discussed the situation in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia with Her Majesty's Representatives in those States. This formed part of a wider meeting with the Commissioner General in South-East Asia and our civil and military representatives throughout that region. This discussion was most valuable to me.
My visits to South-East Asia have brought home to me how closely the countries of the area cherish their independence. Each country wants to develop in its own way, and their own ways may differ widely. They want to shape their own destinies with the minimum of outside interference and pressure. Democracy in these countries will grow stronger as they gain confidence from its practice and example.
From Singapore I flew to Malaya and spent a memorable day, with the help of helicopters, in seeing the work of our Commonwealth Forces. The spirit in which these men are facing their daily ordeal of foul discomfort and danger is beyond praise. [HON MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] The success they have won is a splendid tribute to their leadership and to them.
While I was at Bangkok, I had separate and helpful discussions with Mr. Dulles about the situation in Formosa and the coastal islands. I also maintained, during my journey, the contacts which had been established with Moscow and Peking and which are still continuing.
In the light of these exchanges, I again considered, on the subject of Formosa, whether any further progress could be made through a conference or other discussions. I had valuable conversations about this on my way home with the Prime Minister of Burma and with Mr. Nehru, who received me with the utmost kindness as the first British Foreign Secretary to visit the Indian capital.
After these talks and on the basis of the information about the attitude of the Chinese Government which reached me from Peking, I came reluctantly to the conclusion that the necessary conditions for progress do not yet exist. We are, however, going on working to try to bring them about and meanwhile to prevent incidents and further fighting.
We cannot, of course, impose our views upon the parties most directly concerned, nor decide for them where their own true interests lie. Nor can the many different aspects of this tangled problem be settled all at once. But the House will wish to know—and I think is entitled to know—what is the position of Her Majesty's Government in this situation and what, in their view, are the lines along which progress is to be sought. Its main elements seem to me to be these:
The United States Government have already given positive proofs of their desire to relax tension and reduce the risks of war. I am convinced—I say this with all the conviction in my power—that they wish to see conditions created which would put an end to active military hostilities in the area and reduce the dangers of a wider conflict. In their Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek they have explicitly limited their own formal commitments to the defence of Formosa and the Pescadores. They have effectively restrained the Chinese Nationalists in recent weeks from initiating attacks against the Chinese mainland. They have persuaded the Nationalists to evacuate the Tachen and Nanchi islands.
The Chinese People's Government for their part have refrained from attacking Quemoy and the Matsus. Her Majesty's Government trust that they will continue to exercise this restraint and that they will make it apparent that while maintaining intact in all respects their position in regard to Formosa and the Pescadores they will not prosecute their claims by forceful means.
It is equally desirable that the Chinese Nationalists for their part should also do two things. We would like to see them withdraw their armed forces from the other coastal islands. We would also hope that they would let it be known that they too, while maintaining their claims, will not prosecute them by forceful means and will abstain from all offensive military action.
I suggest to the House that if these objectives could be realised, consideration could then be given internationally at an appropriate moment to the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations and to the future status of Formosa.
Any attempt—and I know it only too well—to make progress along these lines clearly raises grave problems of timing, of presentation and of policy. But there is no problem, however intractable, which with time and patience cannot be made less so. And if the attempt is not made in the case of Formosa and the coastal islands, the consequences may be grave indeed. That is my justification for giving to this House this outline of the main elements of the problem as they appear to Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. H. Morrison: The House will be glad to seethe Foreign Secretary back in his native land after very extensive travels, and we thank him for the comprehensive statement which he has been good enough to make. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman as regards the relationship between the Arab States and Israel—and we are all anxious about recent events—whether anything has been done or anything can be done to end the fundamental difficulty, which is the state of war persisting, at the behest of the Arab States, for five or six years between the Arab States and Israel. I should like to ask whether anything can be done to bring that to an end.
We are obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for what he said about the South-East Asia situation. We fully agree that the. economic activities in South-East Asia, particularly in developing the Colombo Plan, in which we had a hand at the beginning, are a matter of very great importance. We would also join with the Foreign Secretary in paying our tribute to the bravery and courage of the men in Malaya who are struggling under very great difficulties for the restoration of law and order.
We are appreciative of what the Foreign Secretary said about Formosa. It appears to be now established that the policy of Her Majesty's Government is that it would be well for the Nationalist Chinese forces to withdraw from the coastal islands. The coastal islands are one question and Formosa is another question. In principle we agree with that,

and that there should be an abstention from military action.
I do not want to embarrass the right hon. Gentleman, but I wonder if he could say anything about whether the United States Government in principle accept the view which he has expressed. One would hope that that might be so, but we agree with the general view which the right hon. Gentleman has taken that the sooner the Nationalists are out of the islands by the mainland and the issue is confined to Formosa, the better it will be.
The right hon. Gentleman's statement has only just been made. It may be that there will be further Parliamentary questions and that the statement will need further study but, broadly speaking, we are obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for his statement.

Sir A. Eden: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman and I should like to try to reply to the main question, the one concerning Israel and the Arab States. I think that the House knows that we have been making efforts to try to improve the situation there and that there had been in fact a certain improvement over the last month, which had been acknowledged by both sides, when this most unhappy Gaza incident occurred which, I am afraid, will have aroused passions again and set back the work which we wanted to do. I can see nothing that can be achieved at the moment in that sphere except that it should be handled by the Security Council, and I should hope that in so doing the Council will handle it on the broadest basis, dealing not only with the immediate issues but with the wider issues as well.
As to what I said about Formosa, and as to the position of the United States, what I have done in my statement, of course, is to do what I thought the House would consider it my duty to do, that is, to set out the position of Her Majesty's Government. What I have said commits absolutely nobody except Her Majesty's Government. I would add only this in reply to the right hon. Gentleman. If there really were an indication of a willingness to refrain from the use of force, I think that then the chance of a situation resulting such as the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) has in mind in respect of the offshore islands would be enormously


increased. Shall I put it like that? The difficulty for our American friends, I think it is fair to say, is that if any form of withdrawal is regarded as a stepping stone to a further attack, then clearly the position for them is very difficult. I think I should repeat that any indication that, in prosecuting claims, force will not be used would, I believe, reduce the tension at once and perhaps enable us to make headway.

Mr. A. Henderson: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether he and Mr. Nehru found themselves in their talks in broad agreement on Far Eastern problems?

Sir A. Eden: I think one half of that answer should be given by the Prime Minister of India and not by me, but what I have said here about the talks, I repeat, commits nobody else. My statement is made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government and will not even commit any Commonwealth Government. I found our conversations in India very helpful, as my statement indicates. I ought to say that the welcome to me as a Member of Parliament which I received in Delhi from the Parliament there was very warm and friendly indeed.

Mr. Nicholson: May I say that we on this side of the House are glad to see my right hon. Friend back looking so well? I should like to ask him to clarify the position a little in regard to the Indo-China Succession States. I think he was a little vague about that. Perhaps he may not wish to be more precise, but if he could clarify the position I should be grateful.

Sir A. Eden: I considered that, but my statement was already long and the difficulty in doing it was that no common sentence applied to all three States. The situation is different in each one, but if my hon. Friend will be good enough to put down a Question, I will gladly give him full information on each of them. I think that is perhaps the best way to handle it.

Mr. Grimond: After his conversations with the Arab States, did the right hon. Gentleman form the opinion that, if there were a period of comparative peace on the frontier, there was any chance of resettling the Arab refugees?

Sir A. Eden: I do not know that I could answer that helpfully with things as they are at the present moment. The truth would be that what we were working for was some period without incident on the frontier from which we might move to a more comprehensive settlement. I do not myself see how we could settle the refugee problem without settling some other matters, too.

Major Legge-Bourke: In view of the fact that the United Kingdom, together with France and the United States, has guaranteed the frontiers of Israel, and in view of the fact that the Mixed Armistice Commission has condemned Israel, would my right hon. Friend consult the other guarantors to see whether something cannot be done jointly to restrict Israel from repeating her performance?

Sir A. Eden: The matter is before the Security Council and, as my hon. and gallant Friend knows, our guarantees are not unilateral. They extend both ways. Therefore, I think it would not be wise to add to what I have said.

Mrs. Castle: Can the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that, contrary to the report of Mr. James Reston in the "New York Times," the Foreign Secretary did press on Mr. Dulles the need to evacuate Quemoy and the Matsus as the United States' contribution towards a Far Eastern settlement, and can he say whether the report in the "New York Times" that the United States is refusing even to consider this is wrong or not?

Sir A. Eden: I think I must stand on the statement I have made, which is on the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. I do not think I can be asked to confirm or deny newspaper reports, especially in newspapers not even published in this country.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the Egyptian Government joined in the general acceptance of the need to organise a defence shield in the Middle East, and can he say anything of the Egyptian Government's treaty with Syria which appears to be a compact against joining the Iraqi-Turkish alliance?

Sir A. Eden: If my hon. Friend reads my answer, he will find the first part of his supplementary question answered there.

Mr. T. Reid: Would it not strengthen the position, security and safety of every South-East Asian country if India abandoned her policy of neutrality and joined with the other States of South-East Asia? Has the right hon. Gentleman had any success in that direction?

Sir A. Eden: We can all express all sorts of opinions about the policies of other countries, and naturally there is nothing that we want to see more than a wider membership of S.E.A.T.O.As I made plain, I do not think everybody will agree with us any more than any other country will entirely accept the proposals I have just made to the House. No one will accept them in their entirety, but that does not mean to say that they are not right all the same.

Sir T. Moore: Despite the modesty of the statement, will my right hon. Friend accept that we on this side of the House greatly admire him for the tact, skill and patience with which he is dealing with what he himself has called these tangled international problems?

Mr. Younger: While accepting what the Foreign Secretary said about its being a great contribution to a settlement in the Far East if the Chinese Communists would agree not to prosecute their claims to Formosa by force, would the Foreign Secretary not agree that the corollary to that is that they must receive some indication that if they prosecute their claim by negotiation the doors will not be wholly closed? Can he say whether there is any such hope which he can, in fact, offer to them?

Sir A. Eden: The right hon. Gentleman is very experienced in these matters. He asked a question which it is very reasonable to ask, but to answer it beyond the terms of my reply would not be wise or helpful at the present time.

Mr. Doughty: Can my right hon. Friend assure us that our friendship, cooperation and consultation with the United States remains as strong as ever?

Sir A. Eden: Yes, Sir, I could say "normal," as somebody else said on a similar occasion.

Mr. Follick: While congratulating the Foreign Secretary on his statement, may I ask him whether any of the discussion referred to Korea?

Sir A. Eden: Korea was mentioned but not at the Conference. It was outside the scope of the Conference.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Fenner Brockway: On a point of order. May I draw your attention, Mr.Speaker, to the fact that I have on the Order Paper Question No. 109 asking the right hon. Gentleman to make a statement on the Bangkok Conference, and would it, therefore, be in order for me to ask a supplementary Question.

Mr. Speaker: The statement was not made in answer to that Question, so I do not think the hon. Gentleman has any particular right. If he has a question to ask, I am sure the Foreign Secretary would be glad to answer it.

Mr. Brockway: While appreciating what the right hon. Gentleman has said about the coastal islands, can he assure the House that the survey of defence made at the Bangkok Conference would not involve this country inextricably in any developments in that area with which we do not agree?

Sir A. Eden: The Bangkok Conference did not cover the area of Formosa. That island is outside the area of the Conference.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. Crookshank.]

TREASON

Mr. Philip Bell: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide that persons who give aid and comfort or adhere to the enemies of the United Nations shall, if the armed forces of the Queen are operating with the United Nations, be deemed guity of treason.
Many hon. Members may think that in the light of the Questions yesterday this Bill is at least topical. I am inspired to introduce it by two reasons. First, like nearly all hon. Members of the House, I have been profoundly shocked and disturbed by the Ministry of Defence pamphlet dealing with the treatment of British prisoners in Korea. Secondly, I believe that there is considerable doubt, expressed by some not inconsiderable people, that the existing Treason Act does not apply to the events which are set out, in particular, in chapter VI of that Ministry of Defence pamphlet. I shall ask the co-operation of the House in due course to make it clear that aiding and comforting enemies of the United Nations, and doing the acts set out in chapter VI, should without any doubt be deemed to constitute aiding and comforting within the Treason Act.
The existing Treason Act, passed in the reign of Edward III, has served us well and it has not been necessary to amend it for many years. Of course, it has been used in very different circumstances, where all wars were national wars. There is grave doubt whether it is really applicable to wars which have the unhappy title of ideological wars.
This Act was used in the famous trial of Rex v. Lynch in the Boer War. It was used, unamended, in the case against Casement. It was used in the last war in the indictment against Joyce. But in none of those trials was the court concerned in considering whether propaganda aimed at tortured and "brain-washed" prisoners, and used on their relatives, in fact constituted treason.
If I may, I will give a short extract from the Treason Act, which is written in Norman French. I hope hon. Members will not think I am insulting them if I translate it. The relevant part of the Statute reads:

Or if a man do levy war against our lord the King in his realm or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm giving to them aid and comfort in his realm or elsewhere.
Such, then, are the acts which constitute treason. That definition raises two questions. The first is: Do the enemies of the United Nations, such as North Korea—which was not recognised de facto or de jure—constitute within that Treason Act enemies of the Queen? The second question is: Do the acts alleged in chapter VI of the Ministry of Defence pamphlet constitute aiding and comforting the Queen's enemies?
Let us take, first of all, the first point, whether enemies of the United Nations can be treated as enemies of the Crown. A number of text writers—Archbold, Kenney, Halsbury, for example—say that the enemies must be subjects of the State; in other words, pirates and rebels are not enemies for the purposes of the Treason Act. Therefore, can forces fighting for the North Korean organisation properly be described as enemies of the Queen?
Like many other hon. Members, two years ago, when we first heard of what was going on, I raised the matter with the Foreign Office. The reply I received was that the matter was very doubtful. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, Central (Mr. Bishop) raised the matter in this House on 1st December, 1952.He was told by the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Government were investigating what powers, if any, they had to deal with the complaint which my hon. Friend had brought forward.
It was a complaint about the activities of Mrs. Felton. As he told me, the complaint was that Mrs. Felton delivered a letter to a wife who said it was not anything like the sort of thing her husband wrote. Mrs. Felton asked this wife if she could use that bogus letter on platforms to show how happy and contented our prisoners were in Korea.
My hon. Friend was told, when he asked if any steps could be taken, that the Government were investigating what powers, if any, the Government had to stop it. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Totnes (Brigadier Rayner) pressed the Home Secretary in December, 1952, as to whether he would institute a system of permits for persons who wished


to go to Korea. He was told by the then Home Secretary that he had not got the power to control even by permits persons who went there.
As I saw from yesterday's OFFICIAL REPORT, many learned counsel have expressed varying opinions as to whether the acts set out in the Ministry of Defence paper, if they are proved, would constitute treason within the Treason Act. There is an old saying, when doctors disagree, who is to decide? When lawyers disagree, it might well be that this House of Commons might decide, and might collaborate to try to make this branch of our law clear.
The second point concerns the words "aid and comfort." I was surprised to hear my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General say that the activities of Mrs. Felton and Mr. Gaster, which are referred to in the last two paragraphs of chapter VI, did not in his view constitute treason—assuming that the Treason Act applied at all. Whether that is so or not, it is true that, according to the directions given by the Judge in Rex v. Lynch, acts which constitute aiding and comforting must either strengthen the conduct of the war or weaken the power to resist or attack. They may therefore only be acts relating directly to the conduct of operations.
It might, therefore, be a matter of doubt whether lying propaganda given to ill-treated, "brain-washed" prisoners, and exploded on their relatives in England, relate strictly to the carrying on of war, but unhappily in these days, we live in an age where we must face total war. Now the area of battle, the area of aiding and comforting, is not confined to the troops directly engaged but is extended to their relatives and to their friends and to the country. And on that point also I am asking the House to co-operate in making it clear that the conduct of persons, as set out in chapter VI, if it be proved, should be deemed without any doubt aiding and comforting.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Trying them in advance.

Mr. Bell: I said, if it be proved. There are three things which I undertake to the House I will not suggest about this Bill. First, it will not be retrospective. I do not think that we can properly engage in making important treason laws apply to previous acts. We cannot, indeed, restore

the health of prisoners or remove the disquiet of their relatives; but I believe that we can, and we should, take such steps as are within our power to prevent the future degradation of our helpless prisoners and of their relatives.
The second thing I will not do is suggest that this Bill should stop legitimate criticism of whether a war should be carried on or not. We have good precedents. Not 200 yards from where we are, famous Charles Fox thundered against the Napoleonic War, though what we got was the peace of Amiens. Mr. Bright toured the country at the time of the Crimean War. Within living memory, Mr. Lloyd George raised his powerful voice against the Boer War. I do not suggest that in this free country we should stop that.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Thank you very much.

Mr. Bell: The third thing, for which I am sure some hon. Gentleman will be grateful, is that it is not proposed to stop free trips and banquets with incorruptible fly-swatters when there is only a cold war on.

Mr. Hughes: Who is the hon. and learned Member attacking—the Leader of the Opposition?

Mr. Bell: Visits to such countries will continue to be a matter of taste. I propose to leave it at that.
Our duty is to the men who suffered, endured and triumphed, to Fusilier Kinne, to the memory of Lieutenant Waters, and to Captain Gibbon, about whom hon. Members can read in the White Paper. Many hon. Members may agree with me that when it comes to decency and justice, Tommy Atkins is not a bad judge.

Mr. Ellis Smith: The hon. and learned Member is a bad judge.

Mr. Bell: Tommy Atkins may not be a lawyer, but, if the hon. Member can control himself for a moment—

Mr. Ellis Smith: He will control himself.

Mr. Bell: —I will read him a passage from chapter VI of the Ministry of


Defence pamphlet which, in a reference to Mr. Winnington, says:
His main rôle in the North Korean camps was that of visiting propagandist. The fact that he once referred to captured officers as a lot of bloody Fascists may have accounted for the fact that he never visited the officers' and sergeants' camps. He did, however, go to Camps 1 and 5 on a number of occasions, where he had personal talks with selected prisoners and gave lectures-on such subjects as the Korean Peace talks, the aims of the world peace conferences, and the 'appalling conditions' in the United States and Britain. At Camp 5 (the 'Progressives' Camp') he appeared to be fairly welcome; at Camp 1, on the other hand, his lectures were often greeted with shouts of 'You'll hang,' and so on.
How many hon. Members can charge their conscience and say that if they were captured prisoners in those conditions they would have had the courage so to rebuke what the ordinary Tommy describes and recognises as traitors?
I have hopes that the House will welcome the Bill as an opportunity to investigate, and to see if it is necessary to amend or strengthen, the law of treason in modern conditions. I notice that when my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Totnes raised with the Home Secretary his modest proposal for introducing legislation to deal with permits, he was met with the observation from the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) that any legislation giving such powers would be most fiercely resisted. I am asking the House to collaborate in a good deal more than the system of permits. I am ready for the "fierce resistance." It is for hon. Members now to decide.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I rise to oppose the Motion that leave be given to bring in the Bill. I hope to persuade the hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell), who has made a most restrained and moderate speech in support of his Bill, that he ought to withdraw it.
The first point that I would make to him is that what he is proposing to do is to amend the law of treason of this country. I suggest to him that if the criminal law is in need of amendment, one can think of no more undesirable procedure than the procedure which he has adopted. If it needs amendment, the criminal law ought to be amended on the initiative of the Government of the day and not on the initiative of a Private Member under the Ten-Minute Rule—

[HON MEMBERS: "Why not?"]—I am about to say why not, but I cannot say it all at once—in circumstances which give him little hope of pursuing the matter even if he is successful on this occasion. I should say that that is especially true where the criminal law which he is seeking to amend in this way carries only one penalty, and that is the supreme penalty.

Mr. Philip Bell: I could alter the penalty in Committee.

Mr. Silverman: The House can deal today only with the Bill which the hon. and learned Member has sought leave to introduce. Therefore, my point is a valid one, and I am sure the hon. and learned Member will appreciate its importance. If he were in Committee to alter the penalty, he would find himself, as I am sure he realises, in a very complicated field indeed and would produce a totally different Bill from the one that he has in mind.
The second point I would make to him—I think he will agree with me about this, in view of what he said towards the end of his speech about what he did not intend to do—is that patriotism does not require that a citizen shall think that his country is always right. [HON MEMBERS: "The hon. and learned Member said nothing of the kind."] No, I am saying it, and I am inviting the House to agree with me on it. I gather than the hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East agrees. I should think that nobody in the House would like to see the present Home Secretary bringing in a Bill to amend the law so as to declare some of the most honourable political activities of his distinguished father now to be treasonable.
It is all very well for the hon. and learned Member to say that he recognises the right of legitimate criticism or the right, or duty, of a patriotic citizen sometimes to tell his country that it is wrong, but he will remember that in the days of the Boer War when the late Mr. Lloyd George was making his speeches he was making exactly the kind of speeches which the hon. and learned Member described, speeches intended to weaken the war effort in support of a war which he believed to be wrong. Whatever one may have thought in the early 1900s about that matter, I should have thought that there was not one hon. Member who


does not applaud the late Mr. Lloyd George today for what he did in those days. One must remember that in those days what made the difference when one analysed it boiled down to a fundamental difference of political opinion, and that is so with many of the things which were attacked in the hon. and learned Member's speech, though not all of them, I admit.
My next point is that the Bill as proposed by the hon. and learned Member is meaningless and mischievous. It refers to:
… persons who give aid and comfort or adhere to the enemies of the United Nations …
Speaking legally—if one is dealing with an act of the criminal law when death is the only penalty, one must have definitions—there is no such thing as an enemy of the United Nations. It does not exist. The United Nations does not have diplomatic representation in any country. It does not recognise Governments, nor not recognise Governments. It is not an organisation at all. It is a voluntary agreement among a number of nations to take common action against anyone declared under its rules to be an aggressor.

Mr. Jack Jones: Thank God for it.

Mr. Silverman: But there is nothing in the United Nations Charter and nothing in its organisation which would enable the United Nations to take any action itself. The United Nations cannot conduct a war. The United Nations never has conducted a war. It is not within the competence of the United Nations to conduct a war, and therefore there can be no enemies of the United Nations.
I quite recognise that what the hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East had in mind was to make sure that a man did not escape the guilt of treason, if he were guilty of acts which otherwise would be treason, only because the war in which his country was engaged was in support of a collective act of the United Nations and not merely an individual act of its own. That I quite understand. But there is no difficulty at all about that.
When the Security Council unanimously has declared a country an aggressor, it has done all that it can do. It may then proceed to ask its members to take action

themselves. The members are not bound to take action, but if they do, then there is nothing to prevent them from declaring war on the aggressor nation, and if they do, the hon. and learned Gentleman will not need his Bill.
What was the difficulty here? We could not declare war on North Korea. This country could not declare war on North Korea, because North Korea was not a State. There was no such Government. There was no such legal entity as North Korea, and we could not therefore declare war upon it. But if one looks to the United Nations for one's authority, then one must remember that it is extremely doubtful on that ground and on other grounds whether our forces ever had any legal justification for being in North Korea at all.
They had ample, unimpeachable authority for being in South Korea, because South Korea was a country which we recognised and whose Government had invited our assistance. We were perfectly justified in giving it that assistance, but we had no authority whatever for proceeding elsewhere. If we proceeded elsewhere, where there was nothing going on but, on our own definition, a civil war, then we could not possibly declare war, and a man cannot be guilty of treason in somebody else's civil war.
My final point is this—and I suggest that the hon. and learned Member should seriously consider it. I should think that this Bill is completely incompatible with the United Nations Charter and with the whole idea of the United Nations as we have always understood it. The hon. and learned Gentleman talked about ideological war, and I take it that when he talks about the enemies of the United Nations he is speaking in those terms. This involves an implication which, with great respect, is wholly mistaken.
The United Nations has always been conceived of as a universal organisation. It is not a club of democratic nations. It is not a basis for any ideological discrimination of any kind. It would be very much worse for it as a world organisation if it were. The Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and a number of other Communist countries are members of the United Nations. If the hon. and learned Member wishes the House to adopt as a basis of our criminal law the idea that one cannot be a member of the United


Nations unless one adopts a particular form of social, political or economic organisation, if we adopt the principle that a Communist country cannot be a member of the United Nations, then we have altogether abandoned the idea of the United Nations. Indeed, this very difficulty in all these matters arises out of the failure of the United Nations to apply in this instance its own principle of universality.
There is the distinguished and high authority of the late Ernest Bevin for saying that if China, which is a permanent member of the United Nations and which is entitled to be a permanent member of the Security Council, had been allowed to have its correct, instead of its incorrect, representatives at the United Nations at the material time, the whole Korean War would never have happened. It would have been capable of negotiation at the beginning. Negotiation was sought and rejected, because they were not a member of the United Nations, and the whole difficulty arose just because some people in some parts of the world had the mis-

taken notion that there is some ideological ground on which one can distinguish between members of the United Nations and its enemies. If one abandons the principle of universality, one abandons the whole idea.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: Mr. Patrick Maitland (Lanark) rose—

Mr. Silverman: One cannot have a Bill based upon the idea that the United Nations can have enemies in that sense without abandoning its basic principle of universality.
If this matter has to be dealt with, let the Government carefully consider what amendment is necessary and produce this amendment in proper form, and let the hon. and learned Member withdraw his Bill to enable them to do so. If he will not, I beg the House to reject the Bill.

Mr. Maitland: Before the hon. Member sits down, can he say why Russia did not veto the thing?

Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 12:—

The House divided: Ayes 153, Noes 39.

Division No. 42.]
AYES
[4.28 p.m.


Alport, C. J. M.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.


Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.
Errington, Sir Eric
Longden, Gilbert


Arbuthnot, John
Erroll, F. J.
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)


Ashton, H. (Chelmsford)
Fell, A.
McAdden, S. J.


Assheton, Rt. Hn. R. (Blackburn, W.)
Fienburgh, W.
McCallum, Major D.


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Fort, R.
McKibbin, A. J.


Baldwin, A. E.
Foster, John
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)
Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)


Benson, G.
Garner-Evans, E. H.
McLean, Neil (Inverness)


Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel
Godber, J. B.
Macmillan,Rt.Hn.Harold(Bromley)


Bishop, F. P.
Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Gough, C. F. H.
Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)


Boyle, Sir Edward
Gower, H. R.
Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Graham, Sir Fergus
Marlowe, A. A. H.


Braithwaite, Sir Gurney
Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)




Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Moody, A. S.


Brooman-White, R. C.
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Morrison, Rt.Hn.Herbert(Lewis'm,S.)


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Hamilton, W. W.
Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)
Neal, Harold (Bolsover)


Browne, Jack (Govan)
Hill, John (S. Norfolk)
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)


Bullard, D. G.
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.


Burton, Miss F. E.
Hirst Geoffrey
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Holt, A. F.
Oliver, G. H.


Carr, Robert
Horobin, Sir Ian
O'Neill,Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)


Channon, H.
Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)
Osborne, C.


Clarke, Col. Sir Ralph(East Grinstead)
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.
Page, R. G.


Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)
Hurd, A. R.
Pannell, Charles


Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert
Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)
Peto, Brig. C. H. M.


Cooper-Key, E. M.
Hyde, Lt.-Col. H. M.
Peyton, J. W. W.


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Pitman, I. J.


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)


Crouch, R. F.
Iremonger, T. L.
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.


Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Jeger, George (Goole)
Raikes, Sir Victor


Daines, P.
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Remnant, Hon. P.


Davidson, Viscountess
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Renton, D. L. M.


Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Kaberry, D.
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.


Doughty, C. J. A.
Keenan, W.
Robertson, Sir David


Drayson, G. B.
Linstead, Sir H. N.
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)




Roper, Sir Harold
Sutcliffe, Sir Harold
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C


Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Sharples, Maj. R. C.
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)
Wellwood, W.


Shepherd, William
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)
Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.


Smyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)
Wills, G.


Soames, Capt. C.
Thompson, Lt-Cdr. R. (Croydon, W.)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Spearman, A. C. M.
Thornton-Kemsiey, Col. C. N.
Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C.)


Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard
Tomney, F.
Woollam, John Victor


Stevens, Geoffrey
Touche, Sir Gordon



Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Vane, W. M. F.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)
Mr. Philip Bell and


Studholme, H. G.
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)
Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing.




NOES


Bing, G. H. C.
Holman, P.
Silverman, Julius (Erdington)


Blenkinsop, A.
Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)


Bowles, F. G.
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Skeffington, A. M.


Brown, Thomas (Ince)
McGhee, H. G.
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke- on-Trent)


Castle, Mrs. B. A.
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Clunie, J.
Murray, J. D.
Swingler, S. T.


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)
Pargiter, G. A.
Wigg, George


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Plummer, Sir Leslie
Willey, F. T.


Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)
Willis, E. G.


Freeman, Peter (Newport)
Probert, A. R.
Yates, V. F.


Gibson, C. W.
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)



Greenwood, Anthony
Shackleton, E. A. A.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Hastings, S.
Shurmer, P. L. E.
Mr. Emrys Hughes and




Mr. Sydney Silverman.


Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Philip Bell and Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing.
Treason

TREASON

Bill to provide that persons who give aid and comfort or adhere to the enemies

of the United Nations shall, if the armed forces of the Queen are operating with the United Nations, be deemed guilty of treason, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday 8th July and to be printed. [Bill 51.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[4th ALLOTTED DAY]

Orders of the Day — Army Estimates, 1955–56

Order for Committee read.

Orders of the Day — MR. ANTONY HEAD'S STATEMENT

4.36 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I beg to move, That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair.
This debate has got off to a rather late start, and I would say at the outset that I do not propose to cover the ground covered in the Memorandum on Estimates which I assume has been read by at least a proportion of hon. Gentlemen interested in these affairs. No doubt during my speech I shall omit certain matters of interest to hon. Members, but I hope that we shall be able to give them an answer before the conclusion of this debate.
Before compiling my remarks for this debate, I had the advantage of listening to the defence debate which took place last week. I could not help but fee! that this debate and the defence debate were exceptional for two reasons: first, because it was the first occasion on which the House had had an opportunity of discussing the implication of the thermonuclear or hydrogen weapons, and secondly, because it was the first occasion on which the Opposition had put down a Motion of censure against this Government.

Mr. George Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman has started off with a mistake right away. That is quite untrue.

Mr. Head: I said during the period that this Government had been in power.
I am not suggesting for a moment that the two reasons are in any way connected, although in fact they both constitute warnings of the awful consequences of fission, be it nuclear or political. In the debate on defence, I think it was evident that there was a wide degree of anxiety and uncertainty about the extent to which we could both provide a deterrent and maintain conventional forces. Speaker after speaker asked, "Can we do

both?" Many hon. Members queried whether we could afford to have what one might term a conventional Army and also the deterrent of nuclear weapons, and I feel, therefore, that it is appropriate for me at the start of this discussion to say something about the justification and the likely rôle of an Army of the size which the Government propose in the White Paper.
There is no better way to start than to refer to the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister who, I think, made a deep, careful and exceptionally penetrating speech on the implications of the hydrogen bomb and other atomic weapons. He said that for the next three or four years it seemed likely that the preponderance of atomic or nuclear power would lie with the West; that after that period we might reach a situation of what he termed saturation, when both West and East had a sufficient quantity of these weapons to deliver a mortal blow, and when possibly every capital of the countries concerned would be under the direct threat of long-range ballistic rockets.
My right hon. Friend concluded that his message was not one of despair, but one of hope; partly because of the deterrent effect of the preponderance of these weapons in the West in the next three or four years and partly because of the ghastly consequence of initiating such a form of warfare when both sides had the ability to deliver a mortal blow. I felt that there was wide agreement among hon. Members that the deterrent was the best method of preventing war, and that there was a general acceptance of a message of hope rather than of despair. But I feel that it is wildly illogical to try to escape the inevitable conclusion of these perhaps encouraging deductions in thinking that, because the likelihood of nuclear warfare is reduced, at the same time there is less likelihood of the continuance of what we have come to call a cold war.
If we regard the policy of the Communist world in the last 10 years; if we do not anticipate—though pray God it may happen—a change of heart, it seems to me we are logically forced into the acceptance of the likelihood of the continuance or possible intensification of cold wars, whether they are of infiltration or of the type which took place in Korea.
If hon. Gentlemen will agree so far, and if one accepts that, it seems to me that, with a Colonial Empire which is worldwide and which touches on almost every trouble spot throughout the world, we cannot contract out of retaining adequate conventional forces to deal with the kind of situation which is likely to arise in such circumstances.
Nor, I believe, can we possibly imagine that the likelihood of another occurrence such as in Korea which, in effect, was a conventional war, or even something on a larger scale, may not occur, either in the next three or four years, or—and possibly with a greater likelihood—when both sides are evenly matched and Russia has a preponderance of conventional arms, and has perhaps reduced the likelihood of severe reprisals which would come with her present inferiority in nuclear power.
For both those reasons I think that it would be the height of folly to reduce the Army, on which the main burden of these tasks must fall, to a state below which it would be capable of meeting the demands which we have suggested would be made.
Hon. Gentlemen may agree with me so far and say that there may be a case for retaining an Army of that kind. But they may say—indeed they did say during the defence debate—that we cannot retain an Army which could play its part both as a deterrent and in the nuclear war itself. But if we were to escape or withdraw in any way from our commitments in N.A.T.O., that would probably be one of the most serious blows to N.A.T.O. which could be delivered. N.A.T.O. would be disrupted in the extreme, and I believe that it would be shaken to the foundations. If hon. Gentlemen will consider it even from the purely selfish point of view, to retain a shield so as to give defence in depth in Europe is, from the point of view of defence—even in a nuclear age—of paramount importance to this country.

Mr. R. T. Paget: While entirely agreeing with what the right hon. Gentleman says, may I ask, when once N.A.T.O. has accepted that a European war must be a nuclear war, what is the object of the reserve divisions? That is what I find difficult to understand.

Mr. Head: I shall come to that later in my remarks.

Mr. Paget: I am sorry; I thought that the right hon. Gentleman had passed it over.

Mr. Head: No, but I would say that to suggest that conventional weapons can be dispensed with in the shield for Europe and in the same speech demand—as did the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan)—that there should be an undertaking that this bomb should not be used against a conventional attack, is the biggest non sequitur and illogical piece of thinking that I have heard in this House for a long time.
If the House will go with me so far, I would suggest that the Army, today and in the future, must be of a size to meet these commitments and must be of such versatility that it can play its part as a deterrent or even fight in a nuclear war, but can also fight in a conventional war and play its part in a war of infiltration or subversion. That is the basis on which the Government and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence have drawn up and decided upon the size of the Army outlined in the Estimates before the House.
It is a size which for the present asks for the maintenance of the present period of two years' National Service. This is a demand of which the House is rightly and properly extremely jealous. It is a very big demand on the economy of the country. It is, for those reasons, most unpopular in the country, and it is against our tradition. To be quite frank, it would be much easier if we had a wholly Regular Army which could deal with these matters. I feel that because this demand for a two-year National Service period continues, it is my duty to try to deal frankly and carefully with the question of manpower in the Army. Without doing so and without justifying it to the hilt, no Government can be fully justified in introducing Estimates which demand its continuance.
I think that the average hon. Gentleman, in the light of present events—[HON MEMBERS: "The average man."]—if I may make an average of them—will say, "We have recently reduced our commitments. We have redeployed in the Middle East. We have disbanded A.A. Command—of which a vast majority were Territorials—and we have disbanded eight new infantry battalions. In the light of that, why cannot we reduce the


period of National Service?" That question has been asked; it is a perfectly fair one, and demands an answer.
That agreed upon, disbandment has saved some 66,000 men for the Army. A reduction in the period of National Service to 18 months is estimated to cost about 50,000 men, and some hon. Members say that we therefore have 16,000 men left over. There are, however, two claims upon that saving, and two obstacles to the reduction of the period of National Service. The first is the run-down in the strength of the Army and the second the creation of a strategic reserve. It is my duty to say a brief word about each.
Dealing first with the run-down in the Army, the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and other hon. Members will remember full well that in 1951 there was a very serious shortage of manpower. The Government then froze Regulars, called up Reservists and, in 1952, ordered a greatly increased call-up of about 160,000 men instead of the average of 130,000.Since that time that increased call-up has been going out of the Service, and between April, 1954, and April, 1956, there will be a run-down of some 35,000 in the size of the Army.
In all the recent debates in this House I believe that there has been general agreement among hon. Members that we must aim to form a strategic reserve. During the past two or three years the Army has literally scraped the bottom, with hardly any forces left in this country. That is not merely bad for the Army; it is dangerous, and makes it difficult for us to meet our commitments. I am absolutely sure that in the future that now confronts us, with the possible demands made by wars of infiltration or even conventional wars, the existence of a strategic reserve in this country, capable of being lifted by air at short notice, is an inestimable advantage without which we should be ill-equipped to face our commitments.
The creation of that strategic reserve, the retention of certain A.A. units for the field forces and certain other units with which I shall deal later, together with the 35,000 run-down in the Army, take up the 66,000 saving which we have made by the redeployment and disbandment of units. Many hon. Members, in-

cluding my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) say, "What your aim should be is to create a larger Regular force which could meet our commitments, would save endless overheads in training so many National Service men, and would economise on movements. "That is an aim which should be taken seriously, because there is no doubt that we could meet our commitments less wastefully and with a far smaller amount of manpower if it could be achieved.
I have made a very careful inquiry into the recruiting figures and the strength of the Army between 1920 and today, excluding the war-time periods which are not typical. That inquiry is interesting, especially in so far as it shows that, whatever may be the relative position of Army pay to civilian pay—proportionately good or bad—and whatever the situation of the country—full employment or unemployment—by and large the strength and the rate of recruiting of the Regular Army has remained astonishingly level. It has stayed round about the 180,000 mark. I am not saying that that means that this possibility should necessarily be abandoned, but, having discussed this matter with very experienced officials in the Ministry of Labour, I feel that it suggests that there must be a fixed number of individuals who are prepared to join the Regular Army.
That may be a wrong assumption, but if we were to make a radical improvement in conditions of pay and service it would have to be upon an inter-Service basis and could not be confined to the Army alone, for reasons with which I am sure all hon. Members would agree. If it were to apply to all three Services, such an alteration would be very, very expensive. With the data available, and with the uncertainty of the scheme becoming effective, I say that we should be asking the country to take a very big chance in allowing that very large amount of money to be spent in a speculative attempt which might fail. Were it to fail, an immense amount of money would have been spent and we should still not have large enough Regular forces to dispense with National Service.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: If we are expected to follow the right hon. Gentleman's argument to its logical conclusion, he should give us some idea of


the numbers of that Regular Army which he thinks would be able to cope with our commitments and therefore, to some degree, reduce the necessity for National Service.

Mr. Head: I do not want to escape the question, but to some extent the answer depends upon our commitments. With our commitments as they are now. however, we could undoubtedly do away with at least 100,000 of the present force because of our saving in overheads and avoidance of waste in movements, and so forth.

Mr. Wigg: I want to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon having learnt lesson No. 1 after 10 years, but why does not he see the logic of the matter? If it is true that a constant number of men join the Regular Army, and that whatever one does will not affect the total number of men who will do so, why does not he appreciate that the question of paramount importance is for how long they will join and whether they will stay in after they have joined?

Mr. Head: The hon. Member is too anxious. I am coming to that point next. The hon. Member is very keen to intervene, but I hope that he will give me a little bit of a run, because I have a lot of ground to cover and I do not want to delay the House for too long.
Other hon. Members say, "The real answer is that your recruiting policy must be such that you put yourself in the position of recruiting sufficient Regulars upon a long-term basis. That is your best chance of eventually reducing the period of National Service." In relation to the matter of the three-year engagement, the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) is my deadly enemy. As it has become a matter of such controversy—largely due to the hon. Member's efforts—I must say something about it.
In 1949 the Royal Air Force found that it was in serious difficulty over recruiting. It was running at about 5,000 a quarter. In 1950 it decided to introduce the three-year engagement, and its recruiting went up to somewhere about the 10,000 mark—and it stayed up. In the meantime, I imagine that right hon. Gentlemen opposite who were then in the War Office were watching the movement with very great interest but, understandably, they decided to hold on because it was presumably

known that in September, 1950, they were to introduce really good and substantial pay increases. I am pleased to acknowledge the fact that we owe those to the right hon. Member for Easington, who was then Minister of Defence.
When those increases were introduced Army quarterly recruiting figures, which had been somewhere round the 5,000 mark, went up to 7,000, hovered there, and slumped back again to the 5,000 mark. The War Office watched the position for the best part of a year. An actuarial estimate was made of what would happen if the decline in recruiting continued, and it was found that the Regular Army, instead of being 194,000 strong, as it is now, would have gone down to 130,000. There would have been a net loss of manpower in the Active Army of about 30,000.
In those circumstances, and after very careful consideration, it was decided—I still believe that it was rightly decided—to bring in the three-year engagement. The interesting fact about that period of engagement is the figures for recruiting. In 1952 they were 49,000; in 1953 they were 39,000; and in 1954 they were 36,000. When the figures for 1952 were announced in this House, there was a certain amount of dispute as to who should claim the credit for them. Some hon. Members said that it was no good my preening myself, because it was the work of right hon. Members opposite. I did not dispute that, but I said that whoever introduced the scheme bore the responsibility, and so I did not see why he should not have the credit.
In 1954, when the figure of 36,000 was announced, hon. Members opposite said that recruiting had failed, that there had been a flop, and that the Secretary of State should go because he was "in a fearful jam." I am not complaining about any of those remarks, but will say about them what, I think, proves them to be illogical. In 1952 there was an intake of exceptional size—160,000. In 1954 it was 130,000.The main source of recruiting today is the National Service intake. Recruiting sergeants do not go out into the streets to recruit as they did in the old days. Those recruiting figures expressed as a percentage of the intake have not moved except by 0·6 of 1 per cent. They have remained steady at 25 per cent., so that it is rather illogical for hon. Members


opposite on one occasion to claim the credit and on another occasion to cry "Havoc."

Mr. Wigg: Mr. Wigg rose—

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is very quick to say things, but he should have seen his face on the last occasion, as I saw it.
What I wish to say about the three-year engagement is this. We are getting one in four of the National Service intake. The people at the Ministry of Labour are experts at this. In view of the keen competition from the civil market, I do not believe that those are bad figures.
However, we are quite agreed with the hon. Member for Dudley that the vital question is that of prolongations.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman is learning again.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman should not be too cocksure.
The point I would put to him about prolongations is this. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) will know, the War Office was aware, when this matter was considered, that inevitably there would be a query about prolongations. It was also aware that there had in the past always been a certain number of men prepared to join the Regular Army. The effect of offering a three-year engagement in lieu of a five-year engagement should not, it was thought, act as a deterrent to those who would join and stay in the Regular Army. The risk was taken. It was rightly taken, I believe. I believe, too, that the late Government, had they remained in office, would have done the same thing—though I do not say that in justification of what we did. The responsibility for the decision lies fairly and squarely on this Government.
The figures for prolongations, which are relevant in finding the trend, are not yet available. [HON MEMBERS: "Ah."] The hon. Member for Dudley is in an unholy haste to try to produce something to throw at me. The hon. Member has quoted the figures for November and December, which were entirely untypical and included a good many five-year engagements. He created a song and dance about them—not only in the House; he communicated it to the Press

as well, and with some effect. But it was entirely bogus.
We have to wait and see. We do not yet know. What we are doing is to have a special analysis made of these figures because, as the hon. Gentleman will realise, if a man can prolong his service at any period of his three years' service, there must be a special, detailed and very laborious study to discover which particular men have prolonged their service.

Mr. Wigg: Nonsense.

Mr. Head: We are doing that, not to please the hon. Member for Dudley. [Interruption.] I think the hon. Gentleman should let me have a bit of a run. He has had a very good run himself, and I have been silent for a year while he has talked the most fearful rubbish.
The result of that analysis will come to the impatient hon. Gentleman by May. What we do know about prolongations is that for January, 1953, to April, 1954, the prolongations to 12 years, which is an important period, were running at about 350 a month. In April, 1954, as I announced during the consideration of the last Estimates, the Government introduced special concessions and terms of service, and between April, 1954, and now the prolongations to 12 years have been running at 700 a month, which is double, and which is a very gratifying sign, even though it sticks in the gullet of the hon. Gentleman.
I should not leave the question of manpower, although I apologise for dwelling on it for a rather long time, without saying something on what for this House is the perennial question of the waste of manpower. That question arose in the defence debate, and has always been a matter of discussion. I would say at the outset that there is not one of the Services—if I may take the name of the other Services in vain—which can say that it is absolutely blameless as regards waste of manpower, but I say also that it is one of the main jobs of a Secretary of State to try to remedy that waste to the maximum extent possible.
In the last six or seven years there have been in the War Office eight major inquiries into manpower, specifically by the Weekes' Committee, the Harwood Committee, the Jacob Committee, the Templer Committee, the Callander Committee, the Reid-Young Committee, the


McLean Committee and the Kirkman Committee, and five of those inquiries have taken place since I have been at the War Office. In addition, there have been two further inquiries, one on the reduction of wastage through the speeding of the movement of people in the pipeline, and one on the organisation of schools and training establishments. In addition to that, I personally reduced the establishment of the War Office by an arbitrary cut of 10 per cent.

Mr. James Simmons: How many of the Reports of those Committees are available to this House?

Mr. Head: I will send the hon. Gentleman as big a wad of information on them as I can.
The total of the savings since I have been at the War Office is some 12,000 men. I am not saying for a moment that there are not more savings that could be made, but I do say with absolute confidence—and I believe that right hon. Gentlemen opposite will follow me in saying this—that there is no dramatic and radical saving which can be made which would make a real and appreciable difference to National Service at the present time, or that would enable us to reduce the length of National Service by six months.
To all those hon. Members who say, "Let us have an inquiry into the Services and the waste in manpower," I reply that this is a problem of such complexity and such width that to go into the whole of it would be beyond the bounds of any one committee of the greatest genius. Even the Committee of Sir John Reid-Young, who is the business methods and efficiency expert of Vickers, and who visited the large dumps and depots, was not able to go into the problem of economy of manpower so as to cover the whole of the Services. That is beyond the power of any single committee. Therefore, I say that it is the job of a Secretary of State and the job of the House of Commons to watch jealously the use of manpower, but that it is entirely wrong to think that we could have an inquiry which would lead to a saving of the size that would make a material reduction in National Service possible.
I should next say something about the question of the reorganisation which has

followed on the disbandment of Anti-Aircraft Command. In December, 1954, the Government's decision to disband Anti-Aircraft Command was announced. That had, of course, been under discussion for some considerable time before. It will be appreciated that we in the War Office could not take any overt step until the decision was announced.
When it took place we had two clear-cut alternatives. We could have issued arbitrarily decisions to the units to be disbanded or amalgamated. Or we could have heard their own claims and complaints, and the views of the Territorial Army Associations, and so forth, Hon. Members may have differing views as to what we should have done. What we did, I believe, was right. Bearing in mind the immense part the Territorial Army Associations have played in the general organisation and the keeping in health of Anti-Aircraft Command, we decided to consult fully with them and to consider their views and the views of the units. This was a long job, and some very strong and powerful views were expressed in the process. It is always unpleasant to disband units with long traditions of service and with proud records. Finally we came to a solution.
Of all the Territorial units concerned only some 15 per cent. have been actually disbanded. The remainder will either be amalgamated into another rôle or amalgamated with regiments which are retained for anti-aircraft defence. I regret, and I am sure the House regrets, the winding up of a Command which has done great service for this country, and I am sure that the House would wish me to pay tribute to the members of the Command for their service before, during and after the war, particularly for then-effective and patient service during the war when they made such a big contribution to the defence of this country, especially against the flying bombs.
I must say a word about the personnel of this Command. This decision to wind it up poses a difficulty for the Regulars in the Royal Artillery, because the majority of the Regulars in A.A. Command will now be thrown back on the Royal Artillery as a whole. We have two conflicting aims: first, to avoid a block in the promotion structure of the Royal Artillery and, secondly, to avoid undue axing, which I think would have a most unfortunate effect not only in the Royal


Artillery but, by creating uncertainty, in the Army as a whole. I believe that there will be very little axing, and I think we can sort matters out. I should like to take this opportunity of stating that the policy of the War Office, and I believe and hope that it will remain its policy, in the re-organisation and changes which we must expect in this age, is one of re-absorption and transfer rather than of axing and the sudden termination of a career to which a man has devoted his life.
There are two other aspects of the manpower of the Territorial Army on which I will dwell briefly. First, there were many women in the mixed batteries, and we are offering them employment in other branches of the Territorial Army which, I think, will open up the opportunities for women in the Territorial Army. I hope many will transfer.
The other concerns that vital element, the volunteers in the A.A. regiments, who were, so to speak, the back-bone of the Territorial regiments. We have set up boards of officers who will offer employment to them in other Territorial units or in the Army Emergency Reserve, and I hope that as many as possible will again volunteer, because such service is invaluable.
There is another aspect of their employment on which I should touch. I hope that some or many of them will decide to serve in the new mobile defence battalions which are being created. Many hon. Members said, "Why did you not give the task of the mobile defence battalions to particular A.A. regiments and let them take it over lock, stock and barrel? "That is an attractive idea, but the whole basis of the creation of these mobile defence battalions is that they will gradually be built up and that each man will have a months 'training in those duties during his two years' whole-time service.
If we transferred a whole existing unit we should have a whole unit ignorant of those duties. I say to the volunteers, however, especially from units which have been disbanded and of whom very few are left, that if senior officers and N.C.Os. will get together and will volunteer to take over, or jointly to take over, one of these mobile defence battalions, then we will attempt to keep them together and I will also do everything possible to

ensure that there is some continuity of the traditions and name of their past regiment in the transfer to the new mobile defence battalion which they join.
I think I should now say something about a matter on which the right hon. Member for Dundee, West intervened—the rôle of the Reserve Army, which is the Territorial Army and the Army Emergency Reserve. There has been a lot of speculation about this, and many people in the Territorial Army and the Army Emergency Reserve have wondered what their rôle is to be in a future war. We are agreed that our main effort is to be towards a deterrent and towards the prevention of war. But it is no good our saying, "If that war should come, then we have had it and there is nothing more to do." That has never been the way in which the British have overcome their past troubles, and I am certain it is not the way to set about the next troubles.
If such a war occurred, then the vital and decisive factor would be the ability of the home base in these islands to struggle through. That will be a very grim struggle, but I believe that a determining or even a decisive factor in it will be the presence of a- number of formations of trained, mobile, desciplined men who can be sent all over the country to help to the maximum extent in restoring order out of chaos and in the general administration and running of the country. I believe that to be a task of paramount importance in which the Territorial Army, the Army Emergency Reserve and the Home Guard may well play a decisive part, and I should like to assure them that their rôle in that situation is an essential part in the pattern of our defence as we see it.
But, quite apart from that, because of our uncertainty about the form which war may take, I do not think we can exclude the use of Territorial Army divisions, either because of a far longer period of warning of the danger of war than we have foreseen or possibly because of an extensive conventional war. In addition, I suggest to hon. Members the possibility that after this fearful nuclear war has taken place there will be a crying need throughout the world for nations in a position to do so to send troops in order to sort out the mess, perhaps to stop the sporadic fighting which is taking place


and to restore order in a world which has been through a fearful experience.
I believe that the absence of trained formations to give such assistance might have fearful consequences, and I therefore strongly suggest to the House that in our present conditions of uncertainty to do away with these Reserve divisions would be an act of great folly.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: Has the right hon. Gentleman any idea of what the troops will do when they are restoring the order to which he has referred?

Mr. Head: Very much the same as they have done after previous wars, only more so. [Laughter.] The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Hughes) laughs at that. He may have forgotten that in every case immediately after the end of a war there has been a great degree of chaos in the defeated countries and that much civilian suffering has been avoided by the fact that the troops have taken over to restore order, run the services and get the country on its feet. It ill be hoves him to laugh at that because, if he had more experience of it, he would know that it is a fact.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: What experience has the right hon. Gentleman of a nuclear war?

Mr. Head: The hon. Member has constantly said that if there is a nuclear war, then we have had it. He has said in such circumstances, "Let us pack up now." I do not agree with him, because it is that attitude which will turn this country into a Communist country, which may or may not suit the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Hughes: The right hon. Gentleman should read the Prime Minister's speech.

Mr. Head: So much for the question of the Reserve Army. I should like to turn briefly to the question of barracks.

Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: What about the strategic Reserve?

Mr. Head: I will come to that at the end of my remarks.
I believe that today the main deterrents in the Army are separation—which I believe the strategic Reserve will do something to help; bad conditions overseas—

which I believe the re-deployment from the Suez Canal will do something to help; instability—which, again, I think the strategic Reserve will help. But, in addition, there is the question of barracks and of hospitals, in which I know the hon. Member is particularly interested.
I must confess that when I went to the War Office I was shocked by the condition of the barracks. I am not blaming that on any right hon. Gentleman opposite; I am blaming it on the fact—let us face it—that since about 1900 nothing much has been done. That is because in peace-time the Army has been starved of money and in war-time the money has been spent on warlike materials. This is not a party matter at all. It is a fact that the Army barracks must be improved, and it is equally a fact that no single Secretary of State could do it quickly. It is a long-term project.
Before it can even be started, we must have plans, and hon. Members will be surprised to know the amount of effort which has to go into producing the plans. We have got out a lot of plans and we are starting the work. It is our intention, as long as this Government remains in office—and I hope that whoever succeeds me will stick to it—to build up an ever-increasing programme of rebuilding and reconditioning barracks.
I should like to explain why I am making these remarks in this speech. It is because I want to beg and entreat any future Secretary of State for War or any future Government not to fall into the temptation, when they are discussing Estimates, of raiding the works Vote. That is the reason our barracks are in such a mess. If that continues indefinitely, there is a grave danger that the Army will become a race of slum dwellers. There could be nothing worse for recruiting than that.
I turn to the question of production in general. In the defence debate many hon. Members, among them the hon. Member for Aston, said—it is an easy thing to say—that the Government in such and such a year spent thousands of millions of pounds, but what had they to show for it? When the late Government introduced the programme in 1951 it was called the £4,700 million rearmament programme. I am not blaming them for that term, but it did mislead people


because a lot of people thought that money was for rearmament and all these vast sums of money would be spent on new weapons. So far as the Army is concerned, of our total Estimates about one-seventh is spent on the production of new weapons. The remainder is for clothing, feeding, moving, maintaining and housing the soldier and supporting him in cold wars, whether in Malaya, Kenya, or elsewhere. It is illogical and wrong to point to these astronomical sums and say that there is nothing to show for them. During the last four years an immense programme has been met in arming the Army with up-to-date conventional equipment and weapons.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: What about the rifle?

Mr. Head: I am coming to that. It is really no good dismissing the necessity for conventional weapons. If we did so, our only recourse would be the bomb. The Army must have tanks and modern bridging, which would be of great importance if there were nuclear warfare, and it must have vehicles. Replacements have been made and a lot of leeway has been made good. In warlike stores and so forth we are nearing the completion of a phase. That is why, as hon. Members may see, practically the entire cut of £70 million in this year's Estimate has been taken off the production Vote.
I do not want to mislead the House or hon. Members into thinking that this year's production is either typical or one which can go on and will continue indefinitely. As weapon development proceeds and as the introduction of nuclear weapons proceeds, so the Vote will have to meet it. What I would say to hon. Members is that in conventional weapons our Army is a very well-equipped Army by any standards throughout the world.
I should now say a word about nuclear weapons. In 1953 it was decided that for ground-to-ground guided missiles the British Army should follow American research. That was a wise decision to conserve development and research efforts and scientific and technical skill by going together on certain projects. The Americans initially developed the weapon called "Corporal Mark I," and then "Corporal Mark II." We have decided to adopt the "Corporal Mark II" weapon, which is a

first-class ground-to-ground guided missile. It is, I think, ahead of any other ground-to-ground guided missile in the world. We are sending officer and N.C.O. instructors for these units over to America in April or May this year. The units themselves will be formed next year. The Army will then have something which will produce additional fire power, both to economise in conventional means of support and to increase immensely their strength. It is of course our intention that they should be produced for the Army in Europe.

Mr. Bellenger: Is that atomic?

Mr. Head: It is atomic.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Is it the intention to introduce this atomic weapon into the armies in Europe?

Mr. Head: Yes, that is correct. I know the anxiety of my noble Friend. I repeat what I said before, that the decision whether or not such weapons should be used remains with the political heads of nations.
I do not think I could leave the question of production without mentioning two other matters. One is the rifle and the other is aircraft. I thought perhaps we had finished with the rifle—

Mr. James Callaghan: Started with it.

Mr. Head: I thought we had finished with it as we had a long debate. I know the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) has got off his deck, landed, and become an enthusiast for the rifle.

Mr. Callaghan: All-Service co-operation.

Mr. Head: Yes, the Royal Marines will have this rifle in due course. The hon. Member for Aston, all sparkling in the new authority of promotion to the Front Bench, in the defence debate accused the Government and me in particular of what one might term dropping the rifle. I could not help feeling that he might have turned about and used a bit of his authority on hon. Members behind him. I let that pass. What he said, in effect, was that there were no rifles. I wish to say something briefly on this subject.
In 1951 the then Government announced that they were going to adopt the ·280 round rifle. Considerable alarm was expressed by the then Leader of the Opposition, the present Prime Minister. Two conferences were held, a tripartite conference at which the Canadians expressed great alarm that we were to adopt the ·280, and a N.A.T.O. Standing Group meeting, at which both France and America also expressed alarm. The right hon. Member for Easington attended those conferences. The Government seemed to have given him a general instruction on policy which might be summarised as to ignore those expressions of alarm. One might almost say it was a question of, "Manny get your gun." The right hon. Member persisted in the face of great opposition, came back, and said we were to stick to the ·280.
In October, 1951, the present Government took over. The Prime Minister said that in a matter so basic, so fundamental, as small arms we must attempt to reach standardisation. There were then drawn up the N.A.T.O. characteristics, which were the requirements for a standardised round. It took some time for agreement on what the round should be. After that time had elapsed, it was finally agreed by all the N.A.T.O. Powers that we should standardise on the ·30 round. That was a considerable achievement. At that stage we had to choose between the FN. rifle and the rebuilt altered E.M.2 to fit the ·30 round.
That was where the hon. Member for Aston took out a neat saying of mine, embellished it and made it look very misleading. What I said then and say now is that if we had gone in for the new E.M.2 we would have added to the delay. We would have had to tool up to make the rifles so that there could be troop trials, whereas with the FN. we could buy the rifles and go on with troop trials. Troop trials will finish this summer, and by June we shall have had delivered to the Army in Germany 10,000 FN. rifles. We shall have got standardisation throughout N.A.T.O.—[HON MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—standardisation of the round. The hon. Member may decry it, but it is a most important development. We shall have got the Commonwealth with us, and against that we shall have lost between 18 months and two years.
I say with absolute certainty that that deal and that agreement to go for a

standardised round—this rifle—and to get the Commonwealth with us was well worth that delay, particularly as having 10,000 rifles of the FN. calibre in Germany by June this year more or less balances the production which would have occurred had the decision been taken in 1951 to manufacture the 280.

Mr. Wyatt: Would the Secretary of State not agree that the question of the standardisation of the round would have been settled anyway and the British rifle could have fired the same round as the present FN. rifle? What has now happened is that the Belgian rifle has been redesigned according to the inches measurement and, therefore, the new British rifle will not have parts fully interchangeable with the Belgian rifle. Consequently, that important matter of standardisation has gone.
Would the right hon. Gentleman not further agree that my right hon. Friend the previous Minister of Defence made it quite clear in the debate a year ago that the Canadians had said they were quite happy to have the British E.M.2 rifle provided that they could get an order to supply it? So we would have had standardisation of the Canadian rifle anyway and we would also have had it with the other countries.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member is clouding the issue. The inch and the millimetre measurements are identical.

Mr. Wyatt: No, they are not.

Mr. Head: As regards the interchange-ability of parts of rifles, as the hon. Member probably knows, it is an offence in the Army to put the bolt from one rifle into the breach of another. The parts of rifles are individually made. Anybody who has learnt on the FN. rifle can fire a Belgian, Canadian or any other FN. rifle. One does not go about in the field changing parts of rifles for the parts of other rifles. That is a military offence.
The hon. Member mentioned the Canadian undertaking. There has been absolute consistency by the Canadians in that they wished to go on to a rifle which there was a reasonable chance that the United States would take, and they have been constant the whole way through on the FN.

Mr. Michael Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of the interchangeability of parts as if it were of no importance or was even undesirable.

Mr. Head: No, not undesirable.

Mr. Stewart: If there was any meaning in what the Secretary of State was saying, he was rejecting the importance that my hon. Friend attached to the interchange-ability of parts. Does the right hon. Gentleman not remember that in our important debate on the rifle some time ago, great emphasis was laid on the interchangeability of parts which, it was said, would accrue from the Government's decision to have the Belgian rifle? He seems to be arguing that interchange-ability of parts can be produced as an important and valuable point if it can be used on the Government side in argument, whereas when it cannot be used in that way the right hon. Gentleman writes it off.

Mr. Head: I do not know what the hon. Member is quoting from.

Mr. Wyatt: May I interrupt? I can clear up this matter.

Mr. Head: We are having a long debate, and I do not want to speak indefinitely. The hon. Member has made his point. The protagonists of the two rifles will never come together. They are like Catholics and Protestants; they are absolutely determined in their support of their respective views. But I have been carefully into this question with the small arms experts in the War Office, and the question of interchangeability is not a matter of vital importance. The vital importance in this matter is that a man who has learnt to use the FN. rifle and can fire it is equally capable of firing one that is manufactured in Canada, in Australia or in Belgium. The technique is known—

Mr. Wyatt: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Head: I have given way enough on this.

Mr. Wyatt: On a point of order.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I do not see how any point of order can possibly arise, but I will listen to it.

Mr. Wyatt: The Secretary of State is continually saying that I am misquoting him. When I offer to give him the quotation, he will not have it. I have it here in my hand.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That is not a point of order. The hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) will be given an opportunity of speaking later. He had no right to raise that as a point of order, knowing full well that it was not one.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member can make his speech—

Mr. Wyatt: Very unfair.

Mr. Head: —at a later stage, and I suggest that it would be more seemly if he kept his temper.

Mr. Wyatt: It ought to have dawned on the hon. Gentleman"—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I understand that the hon. Member wishes to speak later. If he keeps on interrupting, he will not be called.

Mr. Callaghan: Is this a Ruling that you are now giving us, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that if an hon. Member interrupts he will not be called? If so, could we be told what is the quota of interruptions necessary to prevent a Member being called?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am here to try to keep order, and I will do it to the best of my ability. The hon. Member is asking me to give a Ruling on something which is quite impossible, but I hope we will have an orderly debate. Hon. Members should not go on interrupting each other like that.

Mr. Callaghan: I fully appreciate that, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and I fully accept that you are here to keep order, but if you are introducing a new Ruling, it would be as well if we understood what was meant by it. I therefore ask, with respect, whether if an hon. Member, on any side of the House, feels that he has been misrepresented and, in natural indignation and heat, makes a number of interruptions, it then follows that he is to be denied the right of speaking at a later stage in the debate.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: When that situation arises, I shall judge on it. I cannot possibly judge on it in advance.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member for Aston must appreciate that I have had a lot of interruptions. If he really feels so strongly at this stage, I will give way to him and let him read out his quotation.

Mr. Wyatt: I very much appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's courtesy. This is what he said, answering me, on 1st February, 1954:
It ought to have dawned on the hon. Gentleman that, if the Government had two rifles in an Army, it would mean two different lots of spare parts. That makes a difference."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1954; Vol. 523, c. 97.]
Now, the right hon. Gentleman says that it does not make a difference.

Mr. Head: I am very glad that I gave way to the hon. Member. If ever anybody was bowled a half volley, that was it. The two different lots of spare parts were the spare parts of the E.M.2 and of the FN. For the hon. Member to compare a statement about one rifle of exactly the same type drawn in inches and in millimetres with a remark which was made about the E.M.2 and the FN., is quite ludicrous. The hon. Member ought to know that.

Mr. Callaghan: Do not dodge it.

Mr. Head: I am not dodging anything. It was fantastic to give that quotation.
I turn now to the question of aircraft. I apologise for the length of my speech, but I have tried to give way and I must put some of the blame on to others.

Mr. Callaghan: There is plenty of time.

Mr. Head: We all want to go to bed tonight, and I am sure that the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East does too.
On the question of aircraft, I particularly wish to mention—and I hope I shall not be treading on the toes of any of my hon. Friends—that to an ever increasing extent in the future, the aircraft will play a more and more important and intimate rôle in the Army's structure and organisation. That belief underlies any consideration of the future of the Army.
It is in three rôles that aircraft will play their main part. The first is in air trooping. One of the preoccupations of a Secretary of State for War must be that the standards of the aircraft used in air trooping remain up-to-date and efficient.
As aircraft get more and more expensive, there will always be a problem that types and methods in air trooping fall behind current civilian practice; and that is undesirable.
Some progress has been made in that respect. In the coming spring, Viscounts will come into service on certain routes for air trooping. In addition, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Supply recently announced to the House, the Government have decided to buy three Britannias, Mark II, for operation by the independent air operators, and they will come into Service use for air trooping as well.

Mr. Bellenger: Who will operate the Viscounts?

Mr. Head: They will be operated in the same field. Both of these acquisitions will not merely improve air trooping, but in emergency will be a valuable adjunct to the strategic air lift. The strategic air lift, which now is equivalent to a lift of about one brigade, will itself be improved also by the gradual re-equipment of Transport Command. It will be still further strengthened by the introduction of the Beverley Baxter. [Laughter.] No, my hon. Friend the Member for South-gate (Sir B. Baxter) is not here and there was no intention of making a bad joke. I meant, of course, the Beverley Blackburn. This is probably the best large freighter aircraft in the world today. It will take 94 men with their equipment. Twenty-four have been ordered and eight will be in service this year. In addition, it is a most valuable means of evacuating casualties. The prospects of the strategic airlift are good.
The next matter that I would mention is the part which fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters would play in the supply and administration of the Army, especially in war. As the House knows, we are starting an experimental unit to study techniques. The unit opens in April, and I hope that some hon. Members will wish to go to see it. Our policy, and we are being loyally supported in this by the Royal Air Force, is to introduce as much air transport and air administration into the Army, as quickly as possible, but there are considerable difficulties.
The first is that the medium helicopter which carries a higher load has presented


some very considerable difficulties in development, both in the United States and in this country. Furthermore, it is a very expensive aircraft. There are, however, very good prospects as well in the conventional, fixed-wing aircraft such as the Pioneer or a development of the Pioneer type, which can land in a very restricted space. I have flown in a Pioneer in Malaya. It is astonishing in what a small space they can come down. There are very promising developments going on in this respect. Whether the future of this technique of supply and evacuation in the Army lies with fixed-wing aircraft or with helicopters, or with a combination of both, I do not know, but I assure the House that the War Office is absolutely united on the need to bring them in as early as possible and on the dependence of the Army on this form of assistance in any war of the future.

Mr. Wigg: Would the right hon. Gentleman be kind enough to say something about Valettas, and has the Army abandoned the idea of having a parachute division?

Mr. Head: The question of the re-equipment of Transport Command with the Valetta belongs to my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Air, but the Blackburn Freighter is an ideal aircraft for parachutists.

Mr. Wigg: What about the parachutists?

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman surely knows that we have a Parachute brigade and a Territorial Army Parachute division. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will leave me alone for a moment. After all, he no doubt will have an opportunity to make a speech.
I now come to the last fence. I should like to say a word or two on the future policy of the Army and about the organisation of formations. At least I know that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) will have waited patiently for this, because it is a matter in which he is particularly interested.
What is the task of the Army in the future? As I suggested at the start of my speech, it must have great versatility. It must be capable of fighting a nuclear war and a conventional war, and of taking part in the kind of operations which

are now going on in Malaya and Kenya. If one considers first the requirements of a nuclear or atomic war, the point that was mentioned many times in the debate on defence was the need to eliminate to the maximum extent what many hon. Members called a "clutter" behind the Army.
An Army of the last war is now desperately vulnerable, because of what I might call the long tube of administration which is behind it consisting of large fixed depots, of ports, of masses of vehicles and large headquarters. Something drastic must be done about this. We have worked out in the War Office a new organisation for what one might term the nuclear formations. That is to say, it is an organisation in which one has been quite ruthless in eliminating everything which will add to the administrative clutter.
Starting from the front, the man himself must be lightly equipped. His weapon system and the weapon system of all fighting units must be simplified, because diversity of types means an increase in administrative effort and complexity behind. In addition, it is obvious that the number of vehicles must be reduced drastically. That means, quite apart from simplification of weapons, that the soldier can no longer go to war with the standard of living with which he has been to war in the past. That has got to go.
In addition, headquarters must not only be reduced in number but must be abolished wherever possible. Large dumps and depots are sitting ducks in this type of warfare. They must be eliminated by dispersion and the maximum use of local resources—a matter which is now being gone into in Europe. Ports cannot be relied upon. To overcome that, we are carrying out reconnaissances of very small ports and sheltered anchorages. It is our aim to introduce air transport, not at once but in the future, to the maximum extent in the whole of the administrative and supply system, because that will give flexibility and the power of switching and a reduction in the number of vehicles on the road. Vehicles themselves must be occupied to the full extent of capacity and in the development of cross-country vehicles there are very good signs.
This kind of formation has been drawn up. Two formations in Germany have


been earmarked and, during the next training season, will become experimental formations. They will try out this very drastic revision of the organisation and see how it works. We have had a good go at it, but it would be folly to change the organisation of the whole Army until we have studied the results. I hope that some hon. Members will see the results for themselves, because I have sent out invitations to hon. Members to visit the formations sometime in August or September. This review will be of great significance and of great importance to the Army. It is a really drastic review in which radical changes have been made.
Hon. Members may say, "These changes may suit the nuclear age, but what about the other duties of the Army?" We have already said that there must be versatility. It so happens that when one compares the requirements of Malaya with what we are doing for nuclear units, one finds that they are not divergent but to a large extent complementary. One finds that the requirements of the air-transportable, lightly equipped men one employs in the cold war and in infiltration and so on are very much the same as one would require for the nuclear formations. In that respect, I have very high hopes that the versatility required of the British Army can be maintained. Indeed, already we have reached the stage where large quantities of normal, conventional weapons are abandoned in jobs like those done in Malaya and Kenya, and men are not trained in the use of them until the units are back in an area where they are needed.
I have tried to explain the position of the Army today and what it is planned to do in the future. I have said nothing about the Army itself, but I have written something in my Memorandum relating to the Army Estimates which I hope some hon. Members have read. I feel that some hon. Members, and indeed the Press, often get a rather misleading view of the Army. Hon. Members receive many letters from disgruntled men called up for National Service, but there are some 200,000 National Service men and there are bound to be a few disgruntled men among them.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: There are 50,000.

Mr. Head: Oh, no. The people who are inclined to make news are those who

do not get on, or who misbehave. They are the ones who catch the eye of the Press. The side of the Army in this country which we see in this way is the least convincing and the least glamorous. But if hon. Members in this House had been able to see the active Army on the job in Malaya, in Kenya, in the Middle East and in Germany, as I have been able to see it, they would have a great deal of admiration for its efficiency and for what it does.
I claim none of the credit for that. The credit belongs to the Army, and it is not the job of the Secretary of State to seek either political popularity or public esteem. Indeed, if he seeks it it will be most unlikely that he will get it. It is his job not to be gun-shy of sniping at him by hon. Members or by the Press, but to take note of the well-aimed shots which are the true ones and not to worry too much about the others; to concentrate on his job which is primarily to see that the Army gets a square deal and the public gets good value for money; to see that the Army's size is not cut below the minimum for the safe defence of the country; and to make a full contribution to the defence effort as a whole.
So far as I am able within my limited capacity, I have tried to do something to achieve that. I feel that someone in my position does a better job if he is not so much Secretary of State for War as Secretary of State against war.

5.52 p.m.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: With the exception of the skirmish which the right hon. Gentleman had with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and the small arms engagement with my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt), I do not think the right hon. Gentleman could complain of the reception given to his speech of one hour and 15 minutes, which was favourably listened to but not so favourably received.
I had hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would have told us a little more about the nuclear side of the Army's preparations. He left that to the last, to what I thought was the more exciting part of his speech, and it may be, of course, that he himself knows very little about it. It is interesting to hear that we are for the first time going to get some of the "know-how" on the "Corporal" weapon from our American Allies.

Mr. Head: I am sorry if I started off badly, but I may not have made the position clear. We have decided to adopt the weapon from America. It is not a case of "know-how. "We are sending instructors to learn about it, and then we are going to form units in which it will be used.

Mr. Bellenger: It follows that if we are going to adopt a weapon we are going to get the "know-how." This is the first time that the British Army has had any "know-how" on that level from our American Allies about the progress that has been made by the United States in atomic weapons.
Last year during the exercise "Battle Royal" in Germany, several hon. Members went from this House as guests at General Gale's headquarters, and we saw there the 280 millimetre American guns which are also atomic weapons. It was difficult to follow the briefing given from time to time by staff officers to hon. Members. Although we had an opportunity of looking at the 280 millimetre gun, nevertheless no one in the British Army seemed to know much about it. Although I have very little knowledge of it, I thought that that gun was on the way out. First, it seems to me that if there is any sitting target from the air that weapon is it. It is 84 feet long and weighs 84 tons. I am bound to admit it is an easily manœuvrable weapon and a wonderful piece of machinery.
I should like to say this, in passing, to the right hon. Gentleman. I wonder whether he or his hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State could tell us whether a staff directorate has been set up at the War Office to study nuclear weapons, some of which, as the right hon. Gentleman told us this afternoon, are to be adopted by the British and other N.A.T.O. armies.
On the question of information for hon. Members, a speech was made last week during the debate on the Navy Estimates by my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) which I am bound to echo this afternoon. In any discussion of Service Estimates today, hon. and right hon. Gentlemen are to a large extent in the dark, and I believe that even staff officers in the British Army and other N.A.T.O. armies have very

little opportunity to study weapons, which we have been told by the Deputy Commander for S.H.A.E.F. will be used if aggression takes place in Europe.
It is not the slightest good the right hon. Gentleman coming to the House today and telling us at the tail end of his speech about the preparations which are being made for the use of these atomic weapons unless the Army is trained in the use of them. So I would urge the right hon. Gentleman to get all the information he can from the Americans, who undoubtedly have made much more progress in this matter than we have.
I have referred to a speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln, and I wish it were possible for this House to take the steps which he recommended in that speech and set up a Committee which could be given valuable information under pledge of secrecy. That would enable hon. Members on both sides of the House to assess the proper value of Ministers' statements.
This afternoon I want to sketch the strategic and tactical position as I see it. We have got to use the material that we have available to us, and that contained mostly in what the right hon. Gentleman said this afternoon and, up to a certain point, in the informative Memorandum which he has issued. The whole picture is drawn by the Ministry of Defence, and the Services have got to fit into that jigsaw puzzle.
But it is interesting to note that when it comes to a matter which is primarily an Army matter, namely, the disbanding of Anti-Aircraft Command, it is the Minister of Defence who comes to this House and, with a metaphorical wave of the hand, cancels that Command, which is really part of the Army. I should have thought that the Secretary of State for War would have told the House about it. It may be only a coincidence, but this momentous decision was made after the change of Minister at the head of the Ministry of Defence from Field Marshal Lord Alexander to the right hon. Gentleman who now holds the position.
It was apparent to hon. Members on both sides of the House that Anti-Aircraft Command was nothing more than a facade in home defence. Yet millions of pounds were being spent on maintaining that very expensive Command in both manpower and weapons. I think we are


entitled to be suspicious of this incident. It may be a coincidence that we had at the Ministry of Defence then, a field marshal susceptible to the Service point of view. Obviously there was in the War Office a reluctance to do away with that Command. It may be for that reason that Anti-Aircraft Command was kept in being much longer than it ought to have been. I do not want to probe too deeply into that subject. I mentioned it only to show that in spite of all the right hon. Gentleman's fine words this afternoon, there are vacant spaces in his speech which ought to be filled.
First I shall try to penetrate the somewhat indefinite assessment of the advisers of the Secretary of State. As any right hon. Gentleman who has been in charge of a Service Department knows, many staff officers are trained rigidly to conform to rigid rules. This is often highly desirable in battle but it tends to produce a static type of mind. For example, there was the controversy which raged for years in the Navy about the dreadnoughts, and rages now I believe, about the aircraft carriers. I do not believe that the advisers of the Secretary of State have as flexible minds in this modern type of warfare as they ought to be able to bring to bear in assisting the right hon. Gentleman to come to a right decision. And whatever decisions he makes, he is taking a risk—whether he places more reliance on nuclear or conventional weapons or on a conventional Army.
We concede to the right hon. Gentleman the importance of the maintenance of a conventional Army because it is obvious to anybody who has studied the warfare in which we have been engaged since the last war that a so-called conventional Army is vitally necessary to deal with a conventional situation. It cannot do any more than that, because, if it came to open aggression, that would involve us in conditions far beyond the scope of these Army Estimates.
What has the right hon. Gentleman got to prepare for? As I see it, the situation resolves itself into three parts. First, there could be aggression in Europe by a conventional attack. It might consist of an eruption of forces in East Germany which, never let us forget, under Soviet control, are fairly well armed, and not only with small arms either. As I say, it might occur by an eruption of those forces into

West Germany. That is what I would call the conventional attack, and under those circumstances the attack could be held by a conventional Army. Of course, if the attack was with nuclear weapons, the situation would be changed, and no preparations that the right hon. Gentleman has in view would deal with it adequately.
The second point which the Minister has to bear in mind is aggression elsewhere in the world, such as we have had in Korea. Obviously that should only be met by conventional warfare because, once nuclear warfare is launched, the pot is boiling and it does not just stay so. Lastly there is cold warfare everywhere at all times.
Let us take the second case. Here it would be possible, I believe, with a properly equipped and trained conventional Army, to hold the situation while diplomatic channels were used. Never let us forget that if diplomatic channels had been able to operate in time, the First World War would not have occurred. After all, it was started by a minor incident, the murder of an Archduke.
No doubt, there was a much more important and insistent policy behind that assassination; nevertheless, in these days, I believe that the diplomatic channels can operate if only some sort of peace can be kept. It was evident, listening to the Foreign Secretary this afternoon that he is of the same opinion. Also the classic exponents of warfare—for example, Clausewitz, who is still worth reading today—explain that war is only the following on of diplomatic negotiations which have failed. Therefore I have come to the conclusion that the right hon. Gentleman is right when he stresses the necessity for conventional forces.
What does that mean? It means not National Service troops but, in the main, Regular forces. Therefore, it would be well worth the right hon. Gentleman's while, even if it means a greater expense, to consider whether it is not possible to recruit that Regular Army which the right hon. Gentleman told us today would result in the saving of 100,000 men who could be turned on to productive effort—although he did not tell us the size of the Regular Army he wants.
Here I shall diverge for a moment to deal with a subject which has not been mentioned in the Memorandum or by


the right hon. Gentleman in his speech. It is a matter which is an important part of every Service Ministry, namely, psychological counter-attacks. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) will know well the value of the psychological weapon during the last war. I believe that we have dropped its use today to a large extent, although, of course, there are the intelligence and counterintelligence services.
The use of the psychological weapon can be a potent help to the Army, and it does not cost much manpower or, comparatively speaking, much money. I regret very much, therefore, that the Government have pared down the expenditure on the B.B.C. Overseas Services. The dividends that would be produced by that expenditure would far outweigh the effect of many things which the right hon. Gentleman thinks are necessary now in manpower and weapons. I will give the House one simple illustration.
There is the matter of German rearmament as it is called. I do not want to discuss the pros and cons of that, but why have we allowed the Russian Communist propaganda machine to give the impression, by stressing German rearmament continually, almost ignoring that those in the Eastern Zone of Germany have no clean hands in this matter? All our debates, and the division of opinion in this country, in France and in many other countries, turn on the question of whether the rearmament of Germany is a moral thing or not.
If it is a moral thing for N.A.T.O. countries to protect themselves against aggression, it is just as moral for Germany to take a hand in protecting her homeland against aggression. Put in that form, the argument might assume different proportions, but what have we done about it? Comparatively little. We have allowed the Soviet propaganda machine to get away with it.
The right hon. Gentleman may not want to say too much on that point, so I am only suggesting that he should not overlook the value of this secret weapon, if I may so describe it. The right hon. Gentleman and the Minister of Defence should look into the effect of this weapon because, here again, I believe that our American Allies are much more advanced in those methods than we are.

Mr. Ian Harvey: At the beginning of his speech, the right hon. Gentleman complained that the Minister of Defence had made an announcement about Anti-Aircraft Command which should have come from the Secretary of State for War. Would he not agree that all he has just been saying, which is important and interesting, really concerns the Minister of Defence and should not be answered by the Secretary of State for War?

Mr. Bellenger: Yes, in the main that is so, but obviously the Army will have to operate a part of psychological warfare, and I am calling the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to it, because he said nothing about the subject to us, in the absence of the Minister of Defence, who, obviously, will have to co-ordinate inter-Service methods.
Let us come to the kernel of the situation. As I see it, the right hon. Gentleman has to build deterrent forces which our enemies will recognise as being sufficiently strong so as not to be ignored with impunity. That is what I might call the active army. Secondly, he has to ensure the defence of the home base, because I think that on him and his troops, whatever the Home Office may do about Civil Defence, will fall the ultimate responsibility if we are ever attacked in this country with nuclear weapons.
In the earlier part of his speech the right hon. Gentleman admitted that he would like a highly-trained and sufficient Regular Army. He has never told us, nor has any other Secretary of State ever told us, what the size of that Army should be. I have ventured my opinion before in the House and I will do so today; and it is that it should be 250,000 Regulars, all ranks.
It is interesting to note, when we consider the difficulty of recruiting this Regular Army, what the War Office Publicity adviser, Mr. Sidney Rogerson, wrote in "The Times" yesterday. It surprised me. He wrote that whatever publicity we do to recruit Regular troops this fact remains constant:
The only certain moral is that each year between 25,000 and 35,000 will be willing to accept the Army as a career irrespective of any pressure from publicity, patriotism, or even Peace Pledge campaigns, irrespective also of whether there is widespread unemployment or full employment, or whether the Army is the


120,000 voluntary one of the 1900s or the 450,000 voluntary-cum-national service Army of today.
If that is correct, I should have thought that it might be possible for the right hon. Gentleman over a period of years to build up a Regular Army which would relieve the burden on the National Service men. It is true that it might cost more money. On the other side of the balance sheet, it is true that he would lose National Service men, but those National Service men would go into productive work in this country, and we are told by all sorts of authorities that unless Britain can keep up its steady progress in production the time will come when we may not be able to maintain our Services as they are today.
I merely put that before the right hon. Gentleman, and pose it as a question which I think he ought to answer. It is not sufficient for him to come here and give the stock answers of his military advisers. We have heard them time and again. I am bound to tell the right hon. Gentleman that I do not think he will be able to build up that Regular Army, even if the facts which I have read to the House are true, on the present system of periods of engagement for the Regular Army. I do not believe that the 22-year period, with breaks at three-yearly intervals, or even the three-year short period of service will give him the Regular Army that he wants.
Certainly it will not produce the type of non-commissioned officer and warrant officer which the Army needs. I am fortified in this view by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, who has devoted a great deal of study to the question, and who cannot be brushed off by the right hon. Gentleman merely because he has intervened and said that the Secretary of State ought to go. Many of us on this side of the House think that not only the Secretary of State but the whole Government ought to go.
I have given a figure of 250,000 for the Regular Army. Of course, it is not enough merely to think of a figure and then to advance it to the House. Might I, therefore, offer some evidence of what such a Regular Army could do and what it has done in the past? We had four Regular divisions, which formed the British Expeditionary Force, in 1914. There was no strategic reserve in those

days—just four divisions in this country. They formed the British Expeditionary Force, and they held up the whole of the right wing of the Kaiser's armies and stopped his armies from getting the Channel ports.

Mr. Ellis Smith: They paid dearly for it, too.

Mr. Bellenger: In 1939, the expeditionary force consisted of the same number of divisions. The so-called "Contemptible Army," as the Kaiser referred to it, proved itself, although, I am afraid, at terrible cost in casualties, to be an Army fit to challenge the highly-trained Army which the Kaiser was able to put into the field against it. That "contemptible little Army" proved its worth, and I believe that if the right hon. Gentleman has to build up a conventional Army today he must revert to that system.
He may say, of course, "We had unemployment in those days, which was the recruiting officer"; although he may not say that because of its damaging effect to his own party. But according to Mr. Rogerson, his own publicity adviser, throughout the years, at any rate since 1920, we have had this constant recruitment of 25,000 to 35,000 men whatever happened in the way of unemployment or full employment.
Of course, the four divisions which we have in Germany today are in effect the British expeditionary force. We have agreed, by Treaty, to keep them there. They are the forces at the right spot to deal with any act of aggression coming from those quarters. Indeed, I still believe that the main theatre of war, if it should come, will be Europe. That has proved to be the case in two world wars through which many of us have lived, and if we go back further into history we will find other examples.
There are other factors involved, I know. The right hon. Gentleman may remind us that in 1914 we had the Indian Army. That is true, but we are not entirely without allies today. We have a magnificent brigade of Gurkhas who can still give a good account of themselves in Britain's battles, or, as I like to term them, the world's battles. We also have an Ally whom we did not have in 1914 because, mobilised under N.A.T.O., we


have the Turkish Army, probably consisting of 24 well-trained and well-equipped divisions. On our right flank we have Greece, with no mean Army, and we have Yugoslavia, too, as far as we can judge—an Army and a nation which in two world wars has proved that it can fight. And if it comes to war, we want allies who can fight.
Last of all, we have something which we never had before—the U.S.A. divisions in Europe. I suggest that the situation is not as bad as the right hon. Gentleman's military advisers perhaps make out to him. They do that, I think, in order to bolster up their own preconceived ideas. Last year it was a question of the commitments. This year the commitments have gone, but they still want the men. That is not quite good enough. Those arguments are not likely to convince Her Majesty's Opposition or the trade unions, on whose good will the right hon. Gentleman is dependent if he is to maintain National Service in its present form.
Let us take the commitments. Last year the right hon. Gentleman published, with his Memorandum, a very useful map. He did not publish one this year because the picture would have shown a remarkable change. I have the map here. Let us consider the picture which it showed, because we do not intend to take the right hon. Gentleman's own assessment of the situation. We must be convinced of the situation if we are to give him what he is seeking in the Estimates.
This map shows the disposition of our forces all over the world. There was then one brigade in Trieste—and that has now gone. There were two divisions and one brigade in the Canal Zone, now in the process of going, with the exception of one division, which the right hon. Gentleman says he will re-deploy in Cyprus and Libya. There were 20,000 British troops in Korea and Japan. I do not know how many are there now, but I think that that commitment has considerably shrunk. On top of all that he told us last year that in this country there were 11⅔ Territorial divisions, elements of the Regular Army and other Reserves.
Now his advisers tell him—unless these 11⅔ Territorial Army divisions are to be disbanded, which is not likely to be the case, because he told us only 15 per cent. would be disbanded—that in addition we

are to have troops brought back from overseas stations, from commitments which have now disappeared, and imposed on this country. Why? It is merely to satisfy the demand for what is called a strategic Reserve, which as the right hon. Gentleman rather naïvely said would make service in the Army much more tolerable for families who have been separated.

Mr. Head: Oh, no.

Mr. Bellenger: The strategic Reserve should be for one purpose and for one purpose only. If we are to make life in the Army more tolerable, we must do it irrespective of the strategical or tactical situation. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman how he can do it, and he might take a look at the sister Services, the Navy and the R.A.F. They do not have a period of three years' overseas service. By using aircraft, the R.A.F. is able to make the period much less.
In bringing these troops here and imposing them on the barrack situation—which the right hon. Gentleman has already told us is intolerable—we shall create that very thing, a slumdom, which he deplores. Where will this strategic Reserve be put? I go further; why should it be in this country? If one looks at the map of possible areas of aggression, one will see that the Reserve could just as well be put into areas like Germany, where we are keeping four divisions, and in areas where aggression is likely to take place.
Moreover, if the right hon. Gentleman and others who have spoken in previous debates are right, and we have nuclear warfare, what would be the good of a strategic Reserve piled up here at that time? We should not be able to get it away to where they would be wanted. The right hon. Gentleman should think this out again. He should read, as no doubt he has read, a report by the military reporter which has appeared in "The Times" today. It is about married quarters for the Army.
He will see, if the article is true, that the War Office is seriously concerned about the accommodation problem not only for single soldiers, but for families. The article says that the imposition on already limited quarters of troops returning to this country, will result in some very strange anomalies. Some Service personnel may be turned out of their quarters, and wives who are separated


from their husbands who are serving overseas may have to leave their quarters. I will say no more than this about it, that the whole conception, in its present form, of the strategic Reserve being based in this country should be reconsidered.
That brings me to the question of National Service. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that that should not be dealt with in any irresponsible or emotional way. When the subject came up at the Labour Party's Conference last year, no less a person than Mr. Arthur Deakin—who as hon. Members may know is, with all his alleged faults, a responsible and powerful trade union leader—asked the Conference to refer back the various motions and resolutions on National Service, some of them calling for the cessation of conscription, to the National Executive Committee for further discussion.
I have never been enamoured of National Service, yet in 1947 I was one of the Ministers who helped to introduce the first National Service Bill in peacetime. The right hon. Gentleman and other Members of the Government cannot complain at the responsible way in which the Labour Party in all its constituent parts has dealt with this subject since it was introduced in 1947. But the right hon. Gentleman must not ask for a blank cheque, because we shall not sign it.
My opinion is that the period could be reduced. I think that it should be reduced to 18 months. When I was at the War Office, 18 months was considered ample for the training of troops, and their Reserve period was considered ample to keep them up to scratch. Nothing longer than 18 months was ever considered. It was only because of the Korean incident that the period was extended to two years. That incident is not of the same intensity that it once was. I do not say that incidents like it could not break out again. But the right hon. Gentleman told us that we are keeping large numbers of men—50,000 was the figure he gave as the number which would be involved if we reduced the period to 18 months. We should not keep these men unless it is absolutely and vitally necessary.
I could give much evidence which I have investigated myself as to why that period should be reduced, but all I say on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends

is this. We demand that the Government shall permit an inquiry into the subject. We do not want to peep behind the scenes to see what is happening in the War Office, but even in the war a committee was set up to consider the utilisation of manpower in the Army, and that was in the days when we needed millions of men and women. Surely it is not too much to ask that a responsible Opposition, such as we are, backed by a responsible Trades Union Congress, should not be denied the opportunity of having this matter properly thrashed out and investigated.
I think that a Select Committee would be the best way of doing that, because with a Select Committee we can ensure at any rate reasonable secrecy, so that security matters would be safeguarded to a large extent. Nevertheless, I say to Her Majesty's Government that this matter will not be allowed to rest, and that this question of the utilisation of our National Service men has to be investigated by somebody outside a Government Department. The right hon. Gentleman has told us that he has had quite a number of committees at the War Office. Perhaps the whole trouble has been that he has had too many of them. Let the House have one for a change.
This all links up with something which hon. Members in all parts of the House must admit is undermining the whole purpose and the obligations and guarantees of the National Service Acts. We are not today discussing the R.A.F. Estimates, but in passing I should like to say—and this will no doubt be taken up in the discussion on the R.A.F. Estimates on Thursday—that there we have the deplorable situation disclosed in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). It was that out of 136,000-odd National Service men at the end of December, 1954, fewer than 9,000 had fulfilled their obligations of having training in their period of Reserve Service.
So far as the Army is concerned, it looks as though out of 177,000-odd, only 127,000-odd had whole-time training in 1954. It is obvious that the Reserve situation has got out of hand. That is an illustration of what I have been trying to say, namely, that National Service is not working as it should and that the House is entitled to have the matter properly investigated.

Mr. Ellis Smith: During the war, a number of my friends in industry made a special investigation into this matter, and I respect the valuable work which they did. Sir George Bailey and Mr. John Little and two or three others carried out this investigation, and put on record what they had to contend with from vested interests in the War Office and in military circles. Is not such a committee of investigation wanted now?

Mr. Bellenger: I am not at odds with my hon. Friend as to the sort of committee which is needed. I am asking that we should have a committee to provide us with the appropriate information which, so far, we have not received from the right hon. Gentleman. We have had from him a series of assertions, but there is no real factual evidence to show that the Army in its present form needs as many men as he is asking for.
Let us look at Anti-Aircraft Command, to which I have already referred. The situation there is nothing short of a scandal. For 10 years after the war we kept in service weapons which hon. Members who know anything about Anti-Aircraft Command will know were nothing more than popguns, peashooters, against the high-flying, speedy jet aircraft with which we should have had to contend in the event of aggressionin the last few years. Those 3·7 guns or 4·5 guns would have been useless against attack by high-flying, speedy aeroplanes.
Yet the Army blandly kept that Command in being, and only when we had a change of Defence Ministers was that Command dismantled. And how was the Command dismantled? The right hon. Gentleman may have qualms about it, because, in a moment, to tell the largest part of the Territorial Army that they can go home or be utilised in other occupations is just the same as industry firing its redundant men; and industry today knows that it cannot dismiss a large number of men without taking them into its confidence and trying to find for them proper opportunities of being employed elsewhere.
I regret to say I suspect that we shall lose the services of a large number of those men and women who were in Anti-Aircraft Command and who bore the heat and burden of the day. I say that without fear of contradiction. Let hon. Gentlemen opposite who have had real

experience of the Territorial Army deny it. Let the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) or the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) tell us something about the dismantling of that Command which took place in a night. I think that it should have been done with more consideration for the service which these men and women have valiantly given, and would have been prepared to continue to give, but may not be prepared to give under the conditions of alternative employment which the right hon. Gentleman is offering to them.
I do not know the size of that Command, I can only suspect, and I suspect that many thousands will be involved. In answer to a Question, the right hon. Gentleman told me that 30 per cent. of them would be maintained for antiaircraft purposes. I think that figure has dropped somewhat, and I can only assume that the dispersal of the rest involves a considerable army in itself. I think that the right hon. Gentleman should be condemned for allowing such a situation to blow up.
There is one other matter, that is our home defence. I put this problem into two parts, the active Army, and the defence of the home base. Is there any defence of the home base today? I wonder. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Minister of Supply told us something which seemed to me to be rather startling.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman was being questioned by hon. Members on this side of the House, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) asked him this question:
Is it not true that in the White Paper the Government have declared that our aircraft are capable, in the event of night attack, of putting up a performance better than any other defensive aircraft in the world?
The right hon. and learned Gentleman replied:
That is most certainly true."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 879.]
Pressed to say whether it was better than the American defence system, he went on to say that of course it was—but not in that language.
I am not an expert on matters of defence by night fighters. I can only go by what I read in different journals. I was interested to note that in "The


Times" there appeared this report from the Washington correspondent.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's statement in the House of Commons last week that Britain's night fighters were—as the Government White Paper had already claimed—superior even to their American counterpart, has occasioned here a few derisive, though unofficial snorts.
I wonder whether those who snorted are so wide of the mark? Is that what we call the defence of the home base today? Is that all we have, with the dismantlement of the obsolescent Anti-Aircraft Command?
The right hon. Gentleman himself may not remember, but the Minister of Defence certainly will remember the attacks which used to be made on the Chamberlain Government by the present Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman who is now, I think, the Minister of Housing and Local Government. In those days, they alleged that the defence of this country against Hitler's bombers was practically negligible. And so it appeared at the beginning of the war; we know it now.
Although the situation may not be so serious today, I assert that we have very little real defence against the bomber—and I am not talking about the nuclear bomber—which, of course, will always get through. I do not say that the Anti-Aircraft Command would have given us that defence, but I do say that this twin problem of aeroplane defence—fighter defence if hon. Members like—and ground-to-air missiles, guided or otherwise, should have long been thought out; that we should have had in production something which would offer some hope. I doubt whether today we have anything in the way of ground-to-air guided missiles or otherwise. That, as I see it, is the situation. Let the right hon. Gentleman or any other right hon. Gentleman deny it if they can.
We are told something about weapons in the Memorandum. I do not propose to get involved in an FN. rifle engagement today. I will leave that to my hon. Friends who know far more about it than I do—at any rate, they were more recently at the War Office than I was. But I wish to say something about another statement of the right hon. Gentleman. In paragraph 53 of the Memorandum, he says
The main weapons for which we shall have to make provision in the immediate future are the Conqueror tank, the L70 light anti-aircraft gun. the FN. rifle and the new sub-machine gun.

I take it that the new sub-machine gun is what used to be known as the Patchett gun and is now called the Sterling gun.
If we can judge from recent Press statements, that is the weapon to replace the Sten gun. I have shot one of these guns, and it is a handy weapon. It is interesting to note that it was developped from an original German weapon, or at any rate, a German pattern. It has been brought to a pitch which the Army considers to be very fine, because the Army has accepted this sub-machine gun as the weapon to replace the Sten gun.
That is all very well, but how many Sten machine guns are there in the Army? I do not know, but I will hazard the guess that there are about 500,000. There were about 2 million during the war. According to Press statements, the factory which is making the Sterling gun is manufacturing it at the rate of 250 a week, and hopes to increase its output to 1,000 a week at some period this year. Moreover, this weapon has been accepted by certain other N.A.T.O. countries as the weapon they want.
If the right hon. Gentleman is seriously telling us that the Army is going to adopt this weapon in place of the Sten gun because it is the best machine gun, why does not he work at greater speed? When does he think that the Army will finally be equipped with these weapons? I do not suppose that the first order of 50,000 has been made. If the Minister of Supply were here he might be able to tell us. In mentioning these facts, I am merely trying to show the House that all is not such plain sailing as the Secretary of State would have us believe.
I now wish to refer to the Conqueror tank. I think that it is a very good piece of armament. It is a very heavy tank—heavier than the Centurion, which is a good tank. But during the exercise "Battle Royal" not one Centurion tank did I see off the roads. If the Conqueror tank is to be produced in large numbers, I believe that it will become immobilised in the type of warfare which is visualised in the right hon. Gentleman's Memorandum. No doubt this weapon is very useful for a strong point, but I do not think that the type of warfare we shall see in the future needs large numbers of Conqueror tanks. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman does not mean to order large numbers; perhaps he is


merely putting a few in his shop window, just as was done with the 3·7 anti-aircraft gun before the war.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: The right hon. Gentleman said that he had never seen a Centurion tank off the roads. I do not know what he means by that.

Mr. Bellenger: That they are not mobile. They were either brought up on the carriers or were on the metalled roads themselves. The hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) must know that these Centurion tanks, to say nothing of the Conqueror tanks, will not be able to move in ploughed-up areas unless they can keep to the roads.

Mr. Head: Mr. Head indicated dissent.

Mr. Bellenger: If the Secretary of State says that I am wrong, perhaps he will tell me in what way. He knows a great deal about armoured warfare from the last war.
I think it is a fact that except, in the desert campaigns, these tanks had to keep to the roads. [HON MEMBERS: "No."] Some may have gone across country when it was dry, but it is not always possible to fight one's battles in dry country. I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman does not require large numbers of these tanks. The Navy has decided that it is not going to have so many battle cruisers and battleships, but will depend more upon speedier and lighter, although powerful, armaments.

Mr. Head: The Centurion tank is one for which we have a considerable market. It has a very great reputation, and I should not like anything said against it to go by default. The reason that the right hon. Gentleman saw these tanks on the roads during manœuvres was probably because they were trying to avoid damage to the crops. These tanks can go all over the place, in frightful conditions, and it is entirely misleading to suggest that they are in any way roadbound in a country like Germany.

Mr. Bellenger: The right hon. Gentleman may be right: that may be why I saw these tanks mainly on roads.
But he has said himself that the whole essence of any future warfare, if nuclear

weapons are used, is dispersal and not concentration. In that case these tanks will have to get off the roads, and I still doubt whether they will be able to do it in circumstances which I have outlined. However, that is my opinion, and if the right hon. Gentleman can show me why we should have large numbers of these Conqueror tanks, I shall be prepared to listen to him.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Mr. Emrys Hughes rose—

Mr. Bellenger: I should like to give way to my hon. Friend, but there are many hon. Members who wish to speak after me. I have dealt with various features of the Estimates, and there are obviously many other matters connected with them into which we could and should probe, but I do not believe that Front Bench speakers should monopolise the time of the House in these debates. Obviously, speaking for their party, they are expected to say quite a lot, and they are probably put there to do so because they know a good deal about their subject. That is not to under-estimate the knowledge which many hon. Members on the bank benches on both sides of the House will have to contribute to the debate.
I have tried to pin-point only a few of the outstanding features of our Army. I do not want to create any alarm or despondency. The right hon. Gentleman can never allege that against me or, indeed, against my party in the main, because the Labour Government, with all the faults which the right hon. Gentleman can attribute to them, did accomplish many good things for the Services—not least the housing loan which my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) passed through Parliament, and which is now alleviating much of the distress which was caused to married families in the Army in the past.
I do not think it is necessary to assure the House—although I do so—that we are just as concerned as the right hon. Gentleman with recruiting forces which will act not only as deterrents against war, but which, if we are involved in war, will give as good an account of themselves as our Armies, Navies and Air Forces have done in the past. If we attempted to deal with this matter in a partisan way we should rightly stand condemned. I only hope that the House will concede that in


all my criticisms I have tried to be constructive. That is the purpose of Her Majesty's Opposition.
The right hon. Gentleman was a persistent critic of the Labour Government when he sat upon these benches. The only thing that I can say about him is that in those days he used to put his points more cogently than he does today—but that is because he has to speak from a brief prepared for him by the War Office. In those days he had to search out his own weapons and his own shot and shell.

Mr. Wigg: The reverse is the case. The right hon. Gentleman was then much better briefed by the War Office than he is now.

Mr. Bellenger: That is an allegation which I shall leave my hon. Friend to develop. He probably has more evidence about it than I have. The right hon. Gentleman is a very fluent speaker. I have tried to show that when he was in Opposition he was not only fluent but was sometimes very offensive—to use the term in its military sense—in his attacks, and, looking back now, I would not say that he did not occasionally get a shot or two through our armour. But fine words butter no parsnips, and the right hon. Gentleman must offer us something more than fine words.
Listening to him as I have done on many occasions—not only in debates upon the Army Estimates but in answering Questions—I have the impression that he is often very plausible but not always too precise. I hope that I have raised in the minds of some hon. Members some of the doubts which exist in all parts of the House and which, arising out of the right hon. Gentleman's own words, seem to me to show lack of decision in vital aspects of Army defence. In politics, as well as in war, that is fatal.

6.50 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Hurd: I want to continue for a few minutes the discussion of National Service in the Army. I welcome what my right hon. Friend said this afternoon, as I welcomed the sentence in the Defence White Paper which put very clearly and in straightforward words the attitude of Her Majesty's Government to National Service. The words in the White Paper were:

The Government would therefore be failing in their duty were they to propose, at the present time, any reduction in the current period of whole-time National Service.
I do not think that any hon. Member would disagree with that view or with the words that were chosen to express it.
As the prospect of our future defence plans grows clearer we should begin to prepare for the day when National Service can be limited and its form altered. The Army is by far the biggest user of National Service men, taking 130,000 out of a total of 198,000. The Navy and the Royal Air Force take their pick, and the Army absorbs the rest. It does not have the opportunity of selecting the men as the other two Services do.
I always think it is a bit unfair when all the criticisms of National Service are levelled at the Army, in distinction to the Royal Air Force and the Navy. It is not at all surprising that we hear complaints about National Service from parents and from the lads themselves about dreary routine and wasted time during National Service in the Army. Industrialists, personnel managers and welfare workers say that some lads have to be reconditioned for civilian life at the end of their National Service in the Army, which taught them to waste time and to watch the clock. The lads had somehow lost the zest for work and the initiative which they had before they went into the Army—

Brigadier Christopher Peto: I am sure that my hon. Friend does not want to represent the Army as a place where generally young soldiers waste their time so that they have to be reconditioned upon returning to civilian life again. That would be a gross misrepresentation

Mr. Hurd: I hope that my hon. and gallant Friend will allow me to finish my sentence, and make my point. Let me continue. Those about whom we hear complaints are the small minority. The Secretary of State takes that view, and I share it, but let me repeat for the benefit of my hon. and gallant Friend who interrupted me that I do not blame the Army, because they have to take all sorts of men whereas the other two Services have their pick. I hope I have put this matter into its proper context.
The great majority of the lads who do their service in the Army gain in stature,


particularly if they see service overseas. I had the privilege, and I call it a privilege, of mixing with our National Service men in Malaya last August. I never want a chance of talking to a finer body of young chaps than those who are fighting the battle of freedom in Malaya. I endorse what is written in the Memorandum which the Secretary of State has given us in presenting these Army Estimates, in which he says:
Our National Service men as well as our Regular soldiers have distinguished themselves in this tough and demanding type of warfare.
Previously he says:
Such operations place a great mental and physical strain on the men taking part.
Having talked to a few of them, I know that the strain is almost more than some 19-year-old lads should be asked to bear.
I feel, again in the words of the Memorandum, on the subject of Malaya:
Although the situation has improved there is no room for complacency, and I cannot yet foresee any reduction in the number of troops committed to operations in Malaya.
That is true. We have still a cleaning up job to do there and it may take some years yet. I believe, with the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) who spoke from the Opposition Front Bench, that it must be our constant aim to see that the Army gets, by voluntary recruitment, all the men required for N.A.T.O. forces and police jobs in the Empire, in which I include Malaya and Kenya. We must never let up in pursuing that aim.
On the question of terms of service in the Regular Army, not only pay but allowances for wives and children and the married quarters, I have discussed with officers who have had personal cases put to them by men concerned the problem of why more men do not prolong their Regular service in the Army. Time after time it is because a man has either just got married or is just going to get married and his girl does not fancy Army life. She feels that it will mean a broken life, and that the opportunities she will have for enjoying the company of her husband will be all too few. Therefore she says, "If we are to get married let's try to make a job of it. You must come out of the Army."
My right hon. Friend has told us that he puts a high priority upon improving

conditions for married men in the Army. I am sure that he is right to do so, and that this House would not grudge the spending generously of public money to put that side of Army life right. If my right hon. Friend has further proposals I believe that the Minister of Defence and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would lend a ready ear, and that the House would give full and ready endorsement to them.
We may be nearer than we think to the day when our National Service training can be for a very short, concentrated period of 14 weeks or so, followed of course by periodical camps to keep men handy and up-to-date with weapons and in their ideas. I mention 14 weeks because that is the period which is in operation in Australia and New Zealand. Those Commonwealth partners have promised to give us more help in Malaya.
I discussed the Australian defence contribution with Members of Parliament in Canberra in September. I found they had no idea that we had two years' conscription in Britain. They have just 14 weeks, which does not give an opportunity for much more than to get into uniform and get handy with weapons. There is no attempt to maintain a standing reserve with national service men.
Through their Prime Ministers, those countries have recently declared their willingness and determination to help us further in the defence of South-East Asia, particularly in Malaya. I welcome that very much. No doubt they will do it by improving the terms of service of their Regulars rather than, as we have done, by prolonging the period of conscription so as to provide from conscripts men who are expected in normal times to do police jobs in the Empire. I believe that Australia and New Zealand will somehow or another get the extra men they have promised to put into the Empire defence pool by improving the terms of service for volunteers.
To return to our problem in Britain, I have always felt, as, I suppose, have most hon. Members, unless they have actually served in the War Office, that the mind of the War Office is apt to run in a rut. It is so easy, of course, to feel, "Two years' National Service produces the men, so let us leave well alone, "but all is not truly well, either for the War Office, or, in my opinion, for the general public. I


believe that the administrative machine of the Army is overloaded because there are too many misfits among the lads doing National Service in the Army. When I say "too many" in the Army, I remind my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Devon, North (Brigadier Peto), I mean not the majority but a small minority; but a small minority can be too many.
The House should ask for a fresh review of the training and employment of National Service men in the Army. It is, after all, effective manpower, not only bodies, that are wanted for this job. My right hon. Friend said again today that many problems of the War Office would be simplified if we could rid ourselves of so great a reliance on National Service. I ask the Minister of Defence whether he himself does not think that a fresh look by people outside the War Office into the methods of training and employing National Service men in the Army would be well worth while? I think it would, so that we could be ready to make changes in the system as soon as we can safely lay aside two years' conscription as essential to our defence. I am not an expert in these matters, but I have a feeling that that time may come sooner than any of us can at present foresee.

7.3 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: Like the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), I should like to approach the Army aspect of this enormously complex defence problem from the angle of National Service. I wish to do so because I think it is apparent from all the speeches that we have heard today that that is what is very much in the mind of the House.
It seemed from the speech of the Secretary of State that what he said on this subject was of some gravity, because I could not regard the implication of his speech as any other than that he was thinking of a two-year term of National Service in perpetuity. That seemed to me a very grave issue to be facing the House and the nation.

Mr. Head: I may have given that impression, and until I have read the Report of my speech I cannot say whether I did or not, but it was certainly not the impression I meant to give. The Government have always said that it is their

intention to reduce National Service by as much as possible and as soon as possible, but that in the situation which confronts us at the present time we feel we cannot reduce the size of the Army below its present level.

Mr. Strachey: I have no doubt that that is the aspiration of the right hon. Gentleman, but the implication of his argument, as I hope to show in a moment, seemed to me quite inescapable, and that was that there would be two years' National Service as far ahead as anyone could see.
That is the more serious because this year, it seemed to me, the situation, technically, of our defences, including the commitments, was unusually favourable to at any rate an attempt to begin the process of reducing the period of National Service. There was the very great saving on commitments, which the Government made, and upon which I congratulate them, and to which the Secretary of State referred, and there was also the nuclear revolution which will inescapably in a few years' time make the kind of Army which we are building today completely anachronistic. So the serious matter seemed to me to be that if we could not look towards a reduction of the period this year in those circumstances the prospect of our ever being able to do so was bleak.
I could follow the arithmetic of the Secretary of State, and it was very interesting. He saved 66,000 men, he told us, by reductions in commitments. A cut of six months in the period of National Service would cost him 50,000 men. Then, on the other hand, there had been a total rundown in the Regular content of the Army of 35,000.Therefore, he could not afford to make any reductions.
That is perfectly true if he thinks in terms of the present Army and the present commitments and the discharging of the present commitments in the present way. But he was the first to say, at the start, that if he could have a Regular long-service Army, a professional Army to deal with the commitments in the present way, and even commitments of the present size—I shall come to that in a moment—he could do it with 100,000 men less. We at once see the possibility of very great savings by way of movements and the rest; but he was right in saying that that in itself would not be enough,


because the Regular long-service Army, all experience shows, would not be big enough to do the job even on a more economical basis.
There is no doubt that a reduction in the period of National Service or its virtual abolition as the hon. Member for Newbury said just now, would mean that we should have to have an Army of about half the size of that which is with the Colours today, and if we are even to move far in that direction it seems to me that we shall have to look once again at our commitments. Surely the nuclear revolution which we are all facing in defence gives us an opportunity to do that?
I wish to put some questions to the Secretary of State and to the Minister of Defence that I put in the defence debate. Just as an instance, take this new commitment on which we are embarking, the commitment in Cyprus. There are two commitments in Cyprus from the Army point of view. There is the commitment of Dekalia and the commitment of the Middle Eastern base in another part of the island called Episkopi.
There may be something to be said for the Dekalia base. I admit I have a weak spot for it because it was started when I was at the War Office. It is a very attractive place. I had the pleasure of visiting it with the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinching-brooke) the other day, and a very attractive place it is. There may be something to be said for it if we are to station an armoured division in the Middle East. It is certainly a very nice place to put part of it. I do not doubt that, but what the purpose of that part of it is ought, I think, to be explained to us. In the nuclear age we can use—

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Harold Macmillan): Dekalia is not the headquarters.

Mr. Strachey: The Minister of Defence is confusing two things. Dekalia is a station, and he is confusing that with Episkopi. I am trying to clear his mind on that point. Dekalia is a locality, shall we say?

Mr. Macmillan: The headquarters are being moved from Suez to Cyprus.

Mr. Strachey: We are having a fascinating running commentary from the

Minister of Defence. I am not complaining about that, because he is displaying a certain ignorance of topography and military matters which is not damaging to me, but which I think is damaging to him.
The fact is that it is proposed to station half an armoured division at Dekalia. It is a very nice place to put it, and very nice barracks are being constructed there, but it should be explained to the House what the purpose is to be, in cold or hot war terms, of that armoured division in the Middle East. I am extremely doubtful, in the nuclear age, whether an armoured division in the Middle East is serving any Commonwealth or N.A.T.O. purpose in that area. It may be a defensible proposition, but we have not heard a defence of it.
I pass to the other and much larger establishment being built in Cyprus, at Episkopi—a vast headquarters on which£8 million is to be spent, not for stationing any fighting troops there, not for putting any stores there, but as a vast headquarters much more vulnerable than the vast headquarters in the Suez area. The Prime Minister gave very good reasons for evacuating Suez in the nuclear age. And yet we are building at Cyprus this vast base which would be a perfect target for atomic or nuclear attack. What do the Government think we are going to administer there and what do they think we are to command from such a base?
The Secretary of State said some excellent things about the necessity of carrying on future wars without these enormously elaborate headquarters—these elaborate, ganglia of signals, which are, of course, very convenient and which in the past have been thought to be necessities. We must learn to do without them.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The right hon. Gentleman will agree that, from the point of view of nuclear attack, Episkopi is not much less insecure than Aldershot. Would he not also agree that it is a joint headquarters with the R.A.F.?

Mr. Strachey: It is a joint headquarters of all three Services. The noble Lord makes a fair point—that the bases in this country are extremely vulnerable, too.
May I say a word in that connection about the Reserve Army and the strategic Reserve? Is not the real lesson that which the Secretary of State began to


mention—that we must learn to do without these nerve centres which can be paralysed by one bomb in any future war? It seems to me to be a very grave thing that we are spending great resources in manpower—because thousands of officers and men are to be in this great base—from our very limited resources in this way.
I merely give the example of Cyprus because I have had the opportunity to see it; and I do so from the view that when we reassess our position in the quite new circumstances of the nuclear age, we see that there are still overseas commitments which are not only extravagant in manpower but no longer serve any useful purpose at all. I therefore believe that in this field also the argument that we cannot meet our commitments unless we carry the load of two years 'National Service in perpetuity begins to break down, because those commitments are seen one by one to be becoming purposeless too. I simply gave the Cyprus example.

Mr. Ian Harvey: No one has ever said "in perpetuity." In fact the Secretary of State made it quite clear that he wanted to reduce the period at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. Strachey: We all want to reduce it; I am quite sure of that. But I repeat that unless we make a start fairly soon, if not now, we shall never get a more favourable opportunity. That is the point I am making.
I come to the other overseas commitments and to the overwhelmingly important commitment of N.A.T.O. in Western Europe. There again, surely, the appearance of nuclear warfare has revolutionised the position. We debated last week the whole question of the N.A.T.O. commitments, and all I wish to add today on that subject is that we do not know what kind of aggression, what degree of aggression, we may meet in that area. The Minister of Defence almost said as much in his concluding speech in the defence debate.
I repeat the view which I expressed in that debate—that it is folly to commit ourselves in advance on hypothetical situations. I am quite certain that it would be folly to commit ourselves not to use particular kinds of weapons in particular situations, and equally I believe that it would be folly

to commit ourselves to use them, because these situations are unforeseeable.
The great disaster, it seems to me—and I say this with great respect for them—was when the generals and field marshals in N.A.T.O. began to make speeches which appeared to give hard-and-fast commitments about hypothetical situations. I think that the more the Government look at the matter the more they will regret that that has ever been done, and will wish that we should simply revert to the position of building our own deterrent and reserving, as all Governments hitherto have reserved, the question of its use to a particular situation when it arises.
Having said that, I would stress that the whole tendency of warfare in every field—air, land and sea—is to become nuclear and to have nuclear weapons put into it on both sides. I have never attached very great importance to the hypothesis that we might be attacked by the Russians in a major war without their using nuclear weapons. I should have thought that that was a most remote hypothesis which grows more remote almost hourly, because they have tactical nuclear weapons, and I should have thought that they were almost certain to use them if ever they began a third world war. I therefore think that these are all rather remote hypotheses.
But it means, of course, that land warfare is becoming nuclear. I do not ask the Government to tell us much about that, because they could not do so, but I saw in the American Press, for what these unofficial reports are worth, statements that very soon the American forces will be armed with eight-inch howitzers firing fission weapons. If that is anything like remotely true it shows the extent to which the land forces are becoming revolutionised.
Surely if that is true a far more drastic reorganisation of our land forces is necessary than any we have heard about today. It cannot be done in a moment. We should not dream of expecting the Government to have done it. But as far as we can see, they have not begun seriously to think about it—to think about it in an organised way. Surely this revolution points to a far smaller Army, far more of a long-service professional Army, in order to use the gigantic multiplication of firepower which is obviously to be


made available to us. It will demand great professional skill in its use but much smaller numbers to use it.
Of course we must have a screen in Europe; no one doubts that. But surely no one doubts that that screen will not be the decisive factor in any future war. The decisive factor would be the exchange of thermo-nuclear weapons by air. There I come to what seemed the least satisfactory part of the speech of the Secretary of State—the part dealing with the Reserve Army and the Territorial Army.
I admit that he has a most terrible problem, but he did not seem to tell us what the purpose of the old form of the Reserve Army would be. My hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart), my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), and I, knew at the War Office the concept of building up 11 or 12 Reserve divisions in this country which could be sent out one by one to reinforce the screen in Europe. But surely that whole concept must now be a thing of the past.
One has only to think of what the Secretary of State said about ports and bases, and to think of Antwerp—think of the base we are developing there and the remoteness of the possibility of sending troops through Antwerp in any future war. Surely we must be told—and soon—what is the purpose of the Reserve Army today. The Secretary of State began to give a hint in his speech that it was Civil Defence, home defence services. There may be something in that, but that matter requires far more careful thought and discussion today.
I am not denying the need for a screen in Europe, but I am frankly sceptical about this whole conception of land armies using nuclear weapons in Europe. At any rate, our interest in such a battle, if it occurred, would be largely posthumous. I think a military revolution is needed in our thinking, and it must go far deeper than it has so far. It must take account of the fact that the whole Reserve Army, the build-up of which is the underlying purpose of National Service in its present form, needs drastic revision.
I know very well that these questions are much easier to ask than to answer, but we have a right to ask the Government in these Service debates this year

to show that they are beginning to face them. Instead—I must call the attention of the House to it again—we have that fatal phrase in the White Paper that:
… the thermo-nuclear weapon does not radically alter the rôle of any of the three fighting Services.

Mr. H. Macmillan: Read the next sentence.

Mr. Strachey: It says:
Each has a contribution to make to the three main aims of our defence policy—to build up the deterrent against aggression, to fight the cold war, and to prepare for a major war in case it should come to that.
That does not seem to alter the sense at all
What we want the Government to do is to tell us what that contribution is to be. Of course, each of the fighting Services has a contribution, but we are sure it is going to be a radically different contribution than heretofore. To do the Secretary of State justice, his speech today was in flat contradiction of that sentence in the Defence White Paper, for he began to show that he was giving some thought to this question.

Mr. R. T. Paget: Not that the right hon. Gentleman is doing it.

Mr. Strachey: No, I would not altogether blame him in not beginning to do anything yet. But the question should be faced, and faced far more drastically.
We ask the Government, in this defence field—which, as the other day they re-emphasised, is of such vital importance—to do far more basic thinking, and to show the House that at any rate they are grappling with the truly terrible problems which face us. I do not deny that they are ghastly problems. But the Government should be showing some sign of realising what is in front of us, and not merely carrying on the Defence Services in the old way because they are afraid to face the revolution in front of them.

7.25 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: When the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) asks us to do some basic thinking, I must confess that it could be hardly more difficult to do any thinking at all on the two entirely different


approaches to the problem by two ex-Socialist Secretaries of State for War. They have really expanded the wish of my right hon. Friend that as soon as possible conscription should be diminished.

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;

House counted, and, 40 Members being present—

Mr. Fraser: As I was attempting to show, if there be a confusion, the two ex-Secretaries of State for War have made it worse confounded. The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) was of the opinion that tanks were not efficient enough, and the right hon. Member for Dundee, West was of the opinion that tanks were not worth while at all.

Mr. Strachey: I did not say a word about them.

Mr. Fraser: The right hon. Member was referring to the armoured division in Libya. It is lucky that we have not the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) with us, whose views on defence would seem to lead one either to the position of never firing the atomic bomb, or of building up such an overwhelming force that conscription would have to last in this country for seven or eight years per man. What emerges from the speeches of hon. Members opposite is that at this stage when the atomic bomb as a deterrent is becoming almost obsolescent and when the hydrogen bomb in the hands of the Western Powers is an effective weapon for delivery, we are inevitably in a state of change and revolution.
I must disagree with the right hon. Member for Dundee, West, in all seriousness, when the "Economist" has referred to the White Paper on Defence and the Memorandum accompanying the Estimates as the first real and definite attempt made in this country to try to meet these problems. I believe that newspaper spoke truth. It is extremely difficult at this stage to be absolutely clear on all the things which will have to be done. I think that at this moment it would be extremely dangerous if hon. Members started a hare in the country by saying that the time had come to abolish conscription or to reduce it heavily. At this stage it would be extremely irresponsible and dangerous to our security.
I think the rôles declared by my right hon. Friend for the Army might be described as three. First, there is the rôle in the area of probability—there is nothing more one can say than that it is a probable rôle—which may occur or need to be fulfilled by an Army in this period. The first of the three is in the area of what might be called the main deterrent—that is, Europe. I think there is no question but that if there were a major attack by the Soviet Union in Europe there would be a nuclear war. Most people in the House who have read the statements made from N.A.T.O. can make only that interpretation. I believe that that is the right interpretation and that the clearer it is made the greater probable chance there is of peace.
There is, secondly, the area of what one might call the area of war, or of defence by proxy. We have seen it in Indo-China, where the Chinese or the Russians—certainly the Chinese—made war through other people. We have seen it as a defensive rôle in the defensive rôle with which the Americans are helping to defend Formosa. We have seen it in Korea. We have seen these areas, although probably in the future it will not be to the advantage of any major Power to unleash atomic or nuclear warfare. This second area must be an area where a large number of troops would undoubtedly be used.
Let me remind hon. Members that to toy with the question of nuclear warfare as such is an extremely dangerous consideration for the people of this country. I believe that there must be a peripheral area where the minor war, so to speak, might take place.
Thirdly, my right hon. Friend has dealt clearly enough with what one might call the rôle of British troops in an area of subversion, revolt or revolution. It is in these last two peripheral areas—the area in which there might be war by proxy and the area of subversion—that political considerations must be of first importance. Indeed, one part of the White Paper deals with those matters. In these areas, it is more than ever necessary that the totality of factors should be considered.
As regards the wider area in which our bases have an impact upon the situation, everybody will welcome the elaboration of the S.E A.T.O. Pact which my


right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has helped in achieving. Secondly, there is the point raised by the right hon. Member for Dundee, West about the armoured division which is stationed, according to the White Paper, either in Libya or, partially, in Cyprus. This country should welcome the Iraki-Turco defence pact, and I believe, therefore, that some time, under the umbrella of a Middle East defence pact, which is necessary and is seen now to be necessary by people in the Middle East, it may be possible that that armoured division might be located in a more strategic position than merely occupying the Libyan sand.
It is mainly the problem of subversion of which I shall endeavour to speak this evening, and I address my remarks chiefly to the Colonial Territories, to Malaya and to Kenya. Subversion, of course, can take many forms. It need not necessarily be Communist. Indeed, I feel certain that the rulers of the Kremlin, so long as their revolt shows some measure of success, remove as far as possible any contact with the revolt, otherwise there would be embarrassment for them and, possibly, to those engaged in the subversion. But in the minds of those who are trying to win the cold war against us, there must be two special areas: the Colonial Territories, where they believe there is a chance for upsetting our rule, and secondly, the vital area of the Middle East oilfields, which today produce 20 per cent. of the world's oil and which contain some 60 per cent. of the world's reserves.
This period of transference of power by this country to the colonial peoples is not necessarily a period of peace. It does not necessarily follow that because power is being handed out by the present Government as it was by the previous Government, and because people are being encouraged more and more to govern themselves, that necessarily ensures a period of peace. It is all the more important that in these new Constitutions we and the Crown should retain to ourselves the powers of defence and of the police force until such time as an individual Colony actually attains full self-government as a member of the Commonwealth.
When we look at the questions which have come upon us—the defeat of subversion, for instance, either in Malaya or

in Kenya—and the immense amount of money and numbers of troops which have had to be involved from this country, this House must occasionally think that perhaps more should be done. I suggest that the rôles which have to be fulfilled in those areas as far as the Armed Forces or the Governments are concerned are, firstly, prevention and, secondly, cure.
I suggest that more should perhaps be done in the prevention of some of these outbreaks. This is a purely personal belief, but I believe that if our intelligence work had been more efficient both in Kenya and even in Malaya at an earlier stage, it would have been possible for some of the leaders to have been apprehended before they developed the full strength of war in the jungle. After all, Champin from Malaya paraded through the streets of London in the 1945 Victory Parade. We should, therefore, look seriously at the question of preventing these outbreaks or preventing the need for the Government of the day to use the fire brigade or to use troops, and so on.
Much has been done in the last few years in organising the colonial police, but I believe that more should be done. The vital need is to see that those colonial police forces are efficient and highly trained and get into touch properly, as policemen in this country do, with the people of their country. I believe that the basis of friendly relationship between police and people is the basis of all effective police work and produces the information.
I believe, therefore, that a step might be taken to set up a gendarmerie in the Colonial Territories separate from their police forces. The essence of all intelligence and C.I.D. work depends on good relations between the population and the police. The gendarmerie force would not take part in day-to-day activities but could be used in the event of trouble, as has just occurred in Mombasa. That is the kind of occasion when a gendarmerie force could be used without disrupting the normal relationship between population and police. It would also be a saving to British troops.
I do not question the action taken by any Colonial Government, but it might not be entirely necessary for minor strikes to be broken by British troops. That should be a task for the gendarmerie, and I believe that something


could be done to establish the gendarmerie separately from the regular police.

Mr. Paget: The hon. Member has not made one matter clear. Is he suggesting that the gendarmerie forces should be raised and maintained by this country and should be transferable from one Colonial Territory to another, or that each Colony should raise its own?

Mr. Fraser: I would leave that to the Colonial Office. I would say that probably each Colonial Territory should raise its own gendarmerie force. The only point is that these things cost money and the House should be aware of some of these problems and should be able to give support to the Secretary of State for War. It must be in the interest of the Secretary of State for War to see that these outbreaks do not take place. The first answer is the prevention of the outbreak, and the first means of prevention is a more efficient and effective police force.

Mr. Wigg: Will the hon. Gentleman be good enough to say what part the Navy plays? It will be remembered that at the start of the Mau Mau trouble a cruiser was sent to Mombasa and we never quite knew what rôle that cruiser was to play.

Mr. Fraser: That is a Navy point. We are discussing the Army Estimates.
I am sure that a "fire" could be put out if there were a more effective organisation, and I am certain that there is no one in the House who does not welcome the appointment of Sir Gerald Templer to. advise the Minister of Defence on colonial forces. I believe that that is an extremely popular and valuable appointment.
The problems of the colonial forces have been dealt with in greater detail in the Statement on Defence than in the Memorandum relating to the Army Estimates. We are moving through a period when the colonial peoples are achieving self-government, and naturally the question of officering arises, the question of officers who are Malays and Chinese in Malaya, and Africans in Africa. In the next 30 or 40 years we are bound to see an Africanisation or Malayanisation of part of our forces. There is also the outstanding question of the use of colonial

manpower, which is excellent material. No one who has been in Malaya or East Africa can have anything but the highest praise for the Fijians, the West Africans, the East Africans, the Ibans and others in Malaya, and the contribution made by these people. There is the possibility of further development. It may not come for a considerable number of years, but inevitably one day these forces will be officered by their own nationals. Already there are African junior officers in West Africa.
The central political and military problem of the colonial forces is to ensure that they have the best possible officers from this country. I know that this is difficult. I know that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have worked in the War Office know of the great shortage of N.C.Os. and officers. That is one of the problems which Sir Gerald Templer will have to work out, and I am sure that the whole House will wish him luck. It may be that officers from Anti-Aircraft Command and other officers of distinction and ability will be able to take part in this work. We certainly have in the Colonies a large reservoir of first-class fighting troops. Whatever assumption we make of the type of warfare in which we may be engaged—and on that point my hopes tend to rise—in Africa we have large numbers of men who could be employed as most effective troops.
As to the problem of maintaining law and order in the Colonies, everyone must pay tribute to the Secretary for War upon the success which he has achieved and, I believe, is about to achieve in the reorganisation of the movement of troops by air, which he forecasts in his Memorandum. That is of vital importance, because obviously British forces from this country will be essential in those areas. To these troops no higher tribute can be paid than was paid by the Foreign Secretary today. Undoubtedly, as the Secretary of State for War said, the training which they receive in Malaya and Kenya is of great importance. It needs no confirmation that co-operation with the civil power is now working extremely well in Malaya, though more could be done in providing language classes for Regular forces. There is also the problem of teaching special techniques, such as parachuting, engineering and air supply.
The big problem remains whether in time of war the movement of troops can be carried out sufficiently speedily from this country and whether it may not be necessary to have some form of base in East Africa. There is a base there at the moment because of the Mau Mau troubles and because a large number of British and African battalions are employed there. It is not impossible that in the future we may need something of a base in East Africa, and in Kenya there is a suitable climate for Europeans. The base might be needed for the training of African contingents over the next 20 and 30 years, and African officers and higher ranks of non-commissioned officers. It might also be required as a strategic base because of the possibility that we might find trouble or danger in the Persian Gulf area.
I may have a slight mania about the Persian Gulf, but it seems to me that that is an area which is an extremely ripe and rich target for anyone who wishes us ill and that in that connection it is not impossible that the existing East African base may play an important rôle in the future.
I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend on a powerful speech, delivered without a note, which shed considerably more light on these matters than did the speeches of the two ex-Socialist Secretaries of State for War.

7.49 p.m.

Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: As I am an ex-seaman, I do not intend in this debate to speculate in the strategic stratosphere. I should hesitate to do that about my own Service, and I certainly would not do it about a Service which is comparatively strange to me. Instead of trying to discuss the future of the Army as a whole, I should like to discuss in a few minutes the present of a certain section, about which the facts are more easy to ascertain.
As the Secretary of State for War knows, I have had the chance in recent months of visiting a number of Army hospitals. I want to address my remarks to the condition in which I found those hospitals and to make some comments about the Royal Army Medical Corps as a whole. I begin by saying a few words about the doctors, both Regular and National Service who serve in the Corps.
In the main, we had the habit in the Navy during the war of trying to avoid getting into the clutches of any active service surgeon whose rank was lieutenant-commander or above, because we felt that anybody who was reasonably senior in the Navy had spent so much tune in the Service that he was out of touch with the medical world. Those fears would be completely unnecessary to anybody in the Army today. It seemed to me that the standard of the Army doctors was at least as high as the standard of the civilian doctors. That had been achieved by several means. In the first place, in Army hospitals nowadays all types of people are treated. Men, women and children coming in for attention so that there is ample opportunity for Army doctors to get a variety of experience.
There has also developed an increasing liaison between Army doctors and civilian doctors, in that from time to time Army doctors are seconded to civilian hospitals where they can pick up the latest information. As far as I was able to judge, the medical attention given to soldiers today was absolutely first-class. But it is frequently given in conditions which are not fair either to the patients or the doctors.
One of the Army hospitals that I visited was a hutment hospital at Catterick, which was rushed up as a temporary job in 1914. It will be no surprise to anyone who knows anything about the Service to know that it is in full use even today. The whole series of huts is linked together by very long corridors. I found that as a result of the length of corridors in this hospital there are altogether two and a half acres of linoleum to be kept clean. That was only one of the difficulties for the men in charge of the hospital. It is a tremendous problem to keep these vast unnecessary spaces clean.
The second problem was to try to keep these hospitals warm. At the Connaught Hospital at Hindhead there is a corridor three-quarters of a mile long. In order to keep that warm the wretched officers there have to anticipate a cold spell by a week, because it takes a week to get the air out of the pipes before the heating system becomes efficient.
At Catterick, because of the spread of the huts over a vast area, instead of having one boiler house looked after by perhaps two men dealing with the oil fires,


there are 42 separate boiler houses requiring the attention of some 15 men to look after them at enormous expense. The problem of heating for those who run these hospitals is obviously immense. So are the problems of cleaning.
In meeting these problems, those responsible are not being given the equipment that a modern hospital should have. A lot of the floor polishing is still done by hand. There are very few floor polishing machines. There are comparatively few heated trolleys to keep the food hot on long journeys from the kitchen to the wards.
I should like to speak now of the delicate subject of bedpans. I do not know whether hon. Members in this House have ever handled a clean bedpan by hand. It is a long and most unpleasant job, but a number of medical orderlies and nurses have had to do that job by hand in British Army hospitals because those hospitals are not equipped with bedpan washing machines. I understand there is only one Army hospitial equipped with such machines. That particular hospital cannot use the machines because the bedpans do not fit into them. It has got a stock of these bedpans, and until they are finished and broken up the War Office will not let them get the new type of bedpan which can be used in these machines. That is the kind of difficulty which the staffs of these hospitals have to face.
On the top of the bad conditions in the hospitals, the staffs in some instances have themselves to live in appalling conditions. I have seen officers sleeping in unhealed rooms, some of which were damp with water coming through the roofs and over the walls and taking off the decoration in the process. Most miserable and bleak places they were, and these were for officers. The other ranks I have seen in places where the dormitories—or whatever the Army term for them is—are long distances away from the lavatories and from the washrooms. The men have to walk in the cold, through the dark, often through mud, to get a wash.
Worst of all, I have seen nurses, of whom the Army is so very short, living in huts which were temporary and meant for men. These huts were bleak enough for men in war-time. They were absolutely miserable for the girls in peace-time. I have seen in that particular hospital

where the living quarters were so bad girls having to go as much as half a mile through the dark from their sleeping quarters to the main recreational room, a sort of central community room.
In spite of the conditions of the hospitals and of the living conditions, the service that the men and women in these hospitals give to the patients is quite astonishingly good. I went round a number of them. I was allowed to talk to the patients without anyone else being present, and I cross-examined and, indeed, almost bullied them into expressing complaints about their treatment. But I got none at all. In every instance the patients said they were getting wonderful treatment; but they are actually getting that treatment because of the quite extraordinary devotion, well above the line of duty, of the men and women working in those institutions. I do not think it is fair that we should trade any longer upon that devotion.
There were three proposals that I wish to make to the Secretary of State. The first is that a commanding officer of a hospital should have each year a sum of money officially allocated to him for spending on small types of equipment. At the present moment a commanding officer has not one halfpenny of official money that he is able to spend. If he wants suddently to get a floor polisher or something like that, his only hope is to get it out of the gifts made by patients or out of the profits of N.A.A.F.I.
I was told a terrifying story of something which I must emphasise happened a long time ago. In an Army hospital the officer commanding was in desperate need of some piece of equipment. He had no money to get it, so he "flogged" a piece of equipment belonging to the War Office on the open market. It was, in fact, a water cart. Having "flogged" it and got the money, he bought himself the essential piece of equipment and then put in a chit to the War Office asking for permission to write off one lost water bottle. Two weeks later he followed up this chit with another, saying: "Referring to my previous chit, for 'bottle' read 'cart'. "In that way he managed to get away with the fact that he misappropriated War Office property.
I am quite certain that commanding officers in Army hospitals today do not use that particular trick, but it is possible that they are being forced into


dodges of their own. I think it is wholly wrong that that should be so and I ask the Secretary of State to consider the allocation of a small sum of money to each commanding officer to cover expenditure on equipment of that kind.
The second thing I want to propose is that attached to each hospital there shall be a small works party. At present, when the commanding officer wants anything done he has to apply to the sappers and then wait his turn in the long queue. It may well be that after the sappers have done a lot of decoration at a hospital and have gone away to do another job, an accident occurs and the decorations are spoiled perhaps because the roof of a ward has begun to leak. As a result that hospital will have to wait seven or eight years before this minor repair is made. If, however, each hospital had its own works party, it could get on with such minor repairs straight away.
My final proposal is a much bigger one. It is that in future Army Estimates we should allocate a sum specifically for the maintenance and construction of Army hospitals. As I understand it, at present the commanding officer of a hospital who needs a new operating theatre or an extension, has to put in his application which goes all the way to the top and is then set off against applications from other branches. Hospitals are desperately important, and inevitably they grow. A hospital is not merely built and then found to be completely satisfactory in 50 years time; it grows all the time because of the changing needs of the Service. So I would like to see a regular annual allocation of money specifically for hospitals.
May I repeat that the service given by the Royal Army Medical Corps, as I saw it in my limited experience, was remarkably good. But it was good despite the conditions which we offer to the men who serve in it and I do not think it is fair, either upon the patients or upon the medical officers, the nursing staff or the orderlies, that we in this House of Commons and the public should continue to trade on their great devotion.

CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

8.3 p.m.

Mr. Nigel Nicolson: I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House, while welcoming the education provided in Army schools overseas for the children of serving officers and men, urges Her Majesty's Government to make better provision for the education of such children in the United Kingdom.
In raising the subject of the education of the children of serving officers and men, I realise that I am narrowing the wide scope of the general debate. But, at the same time, I am slightly widening it, since it would be wrong, even if it were possible, to consider the problem of educating Army children without at the same time looking at the problem from the point of view of the other two Services, for the problem in each of the three cases is identical.
Indeed, all Service education is based on the principle that, wherever possible, the three Services should share the facilities which one of them provides. Wherever the Army happens to be the predominating Service in any given area, it is the Army which sets up the schools, but it enables the personnel of the Navy or the Air Force who happen to be in the same locality, to share them. And when the Navy or the Air Force is in that position, they reciprocate and allow the Army children to come in.
Yet it is particularly an Army problem, and that is why I have raised it in the Army estimates debate. Of the 24,000 Service children now being educated in schools abroad, 15,000 are Army children. Half of them are in Germany. Again it is the Army which in Germany has the ultimate charge of the education of these children, working with and through that most excellent organisation known as the British Family Education Service. That Service is wholly civilianised, and long may it remain so, but it is the Army and the War Office which hold the ultimate administrative responsibility for it.
I do not want to talk about the question of educating the children of Service men when they are stationed in this country. There are large numbers


of them. There are 16,000 children of Service men being educated in United Kingdom secondary schools and I do not know how many in primary schools. They present no problem, for the local education authority looks after them in exactly the same way as it looks after their other children in the towns and villages.
I want to talk about the larger, thornier problem of what we should do about the education of the children of men who are serving overseas. Most Service men spend two-thirds of their careers abroad. Usually they are accompanied by their families, and the War Office has accepted responsibility—not for any statutory reason, but as a good employer Service—for educating the children of those men. The Memorandum accompanying the Army Estimates puts it this way:
Our aim is to provide so far as possible those facilities which would be available to them had they remained in this country.
That is high intention, and I want to pay a tribute to the Army for what has been done to meet it. However, I contend that the Army can never fully meet it; that it can never, for reasons which I shall give, provide overseas the same facilities which those children would have if they were the sons and daughters of civilians permanently living in this country.
There are obvious difficulties. In some cases there can be no schools at all, for operational or other reasons. There are no schools in Korea, and there should not be. There are no schools in Japan, because the numbers of British Service men's children there are too small to make schools worth while. With those two exceptions, there is some kind of school provided by one of the three Services, usually the Army, for the education of Service men's children in every part of the world where our Armed Forces are stationed.
It should be remembered, moreover, that in many parts of the world the climate is so bad, so harmful to the health of young children that, even though the Army provides schools, in many cases the parents do not want their children to attend. Exactly the same thing applies to the recruitment of teachers. It is easy enough to obtain excellent teachers from the schools in this country to go to such

places as Germany, but inevitably the Army must accept a lower standard of civilian teacher when he or she is asked to go out to the Far East. In Singapore, for instance, owing to the climate it is impossible to hold any classes in the afternoons at all. No hon. Member needs to be told what effect that has upon the education of children.
Those are minor difficulties, but there are two major ones, the thin dispersal of our troops on the ground and what the Army calls "disturbance" and the Royal Air Force calls "turbulence," which means the constant moving of men, and their families with them, from one place to another.
The thin dispersal on the ground is something which can never be overcome. Even in B.A.O.R. we never get a concentration of families equivalent to the concentration found in any English town, and in other parts of the world the distribution of our Service men and their families is even thinner. For that reason, the Services have been obliged to provide not a small number of large schools but a very large number of small schools. Any hon. Member who has had any experience in education will realise that in consequence there will be children of widely differing ages in every class and that such classes are extremely difficult to teach.
I will take an extreme example; it happens to be the worst, but it best illustrates my point. In the Army school at Tobruk there are 10 infants, eight juniors and six children of secondary school age. None of them can have much chance of a good education under those conditions. Again, there are not enough children to make it worth while to form a secondary school in East or West Africa, in the Caribbean, and in one or two other overseas stations.
Even where there is a sufficient concentration of children, the secondary boarding schools, such as we now have in Germany, are inevitably co-educational, comprehensive, all-denominational, and inter-Service. I am not saying that any of these things is bad, but it indicates how we can never set up abroad, under any circumstances whatever, even the best, the same pattern of education as that to which we are accustomed in this country.
The greatest difficulty of all is "disturbance." I do not expect my right hon. Friend to cut down the movement within


the Army any further. There is an indication in the Memorandum that he has done his utmost; he has managed to cut it down by 10 per cent. in the forthcoming year in spite of the increased movements which will result from the evacuation of the Suez Base. In theory, no man or officer is required to move more than once every two or three years. That is about once during his tour of duty in any overseas or home command. However, matters do not work out that way. Men are constantly moving for reasons of promotion and experience, apart from operational reasons.
The result is that in Germany, where we have the very best conditions, less than 7 per cent. of the children have spent more than two years in the same school; the average length of time spent by a child in a primary school is three terms, and in a secondary school five terms. This means that the child is moving constantly from school to school and from teacher to teacher. He is taught in one school to learn his lessons in a certain way and in another school, to which he may be moved within a few weeks, he may be taught in quite another way.
When I was in Germany last week-end, I talked to a child of 13 who had been to 14 schools. These children arrive in the middle of a term, they leave in the middle of a term, and they have very little opportunity to finish courses which they have begun. This has a bad effect, not only upon the children who move, but also upon those who remain, for they lose their companions and are subject to constant disturbance. The teachers themselves naturally feel thwarted through the disappointment of losing bright children whom they have trained during the year or two, at the most, since their arrival at the school.
Yesterday morning I was in a primary school outside Dusseldorf, and there I saw children from two separate battalions. One of the battalions had arrived 10 days previously from a year's tour in Berlin; the other battalion had had the good fortune to be in that same station for a year and a half. I could tell, simply by looking at the children's copy books which belonged to the men of the first battalion and which to those of the second. The children who had come from Berlin were a long way behind those who

had been at the school for a year and a half.
Commenting upon this very evident fact to the headmistress and the director of the B.F.E.S., who accompanied me, I said that it must surely prove that the teaching that the children had received in Berlin was comparatively second-rate. I was told that I was quite wrong. The reason for the difference in the standard of writing between the two sets of copy books was psychological upset caused by the move from Berlin. I found that difficult to believe, but I was assured that it was so and that if I had come a few weeks later I should have found little difference between the two sets of books. If a move from Berlin to Dusseldorf can produce that result, what must be the result of a long trooping journey out to Malaya?
The children of secondary school age are handicapped even more. They have reached the most impressionable of all ages. They require not a few months but several years of continuous education under the same teacher, but they are not getting it, not even in Germany. I went on Saturday to the big new boarding secondary school at Hamm. I can only say, that, in spite of all its other virtues and qualities, it had the characteristics of an educational marshalling yard. The children were being shunted in and shunted out, and the teachers, who were of the highest quality, were sometimes in despair about the abilities which they saw going to waste.
To sum up, the average child drops below the average as a result of this constant movement, and the bright child manages to keep just level with the average child in this country. However, it is the bright children that we want to encourage; their parents have every right to look forward to a university education for them, but there are very few Service children who are approaching anywhere near that standard.
I do not want to draw too gloomy a picture. There are many compensations even for this constant travel. There are better premises in schools in many parts of the world than we find in England. In Germany, there are much smaller classes, and there are excellent teachers who are hand-picked from volunteers from our own schools here. The very fact that the children travel so much broadens their minds. They have an


astonishing maturity and elasticity. They learn languages with remarkable facility. To them, geography is not a matter of books; it is a matter of places which they have actually visited. The teachers of languages and geography sometimes find themselves embarrassed by the knowledge possessed by their pupils.
These children know the world, but they do not know its sorry politics. To them the Mohne Dam is a place where one can sail on a Saturday afternoon, and Belsen is the name of a primary school. There is no snobbishness in these schools, and it struck me very forcibly that a silent social revolution is taking place. A colonel or brigadier will not for one moment think it strange or unusual if his child is sitting in class next to the child of his own corporal.
The children have no sense of rank. We might have expected them to have adopted among their schoolmates the ranks of their fathers in the unit, but they never do so, and the rivalry, such as it is, is healthy inter-unit rivalry and never inter-rank rivalry. The children have the advantages of being in the Army. They have the transport, the stores and the entertainment facilities which the Army can provide; and they are growing up within the traditions of some of our finest regiments.
In Germany, which is the only area I have been able to visit before this debate, there is an excellent educational system, but we must realise that it is unique. I was seeing the very best that there is. There is a concentration of troops which permits the setting up of permanent, large schools. We now know that British troops will be there perhaps for 50 years. A second advantage not enjoyed by any other theatre is that the Germans themselves have had to pay for the capital costs of the premises which we occupy, and, in many cases, the equipment within them.
The expenditure, had we had to pay the whole cost, would have been appalling. The Army statiticians in the Northern Army Group Headquarters have worked out the real cost of keeping a child at King William's School, Wilhelmshaven, at £562 per child per year, and, for the whole of the Zone, at £499 per child per year in the secondary schools. That figure is a lesson for us. When the Paris Agreements come into

force we shall probably lose that advantage and have to pay.
So, when we are thinking, as we must, of building new schools in Germany for these children, we must realise that the capital cost alone will be between £800 and £1,000 per child, that cost of constructing those schools must now fall on the British taxpayer, and that to run the schools the cost will be about £400 per child per year. The numbers of children there are increasing. By 1960, they will have risen from 11,000 to 16,000 in the B.A.O.R., and 70 per cent. of the increase will be in respect of children requiring a secondary education.
I want to make one or two suggestions resulting from my visit to Germany, without, of course, expecting my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary to give me an answer tonight. It struck me very forcibly that one way of mitigating the disadvantages of this constant change from station to station and school to school would be for the Army to adopt, not only in Germany, but throughout the world, standard syllabuses and to a large extent standard text books, so that on arriving at a new school the child would be able to pick up where he left off at the old school.
At the moment that is not so. It is not so, because the teachers coming from England have always been used to choosing their own textbooks and following their own methods of education. I fully sympathise with that, but I think that there ought to be a greater degree of standardisation in Service schools for the sake of the children themselves. I cannot believe that the teachers' initiative and power of choice would be too greatly limited if the schools were required to work on more or less the same lines, and with more or less the same books.
Secondly, I suggest that there should be teachers upon the troopships when they go out to the further corners of the world. In some cases the children are losing six weeks or two months' education during the voyage. The Australian Army has teachers on all its troopships, but we have none. Could not this six weeks' gap at least be partly eliminated in this way?
Can the Army not make serious efforts to give the children their holidays at the time their parents take their leave? No effort, as far as I could make out from


questioning a number of orderly room quartermaster sergeants, who are the people who should know, is being made in this direction. The result is that the soldier's leave is allotted to him at a time when his children are at school, and the children's holidays coincide with his periods of duty, so that neither gets a proper holiday. Surely it cannot be a very difficult administrative task to see that whenever possible the two coincide.
Even if some of these changes can be made, there still remains the major problem, which is the one with which I want to end. So many parents feel so strongly about this disturbance element in their children's education, that they are voluntarily and at their own expense sending their children to complete their education in this country. I want to ask whether the Government consider that they should be given help in so doing. Six hundred children from B.A.O.R. are being educated in this country at the moment, in spite of all the facilities available in the Zone itself.
I have been told in a very high quarter that the difficulty of providing their children with a proper education is the biggest of all the deterrents to long-service officers and men. We are losing the most valuable men, our senior N.C.Os. and warrant officers, captains, majors and lieutenant-colonels, the men who are old enough to have children of school age and are resigning because they are dissatisfied with the system that exists.
In many cases it is possible for an officer or man to send his children home with his wife, so that they can live in England and attend the ordinary day school. That involves a family separation, a principle against which we have set our faces for the Army as a whole. Many Service men are spending far beyond their means on high school fees so that their children can be taught in private schools in this country. The Education Act is of very little help to parents in that position. The Act places upon the local authorities the power, but not the obligation, to help the children of parents who are serving overseas.
Many parents have found it extremely difficult to establish a local connection with any education authority. They are told that they do not belong anywhere, when they are serving their country in

some far-off land. They are told that although local education authorities may give financial help for the education of children in this country, they are not bound to do so; and most do not.
Moreover, in the scales suggested by the Ministry of Education to local education authorities, the major, the lieutenant-colonel and all ranks above are virtually excluded from any assistance whatever. The result is that men who have made the greatest success of their careers are penalised, and those who have done not so well are given assistance.
There are very few boarding places here to which children can be sent. In my own local authority area at Bournemouth there are only nine children whose parents are overseas who are being educated under this general Ministry of Education scheme, and not one is a Service man's child. Five are the children of colonial officials; three are children of missionaries and one is the child of a pilot in a civil airline.
I suggest that the War Office should implement very soon the promise implied in the statement made by Earl Alexander, the former Minister of Defence, in another place on 3rd February, 1954, when he said:
… we realise only too well that … provision must be made for the boarding education of the children."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 3rd February, 1954; Vol. 185, c. 682–3.]
That promise has not been implemented and I do not see any sign of it being implemented.
The whole reason for my initiating the debate on this subject this evening is to try to extract from the War Office a slightly firmer explanation of what is intended. It has been urged on me from a very high level that the right answer is that an education grant be made to the families, such as the Foreign Office pay for the children of their own officials who are abroad, a grant of up to £150 per year per child.
As it has been urged upon me so strongly, and from men of such high experience, I naturally have great reluctance in disregarding their advice, but I do not think that this is the right way to do it. There is no true parallel between the children of Service men and the children of Foreign Office officials. There are very few of the latter and, so


far as I know, there are no Foreign Office schools in any Embassies or Legations abroad. Presumably, Service men who chose to educate their children where they are stationed would not get the giant allotted to the parents who chose the other alternative of education at home, and the former might well feel rather disgruntled.
The real difficulty involved in the suggestion of a grant is that there are no boarding places, or virtually none, in the United Kingdom to which these children could be sent. A grant would be perfectly useless to any parent were it not matched with a boarding place. It would be like allotting a scholarship to a boy and then finding that there was no school at which the scholarship was tenable. It would be very wrong were we to oblige parents—officers or warrant officers—to use these grants to supplement their meagre resources in order to pay the extremely expensive fees of private schools.
And so I come to my own final suggestion for the solution of this problem. It falls into two parts; an interim solution and a long-term solution. The interim solution is that the Ministry of Education should form itself into a central authority for receiving applications from parents serving overseas, and for allotting school places in this country. An example has already been set this week in the case of housing. The Ministry of Housing and Local Government saw that there was an injustice to Service parents and made arrangements to remove that injustice. I think it time for the Ministry of Education to follow suit.
The Ministry would receive inquiries from overseas and would lay down the scale of assistance and the conditions under which assistance would be given. Thus we should avoid the present anomaly whereby half-a-dozen officers, sharing the same mess overseas, who have managed to attract the attention of different local education authorities in England, are treated in radically different ways. But this act of mercy and of good administration by the Ministry of Education can only be an interim measure. The final solution must be the provision of boarding places in this country for any parents whose needs justify them.
I suggest that the Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the Service

Ministries, should reserve places in existing boarding schools specifically for these children, and that, in the last resort, as it becomes necessary—and when finance becomes available—we should build wings on to existing grammar and secondary modern schools, or, if it is thought wise, even build special boarding schools for children of Service men. These schools should also be open to children of colonial officials, Foreign Office officials, and a few others, but closed to the general body of civilians.
I suggest that Army parents should be required to accept the Army primary schools as the main basis of their children's education. These boarding schools would be required only for children of secondary school age. The parents would have the option of choosing between Army schools overseas or Army or Service schools at home. They would make a contribution—and the best contribution scales that I have yet seen are those of the B.F.E.S., at present in operation in Germany. The Ministry of Education would be responsible for coordinating all this activity.
As an essential part of the scheme, every child should be allowed one free air, sea or rail ticket once a year to enable him to rejoin his parents during the holidays, and he should be able to travel at concession rates at other times. If such a scheme were adopted the children would receive the continuous education which they ought to have; the wives would be able to stay with their husbands during term time, and the children could join them during the holidays. This scheme would be infinitely cheaper than building secondary schools in overseas stations.
I have given figures relating to Germany, and they cannot be so very different in other parts of the world. If a school were built in an overseas command there would always be the possibility that it might have to be abandoned owing to a change in strategic policy or for some other reason, but if it were built at home it would always be of use, and nobody would regret the amount of money expended upon it.
Circumstances have greatly changed since the early years of the century, when a serving soldier could take his family out to India, stay there for many years, and


give his children an education as good as they could obtain in an English public school. The situation has also changed in that we now—thank goodness—promote our officers by merit, and draw them from every social class. One disadvantage of this change is that officers very often have no capital behind them. They marry early; they have children early, and they have not reached a very high rank at the moment when they have to find the money to educate their children.
We cannot afford to lose these men; they are the most valuable in the Army. We want to attract others like them, but if their children's education suffers these men will leave before their time, or they will be subjected to the unnecessary hardship of separation from their families. Let us plan now for 50 years ahead, and do something to alleviate these conditions. If my plan is not adopted, I hope that some other plan will be, which will have an equivalent result.

8.40 p.m.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: I beg to second the Amendment.
It is with the very greatest pleasure that I second the Amendment, although I can add very little to the able speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicolson). He rightly said that one of the matters which disturbs the middle N.C.O. group and the officers more than anything is the education of their children. Exactly a year ago I had the luck to be able to raise this subject. As a result—I like to think that it was a result of what I said—an inter-Departmental committee was set up between the War Office and the Ministry of Education to go into the whole matter. I was able to provide it with a considerable amount of confidential examples of the sort of hardship I have in mind.
I gather that the committee has reported. A whole year has passed, and it is alarming to contemplate the slow speed at which the Civil Service works. I am not sure that the recommendations of that committee even now will be accepted. We have had a change at the Ministry of Education, and it may be that the new Minister does not see eye-to-eye with his predecessor on some of the

policies which were initiated. That is perfectly natural. I am grateful that the Minister is here tonight, because I am discussing a very serious matter.
It is not only a question of what is good for the Army, but of our duty to these young children. That is where the Ministry of Education comes in, because the education of our children, irrespective of whether they are in the Army or not, is its responsibility. This position affects more severely children who are in the last four years before they sit for their general certificate of education. My hon. Friend spoke a good deal about education abroad; I want to say a word or two about what goes on in this country, owing to the constant moves of Army units within the British Isles.
As the Minister of Education knows, there are four boards with four different syllabuses for the general certificate of education, covering Oxford, Cambridge and London, and there is the joint board. The boards teach the children under one or other of the syllabuses, and when a child is moved in those four years he may go to a school studying a totally different syllabus. Apart from the interruption in his studies, he may have to start all over again.
I want to stress, as I did on the last occasion, the question of grants by local authorities for the assistance of people applying out of the Forces for them. There are two points about this and, if the Minister is not aware of them, I hope he will listen very carefully. The first point is that no local authority has the faintest idea of the standard of living and costs in the places abroad from which these children come. The local authority assesses need on the basis of need in its local area, although that may have absolutely no relation to the need in Singapore, Nairobi or any other part of the world. Local authorities have no method of assessing it, and therefore the most appalling injustices take place.
The other point which needs looking into is the question of an unduly uniform basis of assessment throughout the country. The Minister of Education may have heard the suggestions made in regard to long-term policy; I am not sure that a tax-free grant would not be cheaper for the Treasury in the end and might be a simpler short-term solution. After all, if it is costing £400 or £500 a year to educate


the child abroad, it would be cheaper to give the parent £200 a year, which, I am sure, he would welcome, to educate the child fairly well at home.
However, the suggestion I have to make is that meantime and immediately—do not let us wait for any more committees to report—the Minister of Education should make up his mind about the choice he has. Do not let us forget that it is not the local authority that pays the grant. The local authority merely assesses and allocates the place. It then applies to the Ministry to get a grant from the pool. In my opinion, the Ministry ought to deal with all these cases. All these applications should be made to the Ministry, and the Ministry should make the allotments of places and pay the grants. If it does not want to do that it must, alternatively, circulate to local authorities a standard set of bases on which the local authorities should work in order that there should not be this great variation as between local authorities. The Minister should make up his mind now which course to follow.
That is all I have to say on the subject this year. I hope that I shall not have to say it again next year. I do hope that the Minister of Education will seriously study that report, and also some of those examples which I sent in, which he still has, and which I should not mind having back, and see the appalling hardships which do accrue from the present situation.

8.47 p.m.

Mr. A. Blenkinsop (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East): I think we would all like to congratulate the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicolson) on having introduced this subject tonight, even though precious few Members seem to take an interest in it, and also on the very interesting and useful way in which he has raised it. I also have a rather close interest in the matter. It is now some two years since I intervened upon it in the House and received a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for War at that time, setting out the problem that we all know faces the War Office, especially in secondary education for these children.
He put down on paper very clearly the three alternatives which the War Office at that time was considering. First, the possibility was that it might continue

…the present policy towards full and effective provision for secondary education overseas in day and boarding schools according to need and facilities available locally.
The second possibility was
To make partial provision overseas and set up Service schools in U.K. for selected children.
The third was
To set up Service schools in U.K. for all children of secondary school age.
He went on to say:
As you will appreciate, while this matter is still under consideration both in my Department and also in other Departments it is not possible to say what the final outcome will be.
As I well know, those alternatives have not only been under discussion during the last two years, but for a quite considerable time before that. It is right that we should press for some information now from the Secretary of State or the Under-Secretary of State as to just where they have got to in dealing with this very difficult problem, which, I appreciate, is by no means an easy one to settle. There is the narrower problem dealt with by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer), and there is also this wider problem of what attitude we should take about the educational facilities available to these children, whether in Germany or elsewhere.
May I raise one or two points on this subject? I was in Germany, looking incidentally at some of these provisions, about 18 months ago. I saw the alterations which were then being made in the barracks at Hamm to provide for this new boarding school for secondary children on a comprehensive basis—a school which, alas, has now been classified by the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch as providing for a shunting operation. I could see the great expense of the alterations which were being made for this new school, but I can well believe that the hon. Gentleman is right in saying that the bulk of the time of the staff must be occupied with providing for new pupils coming in and other pupils going out, for that is an almost continuous process.
I also had the opportunity of going to Plön to see one of the schools in operation there. Again, the general provision is magnificent, and there is no doubt that the standard of the staff is good, but there


is this appalling problem of not being able to give settled tuition to a child for anything like a period of time which we would regard as satisfactory.
The point has been put on many occasions, and probably put as well as anybody by the director of the British Families Education Service in magazines produced by the Service. He rightly points out that not only is there a continuous change in the children attending the schools but there is almost inevitably a pretty continuous change amongst the teaching staff.
I should like to join the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch in congratulating the staff on the excellent efforts which they make and on the way in which, amazingly, they sometimes manage to overcome their difficulties. They show highly creditable initiative and ingenuity in trying to meet this hopeless problem. Nevertheless, it undoubtedly means that many of the staff are on the move very frequently—much more frequently than in schools in this country.
We thus have the children moving and the staff moving. But even that is not all because, as it were, the buildings are moving too—or, at least, it was certainly the experience in Germany, where I assume that conditions are better than anywhere else in this connection, that in the first few years these schools were continually moving from one set of premises to another. I quite agree that on many occasions they were steadily improving the facilities available.
We thus have all three factors on the move—the children, the teachers, and, as it were the buildings. Nothing is stable. I think it is fair to say that even the home background, which we all agree is so important for children, is not particularly stable. It would be reasonable to say, I think, that the child of a serving officer or a serving man abroad does not have the same stability of home conditions which he might expect in an average home and an average family in this country.
It seems to me that almost everything militates against a proper standard of education being provided. The hon. Member suggested that one minor change which might be made and which might assist—I imagine he had junior children particularly in mind—was a standardisation of textbooks and of teaching.
Although that seems to be attractive—and it was mentioned to me when I was in Germany by one or more of the brigadiers I met—I am by no means certain that in fact it is attractive.
The teaching staff very properly wish to have as near the same freedom as they would have in this country; indeed, it would be fair to say they often have even more. I think the very initiative and ingenuity they often show is due to their feeling that they have that liberty to take whatever action they feel right in relation to particular children. There is the slight advantage in Germany that they have somewhat smaller classes than are common in this country. That means it is a little more possible to give individual attention to the child. That individual attention needs to be emphasised in every possible way. If we were to adopt a method of standardisation of textbooks, however attractive for other reasons, I am not sure that we would not lose something else in the initiative and imagination of the teaching staff. In any case, before any proposal of that kind was accepted it should be thought about very carefully indeed.
The position is now such that we ought to ask the War Office and the Ministry of Education to state what their views are about the future. I am very glad the Ministry of Education has held on to its very close interest in this matter. Although it is right and proper that the War Office should be in charge and local units should be in charge for all local matters of organisation and provisioning, it is very important that the actual education should be retained in the hands of the Ministry of Education and not transferred to the hands of the War Office. So far as I know, that is still so.
I have not got recent figures, and I do not know whether it is still true, but certainly when I was in Germany it worried me considerably to find that very large numbers of children over 11 were still in primary schools, often because there was no other accommodation available for them. That is just one of the examples of the sort of difficulties one is up against in trying to make as wide a provision as possible overseas where obviously we have not the numbers needed to make the normal provision which is expected. I should be very sorry to see schools like


Plön disappear. That is a very imaginative venture, a comprehensive co-educational school. There are not many like it, certainly not in this country. The cost of running a school like that must be very high. I asked some questions about it, but they were very anxious not to give me an answer and I do not altogether blame them.

Mr. N. Nicolson: In order that the hon. Member should not have a wrong impression, I should say that I did not in any way want to suggest that the existing secondary boarding schools in Germany should be done away with. All I suggested was that instead of building new ones in Germany at colossal expense they should be built in this country.

Mr. Blenkinsop: I quite appreciate that the hon. Member had that in mind. I was assuming that the War Office and the Ministry of Education have under consideration the whole problem of what the future should be, even including Plön and problems of that kind. I must admit that it is sometimes rather hard to justify the provision of places like Plönwhen, because of the repeated interruption of a reasonably continuous period of education, we cannot hope to get the result that we ought to expect from the expenditure incurred. That is a matter one has to think about very seriously indeed.
I wondered whether it was possible for the War Office, now that there appear to be slightly more settled conditions so far as the maintenance of troops in Germany is concerned, to give rather more settled conditions, at any rate for a limited number of pupils, in places like Plön, Wilhelmshaven and Hamm. Unless some sort of general undertaking can be given that the children will be able to enjoy the teaching facilities there for a longer period than is possible today, I very much doubt whether the expenditure at these centres, much as I like them in many ways, is justified.
I doubt also whether we will continue to get the staff that we need for those schools, because I noticed that there as in other schools in Germany, there is a constant movement to and fro. I do not think we will check that constant flow unless we can give the teachers as well as the children more settled conditions in which to work. These are circumstances that we cannot allow simply to drift on indefinitely into the future. A decision

must be made fairly soon by the War Office and the Ministry of Education, either on the lines suggested by the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch or, if it is felt that more settled conditions can be envisaged in Europe, by further developments in Europe itself.
I want to finish on a slightly more controversial note. In one of the issues of the British Families Education Service Gazette some little while ago, the Director of the Service very fairly made clear all the difficulties that he had to face. He said, for example, that
There are … peculiar difficulties in B.F.E.S. Service life is, at best, unnatural for both parent and child, and it offers no very tangible cultural pattern into which a school can be fitted.
That is true also. He continued:
The schools, suffering in any case from chronic discontinuity in their children—"
that is a nice phrase—
are not themselves stable (the ghosts of defunct B.F.E.S. schools would populate a tolerably large mansion).In a number of cases, the home life of the children adds nothing by way of stable emotional relationships, and the child is considered a member of the family mainly in that he has equal rights of prescription on the services of the German maid.
I think that there is some truth in that paragraph.
It is unfortunate that the very encouraging way in which the schools themselves have broken down some of the barriers between officer and other rank so far as the children are concerned have not achieved similar results at home. It is something of a tragedy that at the home, apparently, in many cases all that the wives of many serving officers, and, perhaps, other ranks, can have to discuss and to occupy their minds is the problem of the satisfactory or other conduct of the maids and batmen that are provided for them.
When we consider the whole problem of children's education abroad, we have to think not purely of the provision that we make in the schools, but we must think also of the sometimes very unhappy conditions in the homes which are generated partly by the continual movement of serving men all over the world. I hope, therefore, that some of the interesting suggestions of the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch this evening will be followed up by the


Minister and that in any case he gives us some up-to-date information of what action he proposes to take.

9.5 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Fitzroy Maclean): We should be extremely grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicolson) for raising this most important topic. Clearly, he has given much thought to it, and has also taken a great deal of trouble by way of research. Both his speech and the discussion which has followed have been extremely valuable. Certainly all those who have taken part in the debate are extremely well qualified to speak on the subject.
I should like to begin with a few words about the problem in general, and the way in which it has been and still is being tackled. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch said, the Army, like the other Services, in its capacity as a good employer, accepts responsibility for providing free education for soldiers' children abroad. As most soldiers spend two-thirds of their careers outside the United Kingdom, that is clearly very important.
Our intention is that the education thus provided should correspond as nearly as possible to that provided at home by education authorities under the Education Act, 1944. The Army provides both primary and secondary education. Where there are more than 10 children in any one station primary schools are provided, or, if some of the children are older, all-age schools. I shall say something about them later. Where there are fewer than 10 children they are sent elsewhere in the command, if necessary as boarders, or where that is not possible, or where they are outside major commands, arrangements are made for the children to attend local civilian schools at public expense.
So much for primary education. Secondary education, as hon. Members have pointed out, is a much more difficult problem for a number of reasons. Where there are enough older children we are able to establish secondary schools which give secondary modern and, as far as possible, secondary grammar school education. In Singapore, we actually have a separate grammar school, but unfortunately in a great many stations and com-

mands there are too few children of the right age to make that possible. Forty children are considered to be the lowest number for which it is practicable to open a separate secondary department.
The result is that we have to fall back upon all-age schools. My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch mentioned the school in Tobruk. Altogether, the Army has no fewer than 13 all-age schools where there are fewer than 10 secondary-standard children. As my hon. Friend said, such an arrangement is likely to provide a less satisfactory education for the older children. On the other hand—and the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) brought this point out very well—it is possible that if one secures a really good teacher and conditions generally are favourable, children in those sorts of cases may obtain a really good education. It depends on individual circumstances.
All-age schools, especially when they are as small as that, are not likely to be very satisfactory. On an average, at least 1,000 families are needed to provide the 60 secondary grammar school children which we require in order to justify the employment of suitable specialist teachers to set up a separate school. Of course, in some places where there is a large Command with scattered stations the difficulty can be overcome by concentrating the children at a boarding school, but this only applies to large Commands.
Another obstacle to satisfactory education which has already been referred to is the difficulty of attracting suitably qualified teachers from the United Kingdom. Not many teachers are prepared to jeopardise their prospects of a career by undertaking a prolonged tour overseas, but I think that all the more credit is due to those who are prepared to take on a job of that kind. I was very glad to hear the tributes which were paid to teachers in Army schools by hon. Members on both sides of the House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch mentioned that he had been to Germany this week-end, and he told us something about what he had seen. Germany, of course, is the best example. It shows the education of children of Army personnel at its best. The large numbers—and it is half of all the children being educated in


Army schools—are bound to be a great help. The schools there are administered, as my hon. Friend said, by the British Families Education Service. That was started originally in 1946 by the Foreign Office, and only taken over by the War Office in 1952. It is administered by the Chief Education Officer, B.O.A.R., and the director and his staff are civilians. They have their own separate headquarters.
Altogether over 10,000 children attend these schools, of whom about three-quarters are Army children, the remainder being from the other Services or children of civilians and officials. There are altogether 78 primary schools—that is day schools—three small nursery schools and three secondary boarding schools, which are bilateral. That is, they have a modern and a grammar side. We anticipate that by 1958 we shall need another two such schools to meet the increase we expect.
Secondary education in Germany is, as I have already stated, more satisfactory than it is in any other Command. Most of the older children attend boarding schools where there are both modern courses, and grammar courses for the General Certificate of Education. There are also some facilities for secondary technical education.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves that point, can he say whether there still are a large number of children in the primary schools who are over 11 years of age? Two years ago about 800 were stated to be in such schools. I do not expect the hon. Gentleman to give a spot figure, but can he say whether this is still a problem?

Mr. Maclean: So far as I know that is not the case. I do not think there are any all-age schools. They are mostly either primary schools for the younger children or secondary schools for the older children. But I will look into that point and let the hon. Gentleman know.

Mr. Blenkinsop: I do not want to make difficulties but there was a serious problem in that there were many children who were not getting a secondary education being crammed into the primary schools by force of circumstances, and I wanted to know whether that was still the case.

Mr. Maclean: I can give the hon. Gentleman a little more information.
There are still several hundred children over 11 who are not in secondary boarding schools. The reasons are various. In some cases the children are about to go home to the United Kingdom; in others the parents prefer to keep the children at home rather than that they should be boarders. As I have said, we are aiming at opening two more secondary boarding schools. Until we get more boarding accommodation, there may continue to be a problem, but we are pressing on with it.
It gives some idea of the standards which have been attained when I tell the House that the average result for the General Certificate of Education was 62 per cent. successful in our schools in Germany as compared with 60 per cent. in the United Kingdom.
Perhaps I may say a word about the conditions which we aim at establishing in Army schools. In spite of the obvious difficulties, which have been mentioned, we make every attempt to ensure that conditions in Army schools abroad approximate as far as possible to those obtaining in comparable schools in this country. The curriculum is based on that in use here. I thought that the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch that there should be standardisation of the syllabus and textbooks used was interesting and worth looking into in order to provide a greater continuity of education than exists. I was also interested by what the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East said on this subject. It is certainly a consideration to be taken into account.
The staff of our schools is mainly seconded or appointed through local education authorities in the United Kingdom and they are, in general, extremely well qualified and experienced. As in England, there are regular dental and medical inspections. Milk is supplied. In Germany and Austria school meals are also supplied, elsewhere they are covered by special allowances. Finally there is free transport to and from school for the children.
All children's schools are periodically inspected by Her Majesty's Inspectors, and here I should like to express our gratitude both to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Education and also to local education authorities in this country


for the co-operation they give us in helping us with our schools abroad. It has been mentioned already that most of our schools are co-educational. In that respect we may claim to be well in advance of schools at home and, as far as I know, the experiment has worked out satisfactorily.
It has already been mentioned that the rank of the father confers no privileges on the child. I am sure that hon. Members will be glad to hear that, and to know that the fact that the child is the son of a general or of a regimental sergeant major does not enable him to throw his weight about more than anybody else's child.
The accommodation and the equipment of schools is bound to vary with local conditions. We make every effort to secure as high a standard as possible whatever the conditions may be. I will give the House two examples. In Germany the three boarding schools at Hamm, Plön and Wilhelmshaven are really very luxuriously established in naval or army barracks, and we are fortunate in having good accommodation at little or no cost to the taxpayers. In addition to being visited by my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch, the schools were also visited by the Parliamentary delegation under the leadership of the right hon. Member for Dearne Valley (Mr. Wilfred Paling) which recently visited Germany, and we can be grateful for the very valuable comments contained in their Report.
At the other end of the world from Germany, there is the Slim secondary school in the Cameron Highlands of Malaya. It provides a very marked contrast, not in the standard of education but in the surroundings and the conditions of life of the children. Instead of being in well-equipped barrack rooms, the classrooms are in straw huts.
When the 138 boys and girls come back from their holidays, they travel under armed escort in order to protect them from the bandits who infest the whole area. In spite of that, the children carry on very much as they would in England. They are under a headmaster, a major in the Royal Army Education Corps, who was formerly a housemaster at Bedford School. Like most other Army

schools, it is co-educational, and the pupils include a certain number of Gurkha children. The ages range from 11 to 18.
It will be clear to hon. Members from what I have said that the commitment which the Army has thus assumed is an extremely heavy one. At present, £1 million a year is included in the Army Estimates for the education of Army children. What is more, it is an increasing commitment. Since 1950 the number of pupils in Army schools has risen from 4,000 to 20,000, the number of schools has increased from 60 to 160, and the number of teachers has increased from 300 to 1,000.
It is true that the increase is very largely due to the increased responsibilities that we have assumed in Germany, and that that is now a thing of the past which will not recur; but it is also due to some extent to the bulge in the birth rate. The bulge in the birth rate is proportionately larger and more sustained in the Fighting Services than among the civilian population. I am told that it is largest of all in the Royal Air Force

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;

House counted, and 40 Members being present—

Mr. Maclean: I think it has emerged from our debate that the arrangements made for the education of Army children overseas are, so far as they go, comprehensive and not unsuccessful, and I can assure hon. Members that steps are constantly being taken to introduce further improvements wherever possible. But for all that, it cannot be denied that Army children overseas are at a definite disadvantage, particularly in the case of secondary education, compared with children at home.
What is more, the provision of more and better schools overseas cannot provide the whole answer. In the main the difficulties are inherent in the special conditions of Service family life. As has been emphasised by everyone who has spoken in this debate, the biggest single handicap to Army children is the frequency with which their families change homes. In this way they are bound to lose continuity in instruction, and the result, of course, is a fundamental weakness in the basic subjects, particularly in English and in arithmetic.
There is also the difficulty, which I mentioned just now, of providing experienced teachers, a continuity of teachers, and also a sufficiently wide range of education for secondary pupils. Although there is no doubt that the wider outlook which Army children acquire is a great asset, for which many of them are grateful in later life, and even the smallness of the classes and the individual attention which children get may also be a help, none of that really makes up for the ground which they lose in other respects.
For all these reasons, no solution undertaken overseas can really remove the basic difficulties, for it cannot do more than minimise their effects. Army parents are as anxious, perhaps more anxious, than any one else to give their children the best possible start in life. The result is that many of them are obliged to decide between three unsatisfactory choices; their child has to undergo frequent changes of school, or husband and wife have to be separated for long periods, which generally speaking means setting up a home in England, or, the child has to be sent home either to relatives in the United Kingdom or to a boarding school.
None of these three possibilities is entirely satisfactory. What is more, if the child is sent to a boarding school, that is bound to involve additional expense. In addition to that there are the other difficulties which have been mentioned, the difficulty in particular of finding places in schools at home. In the circumstances, it would be useless to pretend that there is no problem. There is a very real problem.
Hon. Members have suggested various possible solutions. The possibility of a central agency has been mentioned, and direct grants, and the possibility of building special schools in this country for Service children. All these possibilities are being given careful and close consideration by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence and also by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Education. It would be wrong for me to say more than that at the present time, but I can assure hon. Members that the problem will not be allowed to go by default.

9.30 p.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: The hon. Gentleman said, "It would be wrong for me to say more than that." It would certainly have been impossible for

him to have said less. He has not answered the debate at all. He has read us his prepared piece, with, I am bound to say, a monotony which did nothing to relieve either the pedestrian quality of his style or the prosaic nature of the matter he was putting forward. He simply described the situation as it is at present.
If I may say so without patronage to the hon. Members concerned, the hon. Gentleman had the advantage of three constructive speeches full of suggestions from the hon. Member for. Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicolson), the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) and my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop). The hon. Gentleman made no comment upon them, except to remark that he thought there might be something to be said for the suggestion about standardised books and syllabuses. He also thought that there was something to be said for the criticism of that suggestion made by my hon. Friend. From that he went on until we were told, in the last sentence, that he realised that there was a problem. 
I hope that the three hon. Members who took part in the debate realise that they have at least scored that measure of success; that that point has been hammered home inevitably, and that the suggestions they made—and the hon. Gentleman reminded them of what were the suggestions—are to be given close and careful consideration. I had hoped to hear that the consideration would be active as well. They are to be given consideration, not only by the right hon. Gentlemen at the War Office, but by the Minister of Education.
I had hoped that the Minister of Education would make some comment in this debate. When the late George Tomlinson was Minister of Education, and went to make a speech somewhere in the provinces, a number of boys from the local grammar school played truant merely in order to see the Minister of Education. They did not wait to hear him—it was enough to see him. In this House, however, we require rather more than that.
Important suggestions have been made to the Minister of Education and I wish to put this point. I do not believe—and I quite agree with the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch—that the education provided abroad in


the Army schools can be the equal of what is provided at home. With the best will in the world, and despite the splendid work of the teachers and the amount of money spent, it is a sheer impossibility. Therefore, some part of this problem must be solved by the kind of methods referred to by all three hon. Members, and particularly by the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing. I hope that the Minister of Education will give most serious consideration to that matter.
I do not regard this problem light-heartedly at all. It is a very serious and difficult problem which deserves more consideration than it has so far received from the Government. There should be provided some way in which these children can be educated in this country, if their parents so wish; but although the provision for education in Army schools abroad cannot be as good as that at home it ought to be available for those parents who require it, for the reason that children react very differently to these moves.
One child will triumph miraculously over being moved from school to school, provided that it has the emotional security of being with its parents all the time. Parents who feel that their child will react in that way ought to have the opportunity of sending it to an Army school. Other children are able to go to boarding schools and be away from their parents often for long periods, but they apparently require to have a very solid and good basis for their schooling if they are to get on. Children vary unpredictably in this way, and we need both types of provision. It is a more serious problem than the hon. Gentleman seems to have grasped.
It is customary, in this kind of a debate within a debate, for the hon. Member who has moved the Amendment to say that in view of the not unsympathetic reply he asks leave to withdraw it. The claims of party loyalty are strong, and we realise that the hon. Member may have to mumble through that form of words, but I assure him quite seriously that if he finds that he cannot bring himself to do so and takes the unusual but not impossible course of dividing the House upon the Amendment he will not go alone into the Lobby.

Mr. N. Nicolson: With great respect to the hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart), it is easier to be a back bencher or even a Front Bencher on his side of the House than it is to be a Front Bencher on this side. I have no inside knowledge of this matter, and I do not want to have any. Presumably there are wheels within wheels, because this matter involves not only the Army and the other Services, but the Ministry of Education, the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, and several other Ministries which employ men who serve overseas for long periods.
I feel confident that discussions are going on in this matter, and I do take the course which the hon. Member said that I might do and beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment, in anticipation of further news later.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

9.38 p.m.

Mr. Ian Harvey: Returning to the main subject, I want to refer to the speech made by the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), whom we were all pleased to see speaking from the Front Bench opposite. He made a very pleasant speech, but I want to take up the point he made concerning strategic reserves because, as in his argument about tanks—in which he got a little involved—I did not follow his reasoning.
The right hon. Gentleman said that it would be wise, if we are to have a strategic reserve, to have it dispersed in various parts of the world in which it was anticipated that trouble might arise. I should have thought that that would completely vitiate the whole idea of a strategic reserve, because the whole object is to hold it as an entity in a position from which it can be used at any point where there might at one time or another be difficulty. If it were dispersed it would not be a strategic reserve. It would be a reserve, but not a strategic one.
When we had this argument last year, the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) made some very strong comments upon the subject of a strategic reserve. Now that he has his strategic reserve, he is not quite so strong upon it.

Mr. Strachey: The reason why I may not be so strong about it is that the hydrogen bomb has made far more vulnerable and doubtful the proposition of keeping large numbers of troops in this country.

Mr. Harvey: I do not concede the point entirely. If we are to have a strategic reserve anywhere it should be concentrated to a certain extent, and it will be equally vulnerable wherever it is concentrated.
Let me move from that point to the issue which I would like to bring out, and which the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw thought I might touch on, although he referred to me as the "hon. Member for Hendon." It is the question of Anti-Aircraft Command. Closely linked with that issue is the defence of the home front and the relationship of the Territorial Army to the whole organization. I was very anxious that the question of air defence should be brought to a head quite a long time ago. I feel that it has now been brought to a head in such a way that it may well lead to dislocation, and we must look at the matter really seriously.
To begin with, the umbrella of air defence must be controlled by a single force. The Government were absolutely right in selecting the R.A.F. to be responsible for the total control of the air over Britain. There were reasons in the last war why control of the air should be vested in the R.A.F. while the ground troops in their general administrative rôle were controlled by the Army. Directly the Government decided that the ground-to-air missile of the future should be in the hands of the R.A.F., the Army, in the form of Anti-Aircraft Command, was put out on a limb. The minute that that decision was taken, measures should have been begun to transfer complete and absolute control of that operation to the R.A.F.
The Army, however, remained for some time after in control of Anti-Aircraft, but quite suddenly Anti-Aircraft Command has been disbanded. I am in agreement with the comments made by the right hon. Member, but he should not derive much satisfaction about Anti-Aircraft Command's failure to develop. The atom bomb and the supersonic fighter all arose in 1945. The consequences of those developments must have been clear to anyone, even then.
[Interruption.] They either occurred in 1945 or they were on the way, and the consequences must have been obvious to those in control. I can say without fear of valid contradiction that from 1945 to 1951 there was no progressive development of any kind in the anti-aircraft defence of this country. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite who criticise the Government for lack of development of antiaircraft defences have a great deal of the blame to carry.
Let me revert to the particular situation with which we are now confronted. Anti-Aircraft Command is the repository of a great deal of ballistic and technical knowledge about anti-aircraft defence. There are still, as the Secretary of State pointed out, anti-aircraft units remaining in the field force, but antiaircraft units cannot be allowed in any circumstances to fire on the home front without some sort of control. From the proposals before us, I cannot see how that control is now to be exercised, because the machinery of Anti-Aircraft Command has gone.
It has been admitted that the guided missile is not at the moment available, but it would seem to me that it is very important that preparation for the use of the guided missile should now be going ahead, and I find it disturbing that in the Memorandum issued by the Secretary of State for Air, to discuss which now would not be in order, there is no evidence whatever of the structural arrangements proposed for the anti-aircraft defence of this country.
It comes to this, that at the moment the structure of Anti-Aircraft Command has gone, there are still some Army antiaircraft units left, there are no Fighter Command guided missile units at all, and there is no anti-aircraft defence of any kind in Britain at the moment. I think the Secretary of State for War must face up to this situation and tell us, since he is no longer responsible for the guided missile, what exactly would be the rôle of the anti-aircraft units still remaining in the Army and which are in this country. At the moment there seems to be no provision for them, and I do not know how they would operate if there were any crisis, and I do not believe that the commanding officers of those units know either.
The disappearance of Anti-Aircraft Command has, of course, disrupted very


considerably very many Territorial Army units. I say to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw that this is not necessarily an innovation, and I will tell him why. After the war I was entrusted with the command of an anti-aircraft unit which first was a light anti-aircraft unit, which then became a light anti-aircraft-searchlight unit, which was then divided into two and became a heavy anti-aircraft unit; then the two parts were joined together again, and, having been a heavy anti-aircraft static unit, it became a mobile unit. Through all those gyrations we were expected to keep complete interest and to maintain loyalty and enthusiasm. While I admit that the unit was still operating within the same arm of the Royal Artillery, nevertheless, the situation was a confusing one.
I say to my right hon. Friend that the time has come when the Territorial Army wants a bit more assurance as to its future. As so often has been said in this House, the Territorial Army has performed great tasks, and has performed them well and loyally, and to great effect. However, we cannot place too great a strain upon the loyalty of people who have other things also to do. I think that this consideration is part of the wider question of the future rôle of all the voluntary services in this country.
I agree with my right hon. Friend that we must aim in future at building up our permanent Regular corps in every Service, and I think that all hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite will agree with us that the new developments in warfare are likely to make it possible for fewer people to do more things. That will help with the development of the Regular corps.
Furthermore, if we are eventually to get the economic structure of the Services in its proper perspective, we have to look ahead to the time when we can cut down National Service. We are all agreed that if we can, with security and safety, and in accordance with our commitments, cut down National Service, we should do so. I do not agree, however, that the moment has come when that can be done. I do not want to enter into an argument on that matter, for my right hon. Friend is likely to deal with it and he is much better qualified to speak on the subject than I am. However, I believe there is a tendency, and a dangerous tendency, in

the arrangements that now obtain to rely too much on the National Service men and too little on the volunteers. That will make it impossible to rid ourselves of the heavy economic strain placed upon the country at the present time.
Let us face what has been done with Anti-Aircraft Command: many units have been left in doubt and many have been told unceremoniously to go and find something else to do. I say quite frankly to my right hon. Friend that that is not the way to talk to the Territorial Army. The Territorial Army will do anything if it is told why it is expected to do it and if it is given a good reason, but there is a stage beyond which it cannot and will not go, and I think we are asking a great deal of the Territorial Army today in treating it in the way in which many units have been treated over the disbandment of Anti-Aircraft Command.
I feel that I can speak strongly in the matter because I was one of those who pressed for its disbandment a long time ago. Indeed, I think that the disbandment could have occurred much more easily had the R.A.F. gradually been brought into the picture and the Army eased out. But that has not been done. There has been a sudden termination of one rôle and no new rôle has been produced in its place.
As has already been said, many units of the Territorial Army of very long standing went over to Anti-Aircraft Command before the last war and are still in anti-aircraft rôles. They are units whose background goes very deep into the history and tradition of the Territorial Army, and we must not tamper with that history and those traditions without exercising great care. I am sorry that precipitate action has been taken in this direction, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to do something more than has been done to ensure that the technical skill of those who worked for a long time on anti-aircraft rôles, that the loyalty and enthusiasm of those who have been in the Territorial Army for many years, are not lost. It need not have been lost had measures been taken very much earlier to indicate what was the general plan.
I was glad to hear that the proposal about the mobile defence corps may well encourage members of the Territorial Army to join it, but I am sceptical


about whether that proposal has been put over with such an alluring appeal that many members of the Territorial Army will go for it. I hope that will be done, because home defence is an operation of the greatest importance and one into which the Territorial Army traditionally ought to fit.
The fact remains that, as things stand, there is a serious danger that many of these people will go away and not take up other employment with the Army. I believe that a clear explanation and a lead by my right hon. Friend and the Government can do much to remedy that situation if it is done rapidly, but if it is not done we shall reach a point at which we are relying, to meet our commitments, more and more on the National Service man, who has to be trained by the Regular, and that vital expanding link of the voluntary Territorial Army will be very seriously damaged.
In those circumstances, I ask my right hon. Friend to look very carefully at the situation which has been brought very much to the fore by the measures which have been taken over Anti-Aircraft Command but which is related to the much bigger and more important question of the voluntary element in our national Army.

9.54 p.m.

Mr. James Simmons: Our position in a discussion of the Army Estimates in these days of nuclear warfare is that we do not quite know what rôle would be expected of the Army in the event of war. I can visualise a possibility that the entire Army would be a vast pioneer corps, engaged purely on salvage work. I say that I can visualise it, but of course we do not know, and we have to probe and try to find out what are the possibilities.
There is no yardstick by which we can measure the duties required of an Army in a press-button war. It is clear that the cold war needs a streamlined, mobile, lightly-equipped Army. The pack mules of the P.B.I, of the First World War—and I was one of them—are things of the past. The old soldier's opinions are brushed aside by the new experts, scientists and people like that. The streamlined, mobile Army may be a good thing, but possibly the P.B.I., staggering along under the weight of a heavy pack, with his trenching tool, his haversack, his

water bottle, and perhaps a few yards of duckboarding to make weight, was better off than the modern soldier whose prospect in a war of the future is that of being atomised.
Discussion of the Army Estimates is futile unless we face the facts of war as designed by the scientist. The pattern of our debates is bound to be different. The shadow of nuclear war eclipses tradition. I do not claim to be an expert. We have in this House, on both sides, many who speak very learnedly from great knowledge and experience on details of the inner workings of the various Services. I do not pretend to be clever like that. Although I say our debates will take a new pattern, there are one or two outstanding points in the White Paper, in the statement of the Minister, and in the debate which I think worthy of consideration.
On the question of reduced commitments, are we likely in the near future to have a definite statement as to the length of service for National Service men? If our commitments are being reduced, and we have to face the new kind of warfare which is threatening, and have a streamlined, mobile Army, there should be an enormous saving of manpower. If there is to be an enormous saving of manpower, why can we not make an all-out effort to raise one of our old Regular Armies? After all, it was the Regular Army which did the job in 1914.Old Kaiser Bill called them the "Old Contemptibles" but they made a very good show.
In 1911, I joined the Worcestershires as a special Reserve in the 5th Worcesters Reserve Battalion. We did six months' training, and a month's training every year. I say without any fear of contradiction from those who know what they are talking about that those six-month soldiers gave a darn good account of themselves when war came in 1914.They did not need two years' National Service or two years' training; they did not need bedside lamps and the rest of it. Most of them were working-class lads. They went through their training in the old Norton Barracks in Worcester. They had good N.C.Os. and Regular soldiers with them, and they gave a good account of themselves when war come.
We ought to have another look at this question of two years' military service in the light of reduced commitments, a


streamlined Army, and the experience of the past when the last soldiers' war was fought. The 1914 war was a soldiers' war, when the Regular Army, plus men with six months' training, won the battles.
The Secretary of State's Memorandum mentions military hospitals and the proposals to rebuild and recondition some of them. But we have a National Health Service, and I should like to inquire whether the military hospitals could not be integrated into the National Health Service. If the military hospitals are not used to capacity, their beds could well be used in the National Health Service. An inter-related service for civilians and soldiers might be worth considering.
On the subject of Territorial formations for the reinforcement of N.A.T.O., I do not know whether I am out of date, but I seem to remember that the Territorial Army was a Territorial Army based on home territory, and that except in war it operated only in this country. Can the Minister say whether there has been any alteration in this policy?
We are also told in the Memorandum about nuclear and atomic weapons. Can we be told whether these are now conventional weapons?

Mr. Strachey: Conventional nuclear weapons.

Mr. Simmons: If not, under what circumstances would they be used?
On the question of air trooping, I should like to know why the Army does not go in for self-service instead of employing private enterprise to do the job. Surely, it would be cheaper for the War Office to do the job itself. As we are told that there is to be more air transport for the movement of supplies and of men and materials, there will be an increasing need for aircraft of this kind and increasing use of them. It might be a good idea if the War Office thought of having its own fleet of aircraft for these purposes.
On the disbandment of regiments, I have a great deal of sympathy with the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) on tradition. We old soldiers in county regiments had a great regard for tradition, and it is sad to think that tradition, which was so important in a soldier's war, is not necessary today now that we have a scientists' war. I fully support what the Minister has said in his

Memorandum about the conduct of our troops. In 99 cases out of 100, the British soldier is a credit to the nation and to the organisation which he serves.
The first time that I spoke in a debate on the Army Estimates was in 1929.I voted for an "absolutist" Amendment against the Army Vote. I spoke passionately from the heart. The 1914–18 War was still a vivid memory, and I regarded voting for the instruments of war as a betrayal of those who were slain in a war to end war.
Since I came back to the House in 1945, I have been constrained to vote for the Service Estimates reluctantly, and with a heavy heart. My memory of war is just as vivid. One does not forget such experiences. Time can heal wounds but it never eliminates scars. My hatred of war is just as fierce, but experience has taught me that there is no easy way to peace.
One does not secure peace simply by repeating "No more war" or shouting "Ban the H-bomb. "By so doing, one wins popular applause from those who are fearful, in an emotional sense, of the future. Our task is to convince other nations to see things our way, and to plan and to prepare, not for an international slanging match, but for a fruitful disarmament conference.
The events of the past decade have proved that weakness is an invitation to the aggressor to do his worst. He is invariably a cowardly, blustering bully and the absolute knowledge that swift and final retribution would follow aggression is the only deterrent that he fears. In the days of the First World War, armaments were no real deterrent because each side's statesmen and civilians fought by proxy—the soldier was the "mug." The last war brought the civilian more into the battle zone, but even then those who had the means and influence could secure "funk holes" and be relatively safe.
Today, there are no safe areas. Soldier, civilian, man, woman, child, adult, rich, poor—all will be in danger of atomisation if the nuclear bomb goes off. We have been used to taking risks for war. New we must be prepared to take as great risks for peace. There is no risk in addressing great demonstrations, playing on emotions and hysterically shouting, "Ban the H-bomb" while one's potential


enemy is making the bomb which one wants one's own country to ban unilaterally.
Those who plan aggression will not be deterred if they are assured that Britain—in the spirit of the hand-washing Pilate—is prepared to allow freedom, liberty, democracy, and those intangibles we hold so dear, to be crucified because we are too spineless to face unpleasant facts. The H-bomb is here. In the hands of one Power it could be used to enslave the whole world. Held as a threat to those who dare to start aggression on a world scale, it could be the deterrent that could save the world for ever from the threat of war.
Let us face facts. There would be a risk, but is it not worth taking a risk for the possibility of saving the world from the man-created folly of mutual total destruction? The risk of disarming unilaterally is the risk of a world spiritually and morally enslaved. The risk of having an effective deterrent is complete destruction of material things, but the awful power of the deterrent is such that the second risk is far less than the first. Let us maintain our armed strength, let us hold the ultimate deterrent in reserve but, above all, let us realise that these things alone will not suffice.
Unless real leadership is given for world disarmament, time will weaken the power of the deterrent. Some madman will let off the bomb. I believe with all my heart that it is our nation's destiny to give the necessary moral and spiritual leadership to the world. If civilisation is to be saved, it must give that leadership without delay.

10.9 p.m.

Brigadier Christopher Peto: All hon. Members who have just heard the speech of the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) must have been as convinced as I was of the deep sincerity with which it was delivered. The hon. Member was, as I was, a soldier in the First World War. It is particularly noticeable that when we are discussing Army Estimates and the dangers of war, those who have seen those dangers at the closest range can speak perhaps with the greatest authority and sincerity about how to stop another war. But they do not say "Ban the bomb" and do not say, as the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) said in

the closing sentence of his speech during our debate on defence, "Pacé, pacé, pacé." That does not make peace. It is the strength of adequate deterrents and the knowledge by the enemy that these deterrents will be used which is the most likely course to preserve peace.
We have heard pleas from both sides of the House for a reduction in the period of National Service. No one would be more anxious, particularly in an election year, as we suspect it may be, to go to the polls with a programme including reduced National Service than the Government. If it were possible to do so with our present commitments I am sure it would be done, but I do not myself think, from the little knowledge that I have, that under existing circumstances even if our commitments were reduced in many respects such a reduction would be possible.
In an earlier speech, I interrupted my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) before he finished a sentence. I took it that he was not quoting a minority, as he in fact was, but a majority of National Service men who were malcontents. For that I apologise, but that is one of the things which, in a very humble capacity, I, as an honorary colonel of a regiment, have taken the keenest interest in, that there should not be at any stage a waste of time in the training of a National Service man, a National Service officer or a potential officer.
I can say with complete sincerity that things have been put right since the occasion two years ago when I brought to the attention of the present Secretary of State for War the waste of time that there was between a potential officer's passing of the War Office selection board at his training regiment, and passing on to a cadet unit at Aldershot, when at that time there was up to three months' complete waste. That was done through a personal visit of my right hon. Friend. I have had no complaints since from the regiment of which I am colonel, or from individuals going to it.
I do not say there is now no waste of time. There must be in every Service, but I would not agree with my hon. Friend in saying that the opinion of industry is that the boys who go out from doing their National Service in the Army have to be reconditioned before they can do


their work. If I may be permitted to say so, that is an insult to the Army training, and I do not believe it to be true.

Mr. Hurd: My hon. and gallant Friend is as ready to give way to me as I was to him. If he will look in Hansard tomorrow, he will see that what I said was that some industrialists, personnel managers and welfare officers will say that there is definite evidence in some cases that that has been the effect of National Service; certainly not in all cases—I hope in only few cases.

Brigadier Peto: I accept what my hon. Friend has said, but it has not been my experience, and I hope it is only in a very few cases.
What I am particularly interested in, and why I have intervened in this debate tonight, is to suggest that the Army and recruitment for the Army both of officers and other ranks. Regulars and National Service men shall be made as successful as it can be, and I want to investigate for a few minutes whether there are not some ways in which it can be improved.
The Secretary of State for War in his opening speech mentioned most of the ways in which he thinks such improvements could be made. He mentioned married quarters, he mentioned pay, and he said that it would be costly to bring these things into line with what could be expected in industry. I do not believe that the British soldier today feels that he is underpaid. I do not think that it is for this reason he will not extend his Service. What he cares for far more is that his life shall be fairly secure. If he extends his Service he wants to feel that he will stay in the regiment with his friends, and not be drafted somewhere else where he will have to make a new start. It is far more the amenities of life and the prospects of useful, long Service in the Army with his friends that really matter to him. In that connection, naturally, I include his wife and family and how they are housed and educated.
With regard to officers, what matters to them is their pay from the time they become fairly senior officers—majors and above that rank—and their prospects thereafter. Some hon. Members may have read in "The Londoner's Diary" in the "Evening Standard" of last Wednesday a short account of how a big store

in London invited 28 careers masters from various schools to visit the store with a view to getting public schoolboys and others to enter the industry. This was the comment of one of the masters:
Commerce and industry are attracting more boys every year at the expense of the Church, the Services and teaching.
We all know that the Church and the Services, compared with industry, are grossly underpaid. I dare say the same applies to teaching.
I have made a comparison to the best of my ability and, if the House will forgive me, I will give hon. Members a few of the figures which appeared from that research. I took a young man, who might be a graduate from one of the universities, at the age of 23 and compared what he would be getting in the Army with what he would receive in a big store. I took him again when he was 30 years old, a captain and still unmarried, and then again at 35 years old, still a captain but married. Those are the most interesting interim periods in the Service of an officer.
The average pay of a subaltern at 23, with his allowances, is £650 a year. In a big departmental store at that age he would get £550. When 30 years old, single and a captain, he would be drawing £800 a year, whereas in a store he would be drawing £800 a year upwards. At 35 years of age, having married, having had 14 or 15 years service, and having not quite become a major—even if he had become a major it would not make much difference—he would be drawing £1,200 per year, whereas if he were in a store he would be drawing between £1,000 and £2,000 according to his capacity.
So far so good, one might say, and the Army appears to come out of it very well; but it is after that stage that the Army officer does not appear to advantage. As a lieutenant-colonel after 25 years' service he draws £1,770 per year; but after that length of service in a store, provided he was a good man and of the capacity of a lieutenant-colonel, a man who had got to the top of his unit, he could not be drawing less than £3,000 to £4,000 per year, being in some form of departmental managerial capacity.
The man in the store has, in addition, the sense of security not only of his home but of the education of his children, and


prospects of further employment and considerably increased emolutions, whereas a lieutenant-colonel coming to the end of his time has not that same sense of security, has very little prospects of further employment in many instances, and has—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: A pension.

Brigadier Peto: Yes, a pension. I had not intended to mention the word "pension" tonight, but as the hon. Gentleman has now done so I should like to point out that in stores and in nearly every branch of industry those employed therein, whether among the workers or among the managerial staff, are encouraged to contribute—in most cases they are made to contribute—towards their ultimate pension. When I thought of that it seemed to me to be wise to ask the Secretary of State whether it has ever been thought possible or advisable for officers to augment their pension by contribution. There is no reason, as far as I can remember from my own experience, why an officer who becomes a captain or above should not put away, as one does by means of an insurance policy, a yearly sum from his pay. That would be to a great extent get over the disadvantage from which officers now suffer of retiring on a totally inadequate pension at an age when they are too old either to earn or to learn.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Especially if they retired in 1919.

Brigadier Peto: I have here a note about 26 ex-Army officers who are still living. They retired prior to 4th August, 1914, on pensions under a code introduced in 1887.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: How much?

Brigadier Peto: It is a very small sum, a great deal less than is now drawn by retired officers. This is a matter of detail which can be better dealt with on a later Vote. That is indeed the bogey which every officer has before him. It is one of the reasons why in many instances fathers of boys thinking of going into the Army now advise them not to do so, but to go into industry to earn their living.
In the days when there were large private incomes—and there are not many now—a boy joining the Army and becoming an officer had some prospect of

an inheritance. Now, under the existing forms of taxation and with inflation, the prospects of a private income to augment one's pay are pretty dim. I go round recruiting potential officers a good deal, and I think that there are two things to note. One is that fathers of boys at school have never suggested to them that they should go into one of the Services. Secondly, I find that the boys themselves have never had that presented to them in any other way by any other body.
That brings me to my last point. In the "Sunday Times" last Sunday there was a good article on publicity. I wonder whether the Secretary of State is satisfied that sufficient is done to bring to the notice of potential officers—and indeed, to all others—the merits of service for the Queen and the country and in the Army. I very much doubt it, to judge from my experience. I very much doubt that it is brought to the notice of public school boys and boys in other schools that there is something to be gained from service of that sort—that the life is a good life.
The hon. Member for Brierley Hill said that he took the greatest pride in his regiment, and I have the greatest pride in mine. There is something that one gets from service with friends and comrades, whether at war or peace, a continuity of friendship, which one does not get in any other walk of life. I should like to see public relations—I do not like that expression—some form of publicity, lectures and cinema shows, explaining what the Army can do for one, and at any rate putting the thought of joining into the boy's mind while he is still at school.
In conclusion, my recommendations are that the men need better conditions of service. They need greater security of tenure in the Army. In that connection, may I ask my right hon. Friend to notice paragraph 110 on page 18 of his Memorandum. There is nothing that units dislike more than being told that there is no room for private armies, and that people must be prepared to be moved from one unit to another at the shortest possible notice. Nothing can more easily destroy a man's desire to prolong his service than being told that.
The Memorandum says:
We cannot afford a number of 'private armies'; we must be able to switch individuals and units from one task to the other at short notice.

Mr. Head: That is a thing about which I feel very strongly. I do see that it is a little ambiguous, but paragraph 110 is concerned not with cross-posting between battalions, but with quite a different problem, and that is the functions of the Army in a nuclear war, in a conventional war, and in a war of infiltration. It is the various rôles of the Army that are being discussed. I could not be more at one with the hon. and gallant Member than I am in being against the switching of individuals from one unit to another.

Brigadier Peto: I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend. Nothing that he has said in this debate could have done more good than that statement in assisting N.C.O.s to make up their minds about prolonging their service.
Men need better prospects on leaving, and in that connection I should like once again to say how grateful I am to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government for what he has said about housing. Officers need better prospects, including better pensions, perhaps with a contributory element, and better pay for senior officers is very much called for

10.31 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I agree with the main point which was made by the hon. and gallant Member for Devon, North (Brigadier Peto). Civilian employment in circumstances of full employment has a great deal to offer which the Army cannot offer—liberty, continuity of living in the same house and the same district, and continuous education for one's children.
The only thing which the Army really has to offer which civilian employment has not, is that very thing to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman referred—the continuity of friendship, the pride in the regiment, the sense of security, the sense of being in a niche in a social milieu in which one has an assured and established place. That is important to many men. But with cross-posting that one attraction which the Army has got and which no other life can offer disappears. It is, therefore, profoundly important, although terribly difficult to achieve.
Now I will come to the right hon. Gentleman's speech to which I listened,

as always, with the utmost interest and admiration. But there is a certain law of diminishing returns with regard to speeches even of the quality of the right hon. Gentleman's speeches. Each year he conveys the impression that here is a really sensible, forward-looking man who realises the stupidity of the Army as it is at present organised; and the next year he comes back to us and he still realises the stupidity of the Army as it is at present organised, but it is still organised just the same and its inertia is too much for him.
Then we hear people saying, "Of course, National Service for two years is not to be a permanent arrangement, but really this is not the occasion to alter it. "But if, with the reorganisation that is imposed now, this is not the opportunity to consider a reduction of the period, when might one conceive to be the opportunity to bring about such a reduction? It is very difficult.
Let us see what the new context is. It is the context of a very terrible sentence in the Defence White Paper, in which N.A.T.O. recognises its incapacity to protect Europe save by atomic means. That, in a sense, is a very great confession of military failure. When we created N.A.T.O. Europe was defended by the American possession of the atomic bomb. That was the very position from which we wished to escape, but we are now told that it is a permanent position; that we can still never defend Europe save by the atomic deterrent.
If that is so, we should do a little more to realise the consequences, and I would say immediately that the first consequence is that in the defence of what I call, loosely, the Christian values of liberty as we see them, we in Britain accept that our island is a war expendable. Let us have no delusions in the matter. This island is and must always be indefensible from atomic attack. The hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) talked about Anti-Aircraft Command, and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on having at least abolished this Command. It seemed to be the only point at which his actions—as distinct from his words—really came into contact with reality.
Surely we are going into a quite absurd world when we talk about developing the guided missile from land to air and


imagining that that is really going to defend us. Does anybody really think that the terribly difficult task of directing the missile on to the aircraft is not vastly more difficult than jamming its controls and turning it away from the aircraft? This is a field in which offence is always going to hold an advantage, and in any event all my scientific friends tell me that the rocket with a range of 450 miles is going to be in production a long time before a satisfactory guided missile, and there is nothing which can stop it. We have to face the situation that this island is indefensible from atomic attack, and recognise that it is quite ludicrous to imagine that we can use this island as a base to reinforce armies on the Continent in any future atomic war. It is an absurdity.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman faced that fact. Our N.A.T.O. commitments require us to have 12 reserve divisions here. The right hon. Gentleman did not even suggest that those reserve divisions could conceivably be used to reinforce the armies on the Continent. Of course they could not in any atomic war. He said that we should need them for our home security. I entirely agree, but why not organise them for our home security? That is just what is not happening.
I spent a most fascinating if rather terrifying day last year in a Jeep with General Festing watching Territorial divisions manoeuvring over Salisbury Plain with tanks. What on earth were they up to? What conceivable rôlewere they exercising? The task of the Army here, the very first task, in atomic war will be that of government, and I hope they are considering it and being exercised in it. Central government and local government will be destroyed. The organisation in the pockets of survival—one cannot speak of more than that in this country after atomic attack—of those who have escaped the bomb can only be provided by the military.
The moment atomic or hydrogen attack comes on this isle government will have to pass into the hands of the military commands, where at least there is a hierarchy capable of organising, of control, of stopping the sort of panic which will kill far more people still. Salvage and survival will depend upon the Army, and I would like to hear that it is receiving some train-

ing and being taught to appreciate that rôle.
We are told that the Army is receiving training in civil defence. To talk about civil defence in an atomic age is ludicrous It will be a question of salvage. The job of the Army will be to bulldoze a way out for the people who are cut off by the blockages of rubble in the cities that have been destroyed, and to seal off, it may be with machine guns, areas which are contaminated. In those circumstances, if people are to be saved the most brutal methods are very often necessary. All these grim steps have to be taken. The military must be brought to realise this.
This is the function of the home Army; not being equipped with highly-expensive tanks to waltz across Salisbury Plain for a fortnight in the summer. Do not let us have this nonsense in the future. The home defence Army has no conceivable other job in an atomic war than salvage. Let it be trained for that.
We shall greatly increase the safety of this country that way. If we rely upon deterrents, we shall succeed only if the other side take our deterrents seriously. If we go on organising, deploying our Army, and making our arrangements as if atomic weapons were not going to be used at all, nobody will believe that we shall use them. Hence the danger in which this sort of thing puts the country. So much for the position of the home Army, if we take our policy seriously. If we do not take it seriously, it makes our position vastly more dangerous and brings much nearer to us the danger that we wish to avoid.
Now let us think of the rôle of our Continental divisions. In the history of war we always get at one phase the superiority of movementover fire power, and at another phase of fire power over movement. When fire power is superior, movement is bogged down. With the arrival of the atomic age, with nuclear weapons of differing sorts, we have had the greatest addition to fire power which the world has ever seen. But we have had it without any corresponding addition to one's capacity to move. I think it was Marshal Petain who said during the 1914–1918 War—which was another occasion during which fire power had gained superiority over the capacity to


move—that today the artillery captures ground and the infantry only occupies it. That was said about 40 years ago.
If anything is going to capture ground today it is the atomic explosion; and the rôle of the infantry will be very much the same. Indeed, when my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) was speaking just now and said that we should never see the circumstances of the 1914–1918 War again, I thought that we should be far better advised to prepare for a 1914 type of war than for a 1939 war, when movement for a short time at intervals had advantage over fire power. Yet, in large measure, it is the 1939 war for which we are still preparing.
The function, as I see it, of our troops will be to stay put; to stick it out; to let enemy go round; to form their hedgehogs, and fight it out. Above all, they will have to do without supplies. Such movement as may be possible will have to be airborne. Yet we have an organisation which provides very few people to fire rifles because there is an immense group of services whose primary function is to provide ground movement which is no longer practical. Let us look at the division. Our divisional slice is still in the neighbourhood of 50,000 men. The Russians have made it about 22,000.

Mr. Head: If the hon. and learned Gentleman is referring to me in an interrogatory way, I would remind him that the war-time slice was something of that nature. If he had listened to my speech he would have known that I indicated that the whole object of the experimental organisations we are drawing up was a radical reduction behind the division and a simplification of weapons so as to reduce exactly what he complains about.

Mr. Paget: I did compose my remarks on the basis of what the right hon. Gentleman said today; but here and now the divisional slice is about 50,000 men. We hope that it is going to be very much fewer; but in doing the figures so far as I am able on the latest information which I can find available, the division itself costs us in the neighbourhood of £27 million a year. It is, of course, a little difficult to get exact Russian figures, but against ours the Russians would appear to spend £9 million. The daily supply

requirements—and here I have had to take as an example an American division because I have not the comparable British figures—seem to be 600 to 800 tons a day, whereas the Russians apparently do with 150 to 200 tons.

Mr. John Hall: The Russian division is of a different size.

Mr. Paget: The Russian division has about 10,500 men against the American figure of 18,500 and our figure of between 16,000 and 17,000. But remember this: the Russian division has every bit as much fire power as the American division; the Russian division is not smaller at the fighting end but has very much less tail and fewer services.
Some of the Russian divisions are motorised, but some have horse transport. My hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill said that the mule was out of date, but I am not at all certain that that is so. In the slower war which is imposed upon us today, we must learn to live on the supplies of the country, and I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman made some comments on that. It may be that pack mules, which can fairly easily be dispersed, are still of great value. In this slower tempo of movement, we must realise that if units are cut off and must survive without normal supplies reaching them, then it may be much easier to keep mules going than to keep vehicles going which drink petrol. These are considerations which we must bear in mind.
Out of our old form of division, out of roughly 16,000 men—the division of the last war—about 7,000 men were in headquarters. Even within the infantry division—this is not within the slice—only 10 per cent. were riflemen. In that organisation we have so few people who do the fighting and so many who serve them, partly with fire power but mainly with movement—a movement which, in the circumstances of atomic power, will no longer be practicable.
I believe that one of the lines on which we must re-think is that of considering the Russian type of division and of considering that we are likely to see a war of much less movement, not more movement, in which the essential function of our troops will be to hold land, to occupy. It is the rifleman who occupies, and we must create an organisation in which a far


higher proportion occupies and a far lower proportion serves.
As we must get units which require less maintenance, and as the only prospect of being able to move is by air, we ought to organise at Supreme Command level airlifts for divisions. These would be under the hand of the commander and would be attached to the division for a particular movement one wanted to make or would be used sometimes for supply where troops had been cut off. Except on that basis. I cannot see a great prospect of very much movement.
It is getting late and I do not want to waste the time of the House, but I am conveying the sort of general ideas which ought to govern our re-thinking.I will deal, too, with the function of the Army in the cold war, which I hope will be the most important function; for, as has been said, our interest in an atom war is largely posthumous. The real interest of this country is in the cold war. The most important function performed by our Army on the Continent in the cold war is simply that it exists. That is an enormously important function. The fact that there is a British Army there—it does not matter how it is organised, it does not matter within fairly wide limits how large it is—the mere fact that there is that substantial block of a British Army there on the Continent is the thing that holds Europe together today. But for that contribution West Europe would have disintegrated by now, and if ever it were withdrawn it would disintegrate. It is the thing which gives the French a sense of security with the Germans and which gives the Germans a sense of equality with the French. It is the force which holds Europe together. While N.A.T.O. has had to make a confession of military failure, its political success has been overwhelmingly worth anything that has been contributed to it.
As to the colonial aspect, I would say that the type of forces we require for a Malayan war, for a Mau-Mau war and that sort of operation is wholly different from the type of organisation which we have for those purposes. The sort of forces we want in Malaya are forces with the Bren carrier level of equipment. We want the very light vehicle, armoured to give some protection against light arms, we want a good rifle and we want very

little in the way of supply or the elaborate organisations we have today. Instead of producing, as we do, about one rifle for 20 Service men, we ought for this purpose to produce a force in which at least more than half use rifles and fight.
This is the sort of activity in which the established organisation of supplies and services is wildly superfluous for its purpose. I would follow the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) in urging the creation of a gendarmerie. I believe it should not be simply prepared locally for each Colony. It should be a force capable of switching. It should be organised somewhere between an army of the rather old-fashioned type without modern elaborations and a police force. It should be very highly trained and, in order to get the recruitment we require, very highly paid, if necessary. If we are raising a special gendarmerie of a police kind, we need not go into competition with the other Services. We should say, "If we pay a little more for these special chaps who have to go into the Malayan jungle, if we pay them twice or three times as much, it does not matter. They have a special job not comparable with the other Services. It is worth paying and the amount it will save the Army is overwhelmingly worth while."
Finally, I agree that one does require some strategic reserves, remembering that one can always call to some degree on Germany—about a division—for a contribution to a U.N.O. war, or something of that sort. If one tried to cut out these present military commitments, such as Cyprus—which I regard as an absurdity today—and a good many others, such as British Guiana, and handed those over to a specially-organised gendarmerie, one could pull out of these commitments which one cannot afford.
I always remember my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) saying on one occasion that he had always had some difficulty in understanding what the word "commitments" really meant until one day he was in a police court where a man who was asked to support his wife said that he was unable to do so because of his commitments, which turned out to be another lady and two children. One has to remember that commitments sometimes are something one cannot afford, which will only


destroy one if one goes on attempting to afford them.
I believe that one must cut out these commitments, get a gendarmerie to take the job over, really make an attempt to get away from the two years' National Service, which I think puts an economic strain on this country which is beyond what it can bear, and, as that is done, it may be possible to get nearer the point where one can get Regulars for the divisions which are maintained in Germany. With the smaller manpower it may be possible seriously to get away from this two years' service.
I urge the Government not merely to use words but really to think out what would be the consequences of the decision to defend Europe by atomic means, and to draw the real consequences and not to go on maintaining forces who can perform only an imaginary rôle.

11.3 p.m.

Sir Eric Errington: I shall not attempt to follow the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). The views he expressed are of great interest, and I think that no doubt there is a great deal to be said in support of what he has put forward. I want for a few moments to deal with the more domestic side of Army matters. I think it is some time since the representative of Aldershot constituency has had an opportunity to address the House on the Estimates, as my predecessor for some time was a Cabinet Minister and therefore was unable to speak on these matters.
Aldershot is proud to call itself the home of the British Army, and there is one of the best possible feelings between the local authority and the local population, and between the Army representatives and the Army personnel there. I should like to say a word on one or two matters of importance from this—some might say—rather parochial point of view. I regret that no reference is made in paragraph 90 of the Memorandum to improvements in the barracks at Aldershot. A number of places are referred to, but not that town. When my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State spoke about the question of barrack accommodation, he spoke with considerable sympathy but pointed

out the considerable commitments that would be required and the long time that would be taken to bring barrack accommodation up to date.
I beg leave to differ from that point of view, because I believe that the structure of the barracks is not in bad condition. What is needed is the bringing up to date of the internal conditions and improvements which do not involve considerable structural alterations. I am satisfied that if this was done, there would be far less criticism of the conditions under which the Army personnel live.
The other matter which I should like to raise arises from paragraph 73 of the Memorandum, which indicates that according to the view of the Secretary of State,
The officer situation is in general satisfactory. The number of officers in the Army is little changed from last year. …
But I should like to add force to what was said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Devon, North (Brigadier Peto) as to the importance of the conditions for officers.
I should probably be out of order in referring to the thorny question of the retired pay of officers, but I should like to point out that for the junior officer the situation is that a Regular full lieutenant with service, presumably, of at least three years gets the same pay as a sergeant on appointment: namely, £6 16s. 6d. weekly. The officer has a great deal of expense which the noncommissioned officer is saved, and consideration ought to be given to the younger officer with regard to pay.
Some of us who remember the First World War know what wonderful work was done by the young platoon commanders under the most difficult conditions, and I believe that if my right hon. Friend's ideas are right, the small section will become more and more important under conditions of nuclear warfare. I hope the War Office will not take the view that all is right with the officer, because I believe that there is considerable disquiet amongst Army families at the way in which the retired pay has been dealt with.
I come, finally, to a matter which I believe to be of considerable importance


and which was touched on by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Devon, North: that is, the question of publicity. I fear that the Army generally does not show its best appearance to the public. It projects itself very badly on the public mind. Something should be done about it. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War should consider seriously the issue of No. 1 dress uniform. That has not been done. At the moment, battle-dress is the uniform that is used almost entirely, with the exception of members of bands and some special individuals. The result of the use of battle-dress is very often a sloppiness and unattractive appearance which some of us believe is a bad thing from the point of view of the Army.
Prior to the First World War one of the things that was most attractive to the people in the Army was the scarlet uniform. It may not be possible to bring that back, but at any rate it is possible to give the troops a really good walking-out dress. There seems to be no indication that that is being done. It has been suggested that officers should have mess kit again, but that does not really meet the situation. I hope that consideration will be given to the suggestion that I have made.
Another matter in somewhat the same line is giving some idea to the public of what the Army is doing. When one considers that pre-war 600,000 people attended the Aldershot Tattoo and enjoyed the interesting evolutions there, one realises that the Army then was projecting to the people the things it was doing. At present, we have the Royal Tournament. That is something which keeps that idea alive, but in a rather more personal way than what I have in mind.
Bearing in mind the number of troops in the country, it would not be expensive to renew the tattoo. I am told that it is possible at the Aldershot Tattoo to use the various arms of the Services in a way that is not possible at the Royal Tournament in London. I suggest that the difficulties of interference with training, which are sometimes put forward against holding the tattoo, are not real difficulties which cannot be overcome. That kind of tattoo would publicise and popularise the Regular Army.
In present conditions, with the three or four types of commitments which may arise at any time, we must have National Service and we must have it for a substantial period, but if we can make an effort to do something to popularise the Regular Army in a way I have suggested, it will be possible at an earlier date to dispense with a long period of National Service.

11.15 p.m.

Mr. M.Philips Price: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) will not expect me to follow him in what he has said. But I am also going to take a different line from that taken by other hon. Members. I wish to say something about the rôleof the Army in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Secretary of State for War has spoken of three types of warfare which we may have to face. First, a nuclear war; second, the conventional type of war, and third, what I think he called the infiltration type of war, the guerilla type which we deal with in Malaya and Kenya. I think there is no doubt that the first type of war, the nuclear type, has caused us to revise our ideas not only about war in Europe, but warfare in other parts of the world. I refer to the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
I think there is little doubt that what persuaded the Prime Minister, and other members of the Government, to revise their ideas on whether we should keep our forces in the Suez was the change of function which a large depot would have in the Suez Canal area in view of nuclear warfare. That seems to be reflected in paragraph 51 of this Memorandum on the Army Estimates, which states that our commitments have been reduced by withdrawals in the Middle East, while it also refers to Korea and Trieste, and states that this has made it possible to reduce our commitments overseas and to build up a strategic reserve at home.
It is satisfactory that the Government have come to that conclusion in regard to that great depot which we had in the Canal Zone. It is right in this atomic age to reduce the concentration of stores and equipment which we had there. I am wondering whether we have gone far enough in that direction. I was in the


Canal Zone last autumn, when I visited some of the great stores camps which remain there. I fancy that stores and equipment to the value of about £100 million worth of the taxpayers' money are still lying out there, some of it probably deteriorating. Also, I do not know whether, under the new set-up there, we shall be able to prevent pilfering. We were able to stop it when we were in occupation. In paragraph 23 of the Memorandum it is stated there are still 600,000 tons of material of all sorts which is being sorted.
Standing on a tower on a big camp and looking over the Great Bitter Lake. I saw acres and acres of stores and equipment, and I wondered whether it was going to be one of the "sitting ducks" in the atomic age, to which the Secretary of State referred just now. I hope that our military authorities are taking steps to sort the stores over still further to determine how much it is necessary to keep out there.
All sorts of things that have been there for years and years, many of them doing no good at all, are being discovered. In one camp only the other day a lot of lances were discovered which were probably there at the time of the Battle of Omdurman. It may be that the Prime Minister himself saw some of these lances in action during that Battle. In this atomic age, lances are really mediaeval.

Mr. Strachey: Very useful, perhaps, for the next war but one.

Mr. Price: Paragraph 26 of the Memorandum speaks of the redeployment of our Middle East Forces mainly in Cyprus and Libya. I do not know how far Cyprus is in a position to receive the forces that we are sending there. There is no harbour there that I am aware of, and the equipment and general layout for a military force seem to be very inadequate. I should like to know what is being done in this connection.
While I was in the Canal Zone I heard that a small force of our troops has recently gone to the Gulf of Akabah in Jordan, no doubt with the consent of the Jordan Government, in connection with the training of Jordan forces. I do

not know whether the Secretary of State would like to say something about that. For my part, I am very glad to hear of that redeployment of our Forces, because I believe it will have a stabilising effect in the Middle East and particularly on the Israel frontier. The British soldier is generally a good ambassador wherever he goes. If it were possible with the agreement of the Jordan Government to increase that force a little, I believe it would have the effect of reducing the number of incidents on the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Jordan frontiers a great deal. I make that suggestion; I do not know whether the Secretary of State would like to say something about it.
In general, the difficulties in that part of the world are largely due to the strong nationalist feeling which is running through the Arab States. The Arab States will not co-operate in any defence system based on N.A.T.O., which they think is an international organisation which might interfere with their rights as nation-States. Egypt seems to be more prepared to work with us as a so-called "imperialist" Power than with an international organisation like N.A.T.O. Nationalism is very strong out there. I am afraid that it has been fanned by anti-foreign demagogy for a long time, and it will take a little time to die out, but I am not unhopeful that in the long run it will be possible to get the Arab States to work with an international organisation like N.A.T.O.
I now want to say a word about the three types of warfare to which I referred in my opening remarks, the nuclear, the conventional and the infiltration types, and how they are likely to affect strategy in the Middle East. I do not think that nuclear warfare in the Middle East is likely. All the same, it is desirable that we should have our stores and equipment depots dispersed as much as possible. That is why I favour the idea of reducing the Suez depôt even more than it is today.
As for the second type, conventional warfare, the only kind of conventional warfare that I think is possible is a direct Russian attack upon Eastern Turkey, upon the military positions of Turkey in Eastern Anatolia. I believe that that would not happen if the Western Powers were in a position


to give Turkey the assistance which she must have in order to resist such an attack. Turkey has great manpower, and she also has the will, the strength and the tradition to resist, but she has not got the equipment, particularly in the air. But I believe that she could be assured of that.
I do not believe that a conventional type of attack upon Turkey is likely. But I should like to have the assurance that we are thinking out these problems, in order to ensure that we are preparing for a situation of that kind, because I am certain that if we prepare for it, it will be avoided.
Much more likely in this part of the Middle East is the third type of warfare to which I have referred, namely the infiltration type. I refer particularly to what might happen, say, in Northern Persia or Iraq. It is quite likely that Persian nationalist fellow-travelling bands trained in the Caucasus, or some Kurdish tribes whose leaders are known to be trained there, might infiltrate into that part of the Middle East and try to filter their way down to the Persian Gulf. That is the most dangerous type of warfare which might easily happen. It is towards that danger that I hope our military authorities are looking, to see how far they could help Iraq and Turkey who are now prepared to organise their own defence mutually.
I now wish to refer to the speech of the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) who referred to bases which he considers we ought to have in East Africa as a possible means of defence of the Persian Gulf. He referred to the Persian Gulf as the most vital area, with which I entirely agree. I think that the hon. Gentleman's remarks link up with mine in this respect. I was arguing just now that the Suez Canal depot should be still further reduced. He was arguing that the existing one in East Africa should be built up further. That is all in line with the general idea of dispersion.
It would possibly assist the defence of the Persian Gulf and that area of the Middle East, because with the aid of airborne troops, in which I know development is proceeding as quickly as possible, it should be possible to give assistance to those countries like Iraq, Turkey and

Pakistan if they are threatened by infiltration from the north.
Finally, I want to say a few words about East Africa, which is dealt with in paragraphs 27 to 37 of the Memorandum. The type of war with which we should be concerned there is the third type—guerilla warfare in the jungle, such as we have had in Malaya and now have in Kenya, in our fight against Mau Mau. Since I was in Kenya last autumn the evidence is that we are gradually getting the better of the forces of darkness there. At the same time, the more I saw there the more convinced I became that military measures were by no means the only ones that we should take.
I am very glad therefore that the Memorandum refers to measures for concentrating Africans in villages and getting them to reorganise their lives in such a way as to give them proper protection. Not only military measures but measures for improving the methods of cultivation of the land and the education of the Africans are vital in our struggle in East Africa against the forces of darkness. I saw areas where this process had not begun, and where the African huts were scattered about on the edge of the forest, and it was very easy for Mau Mau agents to get in and terrorise and blackmail the people.
In those areas where the people had been concentrated in villages that was not possible, and I saw some very good work being done there. All the Africans had new and better houses; they had an educational centre where they could all meet and discuss their problems. There was the Home Guard, and an observation tower which enabled watchers to give warning of any danger. All that seemed to me to be a move in the right direction, but it had not been going on for long, and I should like to know by how much it has progressed and been extended since I was there. I am certain that it is a move which will enable us to settle this difficulty eventually. Educational and protective work is just as important as the carrying on of the campaign of bombing the hideouts of the Mau Mau.

11.34 p.m.

Mr. C. J. M. Alport: I am delighted to learn that the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) has joined the select band of hon.
Members on both sides of the House who, in successive Army Estimates debates, have advocated the setting up of a base in East Africa. I can assure him that the arguments in favour of that course have increased in importance and urgency during the last few years.
I understand that it is now the accepted theory that it would be possible to reinforce various areas in the Middle East and in Africa direct from this country by flying out troops. But it is also part of the process which has taken place during the last few years that the facilities to overfly countries between the United Kingdom and parts of Africa to which troops may need to be flown have lessened. It may be necessary, in order to ensure that troops are available to fly to the point endangered by some sudden crisis, to have them in East Africa so that they can be flown there, which might not be possible if those troops were stationed in the United Kingdom.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman did not join with other of his hon. Friends, including the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), in trying to impress the House with the possibility and practicality of a reduction in the present length of National Service. The right hon. Gentleman must know that it is not possible for that to happen at present.
Our predecessors and ancestors were warned always to be particularly cautious of the Greeks when they came bearing gifts in their hands; we should be equally careful of right hon. Gentlemen when they come to the House bearing a Select Committee. That means almost certainly that they are trying to find a way of doing something which they know to be wrong but which they are being pressed to do by influences outside this House, in this case by trade unions.
My right hon. Friend has been asked the size of the Regular Army needed to take over all the commitments at present being fulfilled by Regular and National Servicemen together. A reasonable estimate, based upon what my right hon. Friend has said and the figures in the Army Estimates, would be about 325,000. The Regular Army is 190,000. Right hon. Gentlemen know from their own

experience the insuperable difficulties that would be faced by this or any other Government in trying to recruit an additional 135,000 men for the Regular Army.
One of the steps necessary, if the Army is to make a greater recruiting appeal as a career, is the provision of greater stability. That is more important than better pay or any of the advantages which my right hon. Friend outlined in his speech. We have an example in Colchester of what happens. We have had during recent months some 80 families of soldiers threatened with eviction, or pressed very strongly by the authorities to move from their existing married quarters in Colchester to married quarters or hostels elsewhere. I know the argument used, quite rightly, by the War Office. It was used by the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) when he was Minister for War. It is that it is most important when troops come into a garrison town that their families should be reunited with them as soon as possible after their arrival. If there are not sufficient married quarters for them, then families where the husbands have gone to some other station or overseas must move out to make room for those who are coming in. That is understandable but it causes great anxiety to those who have to carry out the evictions—for that is what they come to—and to the husbands and menfolk overseas. It is much harder for them to face this crisis in their families when they are not there to help their wives through it. The military authorities in Colchester have handled this difficult and human problem most carefully and have done the best they could.
The truth is that we have remaining on in Colchester the wives of at least four different lots of units who have passed through the garrison during the last two or three years. They are now faced with removal to other quarters which they have to find for themselves, to an uncongenial hostel, or to married quarters in some other garrison town. I believe that if that sort of thing could be avoided—if it could be made certain that the moves of units, or of men within units, should not be so frequently as at present, or at least not under a minimum, say, of two years—the whole of the morale and outlook of the Regular


soldier in respect of his career would be changed. I realise that there are very great difficulties in this, but many of these moves could be avoided if, in fact, this particular aspect of the problem were borne more clearly in mind by the War Office when making its various plans for deployment.
I find that this problem affects particularly the infantry soldier. I am sad, to say the least, about the decision to disband the eight infantry battalions which were raised during the Korean crisis of three years ago. I say that because if we had these additional units available it would be much less necessary to move infantry units from one garrison to another as has happened in the last few years.
My right hon. Friend may say that these units are redundant, but here I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), who said that infantry in the cold war is a major arm. Whereas we often find ourselves with more artillery than is necessary—and certainly that was the case at the end of the last war—never, I think, in history have we found ourselves with too many infantry. I hope that my right hon. Friend can retain some of these battalions, because the decision to disband them has struck a blow at the morale of the infantry which is perhaps no less drastic than the blow struck at anti-aircraft artillery by the decision to disband that arm of the Service.
I would now like to say that I welcome very much indeed the announcement in the Memorandum accompanying the Estimates that improvements in barrack accommodation are going to take place at Sandhurst, Purbright, and Colchester. There is particular reference to accommodation for single men. But the problem is not one of the single man's accommodation; it is all the time a problem of the married soldier and the married officer and their families, and in the plans for improvements in barrack accommodation to be carried out during this year in Colchester, I hope that this is to include improvements in the somewhat antiquated married quarters which have existed for the last 60 or 70 years. They will need very considerable improvement if they are to come up to modern standards.
If I might now turn from a subject which does affect the whole of the Army, but which is perhaps a local one, I would like for a few moments to deal with the subject of the colonial forces. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser), I warmly welcome the appointment of General Templer under the Minister of Defence to investigate the whole problem of the organisation and future of the colonial forces; and I hope that this will be the forerunner of a decision by the War Office to appoint, if not an Inspector of Colonial Forces attached to the War Office such as existed with the Colonial Office before the last war, at least a department in the War Office which can deal with the particular problems of the colonial forces.
Although there are in the War Office many officers who know the problems of the colonial troops, there is no special man, no liaison officer, or a branch of G., A or Q. specially entrusted with the work of looking after the interests of our colonial troops, particularly in Africa. I ask my right hon. Friend to pay particular attention to the possibility of establishing a branch or inspectorate of this sort, because it has been quite clear from our experience of the King's African Rifles during the Mau Mau crisis that the standard of the officers being sent out there is in no way comparable with the standard of the officers who went to the King's African Rifles regularly in pre-war days. In those days, service with African colonial forces was service with a corps d' élite. The British N.C.Os. and officers who went out there were specially picked, but today there is no selection board, as far as I know, to select those men.
Would my right hon. Friend consider setting up a selection board, consisting of experienced colonial soldiers, who would be entrusted with the task of choosing officers to serve with African troops—officers who are fitted and qualified for that form of service; because I can assure my right hon. Friend that service with colonial forces presents a different problem from that of serving with United Kingdom troops in Europe or even in Africa or the Middle East. For colonial troops we require a special type of officer, preferably with special


training but certainly with a special attitude of mind, who can gain the confidence of African troops, something which is by no means easy.
Would my right hon. Friend consider very seriously the argument put forward earlier in the debate by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton in favour of the establishment of a gendarmerie—and here I speak without very intimate knowledge—associated more closely with the Army than with the police, which would be trained and equipped specifically for dealing with the internal security tasks which the Army has been called upon to carry out too often in the last few years in assistance of the civil power?
I feel that it must be wrong that time and again troops have been called out to aid the civil power in circumstances which perhaps should never have arisen and in circumstances in which the action should have remained, in my view, in police hands and not handed over to the Army. There has been a tendency—perhaps it is the fault of the civil administrations—to call too early upon the military for assistance when the situation could most effectively have been dealt with by the police. Does not my right hon. Friend think that a gendarmerie organisation could be established, trained, equipped and organised for internal security duties—perhaps established independently in each Colony—and, if he does, could General Templer, in his mission to the Colonial Territories, be asked to look into this point?
Finally, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he would consider how effective is the colonial intelligence service? Frankly, I do not know whether this comes under the War Office or under the Colonial Office, nor, perhaps, is it my place to find out, but I am convinced that time and again the crises which have occurred in the Colonial Territories could have been prevented, or could have been prevented from spreading if they had been dealt with early, and if there had been better intelligence, and preferably better military intelligence.
I therefore hope that when General Templer carries out his mission to the Colonial Territories he will be given the opportunity not only of considering the problem of military organisation, but also will be asked to inquire into the intelligence service and the relationship between the civil intelligence and military intelligence as existing at present and how it can be improved.
I cannot pretend that those of us who, like myself, have taken a close interest in the development of the colonial forces and their use feel that their ability to tackle the tasks they are likely to be called upon to tackle at present is adequate. I believe nothing could be more timely than the decision to send General Templer on his mission of investigation, but I hope very sincerely that as a result of the investigation improvements and changes which are long overdue will be carried through quickly and effectively and that the mission is not regarded merely as a stop gap before General Templer undertakes even more important duties in the military sphere.

11.52 p.m.

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: It seems to be my fate to follow the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport), but this evening I am not going to follow his argument or even his reference to the Forces in the Colonies.
I wish towards the end of this debate not to deal with the effect of nuclear weapons upon war preparations, nor with the issues of strategy which have been so much discussed during the last five hours. I want to turn to a very human problem, the problem of the men in the Forces who are the victims of accident, of mutilation, or disease, and of their parents and near relatives who suffer also when they are such victims. I have indicated to the Under-Secretary of State for War that I intended to raise this issue tonight. I am not going to do so in an attitude of opposition, but I hope, in a constructive spirit which will contribute something towards a solution of a problem which I recognise is difficult. I want to propose changes in the routine related to soldiers undergoing medical treatment, particularly in the routine of informing parents and closest relatives of the nature of their illness and of its development.
I raised this matter last June in the case of a boy who came from my constituency and had been serving in the Far East. His name was Whitten. I refer to that case this evening because there has been a tragic conclusion to it since 1 brought the attention of the War Office to his position. On 5th July last year his parents received a formal card, A2042, stating that he was sick in a Japanese hospital. Except for a communication on 22nd January reporting that he was in the hospital at Netley, no further information at all was given to his parents about his illness. The first intimation of his serious condition was when they saw him suffering from contortions being dragged down a corridor between two orderlies at Netley Hospital when they visited him.
One can imagine the shock of parents going to visit their son, finding him in that condition, and never having been given any warning by the War Office that he was in that serious state. Indeed, the explanation from the War Office was that he was not in that serious condition, but later it was diagnosed as torsion dystonia, which was not thought to be associated with Army service, but in his later days at St. Mary's Hospital, Paddington, was held to be probably inflammation of the brain caused by a germ picked up during his service. He died of that disease. I am glad to say that the War Office recognised that second diagnosis to the extent of giving him a 100 per cent. disablement pension from 24th May, 1954, to the date of his death. The matter of a dependent's pension is still unsettled.
The point I am emphasising today, and which I shall illustrate from later cases, is not so much the matter of pensions as the absence of information to parents and relatives about the conditions of these boys when they are in these hospitals. My experience has shown that the Whitten case was not isolated. Only the fact that I have had others from my constituency, one of which I shall deal with in detail now, has led me to raise this matter during this discussion on the Army Estimates.
The story which I am now going to tell will seem incredible to hon. Members of this House. Incident after incident, which

become a mountain of inhumanity, which reaches a point of an absolute scandal which should be exposed as an illustration of Army methods. I am referring to Trooper Colin Wheatley, who was a member of the First King's Dragoon Guards. He was serving in Germany. In September last his mother was informed by the Red Cross that he was in hospital with injuries, though those injuries were not specified. Six weeks passed with no further information to his parents. I telephoned at the request of his parents who are my constituents, on 4th November, to the War Office, and I wrote to the Minister. I had no reply until 10th November, which was seven weeks after his admission to hospital.
I was informed that there had been a car accident—I believe, during the "Exercise Battle Royal" manoeuvres in Germany—between a scout car and a jeep, and that Wheatley had received cuts and slight concussion, for which he was immediately treated at a German civilian hospital. He was discharged next day, but on 25th September was admitted to the military hospital at Munster, where he was treated for concussion, and on 22nd October he was transferred to the military hospital at Hanover, suffering from post-concussional neurosis.
The explanation given to me by the War Office of the fact that Wheatley was left in that condition for seven weeks, without his relatives or parents being informed, was that he was not dangerously ill; that
As he was not on the dangerously ill list or seriously ill list, official reports on his progress would not have been rendered as it is normally considered better in such circumstances to leave the soldier himself to inform his relatives of the reasons for his admission to hospital in his own way.
I was told that there was always someone ready to write if a soldier did not feel up to writing, and that the medical officer at Hanover had urged Wheatley to write to his mother. But this boy was suffering from neurosis as a result of that concussion.
I suggest that when a soldier is in that condition in a hospital, it should not be left to the boy to ask someone to write; it should not be left to the medical officer to urge him to write. There should be


someone present who offers to write the letter for him and who will normally do so unless the permission of the boy is withheld. This boy, a patient in bed, suffering from neurosis, was not in his normal state of mind. Instead of waiting for him to take the initiative to write to his parents or his relatives, someone ought to have been in the ward who would go to him and offer to write to his parents for him, and to do so unless he himself indicated that he did not want a letter to be sent.
When I received that letter from the War Office saying that the boy's illness was not serious, I hoped that he would soon be home and discharged, because his period of service as a Regular soldier ended on 7th December, but on 15th December I heard that on arriving in England he had been moved to the Tidworth Hospital. When his mother was informed and telephoned to the hospital, the reply was that he was in bed and the hospital could not say how long for.
That is only the beginning of the story. In the letter of 10th November, the Parliamentary Secretary had said to me that it was expected that the boy would make a good recovery. The hon. Gentleman said:
I am sorry that Mrs. Wheatley should have had this anxiety and I am glad that we have been able to obtain reassuring news for her.
That was on 10th November. On 15th December, the mother wrote to me in these terms:
The War Office wrote to me and said his condition was satisfactory and he would be discharged from hospital on 12th November. I am not at all satisfied about the satisfactory condition, as he arrived in England only to be sent to hospital.
Once more no information was given to the mother. She said:
No one can tell me how long it will be. I am still hoping that someone will enlighten me how long, or if he will ever be cured.
She was then informed that he would be home after Christmas. She telephoned the hospital on 28th December. She was informed rather crudely as a result of that telephone message that he had run away. On telephoning again later in the day, she was informed that he had been given a

railway warrant and was on his way home. She was told, "He should be there now."
She and his wife stayed up all night to await him. In the morning he had not come and she reported his absence to the Slough police station. Inquiries showed that he had been sent from the Tidworth hospital, not home, but to Bovington Military Hospital. He was allowed sick leave there from 30th December, to 1st January when he returned to hospital again.
Meanwhile, I wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for War on 22nd December asking for a report on the condition and prospects of Trooper Wheatley. The War Office replied on 5th January, three weeks later, that Wheatley would be leaving the Army on completion of his Regular engagement on 6th January. On 6th January, the War Office wrote to me once more:
…some slight delay over his discharge from the Regular Army as he has had to attend hospital again for a final check-up.
Three more weeks passed without further news, but on 2nd February we were informed that he was being transferred to the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley for further observation.
I was given this promise:
As soon as this hospital has had an opportunity to report on his condition I will write you again.
On 10th February there was another letter from the Under-Secretary saying,
… he will by now be returned to his unit in a low medical category and can therefore be released.
When I received that letter I expected that he would be discharged, and would be returned home and that he would be at least reasonably well.
On 17th February I heard from his mother that he was home at last. These are her words:
He is a very sick lad and it is heartbreaking to see him. He tries very hard to keep well, but when he goes out I am always on edge, wondering where he is and whether he will be all right. He went out last Wednesday and was found in a dazed condition and taken to hospital until he had recovered, and then brought home in an ambulance. The same thing happened yesterday—he was brought home in a car.


The local newspaper reported a third occasion when he was found in a state of collapse, taken to hospital and brought home by ambulance again.
When I read that report I wrote to the Under-Secretary and asked him whether he would send the report which he had promised in his letter of 2nd February. Not only had I not had that report: even the doctor who was attending the boy at home had not had it. Two weeks passed. The War Office had not even informed the doctor who was treating the boy at home—a boy in such condition that on three occasions when he left home he collapsed in the street—of the War Office diagnosis, of the boy's case history, of how he ought to be treated, or of what was wrong with him.
I wrote to the War Office asking that the medical reports should be sent to his doctor. A week passed and I had no reply. On 3rd March I telephoned to the hon. Gentleman's private secretary. Then I was informed that it was the practice to send medical reports from the Army to a doctor attending a boy who had been discharged from the Army in the condition I have described, only when the boy's doctor made a request for them and it was certified by him. I recognise that in view of the urgency of the case the War Office instructed that a report should be provided pending the sending of the form from the patient.
The latest information I have is that this boy is very ill in the Lipton Hospital, Slough, and that the medical authorities at that hospital have approached the medical officer at the War Office for his reports. There are three conclusions to be reached on the appalling story I have recited. The first is that the War Office must find some method of improving communication with relatives when men are ill in hospital. The second is that when a man has been ill he should, on discharge, be given a form to be filled in so that the case history, diagnosis, and suggested treatment can be sent at once to his doctor when the man goes home. The third conclusion is that there ought to be more immediate contact between the War Office and the local medical officer in the Army to prevent the kind of delay which occurred when I applied

to the War Office concerning this case. Despite the urgency, days and on one occasion weeks, passed before the necessary information was sent to me.
I have raised this case not only because it refers to Colin Wheatley, a boy in my constituency, but because letters I have received indicate that this case illustrates something which the War Office must put right for other men in other parts of the country.

12.14 a.m.

Mr. John Hall: I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway), who is one of my Buckinghamshire neighbours. I have listened to the cases he has brought to our notice with a great deal of interest and sympathy because I had a similar case which I had to bring to notice of the War Office. I must say that the War Office treated it with sympathy and attention. I do not want to deal with the more human side of the problems discussed recently, but to return to the wider aspects of the form which the Army ought to take and the problems which it has to face.
I want to deal specifically with the question of reserves. There has been a certain amount of argument, both in the defence debate and today, as to exactly what type of war we are preparing for. It has been suggested that the Army has a treble duty to face. It may have to face an all-out nuclear fission war, or merely an extension of the cold war breaking out in large-scale local wars in different parts of the world, or, less conceivably, a major world war with conventional weapons, possibly with a limited tactical use of atomic weapons.
I doubt very much whether the last one is a possibility. If we are really to believe what the Defence White Paper says, and if we are to accept as accurate, as I believe we must, the estimates of Russian strength, an outbreak of a major world war inevitably means the outbreak of a nuclear fission war. In these circumstances, many of the things that we have been talking about really do not matter very much at all.
Therefore, there are two alternatives. Are we likely to have a nuclear fission war? I am not quite so pessimistic as


some hon. Members who have spoken today. I very much doubt whether any Government will be so insane as to initiate, directly or by provocation, a nuclear fission war when it is remembered that not only those who take part in it but the whole of civilisation will be affected and destroyed.
If we are to believe the scientists, should there be a world-wide nuclear fission war, the atmosphere is likely to be so saturated with radio-active particles that we shall be affected unto the third and fourth generation—the old Biblical saying will come true—the evolution of the species will go into reverse and man will descend unto the ape. In the circumstances, I doubt very much whether we stand a great risk of nuclear fission war all the time we have in our own possession weapons which are as strong as those which can be brought against us.
I believe that we have really to plan for a development of the cold war, localised wars which can become quite large and absorb a considerable amount of manpower and materials. In those circumstances, the Secretary of State, in his brilliant opening speech, gave what I thought was a very good indication of the form which our Army should take. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) confirmed the outline for the Army which had previously been given when he talked about the way in which it should be streamlined, the necessity for cutting down the number of vehicles that it had, learning to be tough and living on the country, doing away with the extensive commissariat and so on. Undoubtedly, that is the form that the Army should take.
However, there is one thing that nobody has touched on except very slightly, and that is how, in those circumstances, the Army can be reinforced. It seems to me that the reserves, as we have them now, are not really applicable to the type of warfare that we have to face. We have two main sources of reserves, the Army Emergency Reserve and the Territorial Army. I want to deal first with the Army Emergency Reserve.
What is to be the future rôle of the Army Emergency Reserve? As I understand it, it is likely to be used to form

or implement the Mobile Defence Force battalions. Also, it will apparently be used to provide units which will, in the case of nuclear fission warfare, be used together with Territorial units to restore order and government to this country. I can hardly conceive of that happening. If we have an outbreak of nuclear fission warfare, there will not be very much to restore in this country, for it will be a blazing inferno.
In any case, how will the Army Emergency Reserve be mobilised? It is drawn from people all over the United Kingdom who meet only once a year for a fortnight's camp. Its officers and N.C.Os. are mostly National Service men. It has not a continuity of volunteers to the same extent as the Territorial Army has. We want something like 15 per cent. volunteers to get efficiency in an Army Emergency Reserve unit, and I think we have reached about 5 per cent. How is the Army Emergency Reserve going to work? I should have thought that if we believe—and, after all, we have got to make a guess about this—that the threat we have to face is an extension of the cold war, we ought to be prepared to reinforce our regular troops, which may be required to be reinforced very quickly, by our reserve troops.
Let me take the example of Indochina. If the Indo-China war had continued, we might have found it very difficult, if we were brought into that war, to reinforce our regular troops. We might have wished to call up Territorial divisions to do so. Our reserve, as it stands at the moment, is not organised for rapid mobilisation and deployment. It is not trained or organised for it. If we are going to get an effective reserve in the future, we have got to consider how we are going to do so.
I would have thought that the best rôle for National Service men coming out of the Forces from now on is twofold. First, I think the Territorial Army should absorb them to the maximum extent. We ought to develop far more Territorial divisions if possible. By all means let us have the streamlined version, but we ought to have more men getting longer training than they get in the two weeks Army Emergency Reserve. They have certainly got to be organised in a way which makes it possible to mobilise them


rapidly, and we have got to accept the fact that the Territorial divisions may be mobilised at a time when a world war has not broken out but merely to participate in a localised war.
Those men who cannot go into the Territorial Army because they may be some way from Territorial Army headquarters may have to go into the Army Emergency Reserve. There may be some Service units of the old style which could be maintained, and which might be of use, although I can hardly conceive of that in the circumstances. They may be required in the Mobile Defence Corps, although I am not at all convinced that that is not a complete waste of manpower. I doubt if a civilian defence force of that kind would be of real use for the purpose for which it is required if a nuclear fission war were to begin. However, civil defence is an attitude of mind, and it might be of some use in maintaining morale.
The other members of the Army Emergency Reserve who cannot be absorbed into those tasks might well be put into the Home Guard units. There are—or there should be—Home Guard units situated in different parts of the country. There are little localised units, very often in small country areas, which obtain their men from small hamlets. Those are about the only military units which will be capable of functioning in the type of cataclysm which we are considering. I cannot conceive of a large military force remaining in existence after a nuclear fission attack on this country which would be able to restore order. There would only be small units. Therefore it may be advantageous to strengthen Home Guard units with those men who go into the Army Emergency Reserve and who live in isolated areas, thus making it difficult for them to get into the Territorial units.
There are many others who wish to speak on this subject, and therefore I am going to restrict my remarks to this question of the reserve. I beg my right hon. Friend to consider this matter carefully, because I am convinced that the reserve is wrongly organised at the moment for the type of warfare we might have to face. Twelve or 18 months ago it may have been right, although I have my

doubts, but it certainly is not right now. We have got to make certain that we have a reserve which can be deployed rapidly in a cold war and which can be utilised usefully—or the remnants of it—if we have a nuclear fission war

12.25 a.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I distinctly remember the speech which the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) made a year ago, and I am not sure that he entirely agreed with the way my mind was then working in the light of the situation facing us. In the White Paper of a year ago we were given a description of the opening phases of a fission war, which would be followed by broken back warfare, and, like him, I had my doubts whether it would be possible in those circumstances to undertake an elaborate scheme of mobilisation, to equip the mobilised forces and then transport them to the Continent. My idea then was that we should establish our mobilisation centres on the Continent, because I believed that the N.A.T.O. conception had not finally broken down, and that the four divisions on the Continent would be reinforced.
It is perfectly clear that that conception of 1954 has gone, and we now have to start off with the public statements of General Gruenther and Field Marshal Montgomery, that the basis of N.A.T.O. planning is the use of nuclear weapons, not only of fission but of fusion.The reason why General Gruenther is committed to that is that the conception of a screen of some 40 or 50 divisions behind which mobilisation could take place until the counter-attack was ready is clearly not going to work any longer.
We must therefore accept that if the planning conception is based upon the use of nuclear weapons, whether or not we like it, we should find ourselves in a position where they would have to be used to redress the conventional balance against us. That is a highly dangerous situation, because the American forces on the Continent are already liberally armed with tactical atomic weapons, and from the statement of the Secretary of State today it is clear that within a few months, or a year at most, British forces on the Continent will possess those weapons.
That is the situation which we must face, and the hon. Member for Wycombe is quite right to express doubts about the possibility of those four divisions on the Continent being reinforced. It is a truly alarming situation, and seems to me to rub any brilliance off the speech of the Secretary of State, because he said nothing about it. If we are right about this; if those four divisions are on the end of a limb and no plans have been made for their withdrawal or reinforcement, the rôle they will play, whether in a cold or a hot war, is that of the tethered goat. They are there, and the best that they can hope for is another Dunkirk.
That seems to present a very odd picture, in which this country is being asked to pour out some £1,500 million a year to maintain the two years' compulsory National Service to keep our youngest and best men on the Continent, knowing that in no conceivable circumstances will they ever be able to fight effectively. That is where the Government's policy has got us. I think it likely that some person with an able pen is now compiling the material for the second volume of "Guilty Men." There is no doubt that the Prime Minister has established his right to inclusion in that volume, and I do not think that the Secretary of State has done very badly. However we look at this matter, these are the bare and cruel facts of the situation.
I can understand that it came as a very great shock to the Prime Minister when he discovered the full implications of the fusion weapon, and he told his colleagues that we should have to think again. It would not be so bad if it were clear from the Defence White Paper that the picture painted for us this year was being followed by some hard thinking against a time-table, but the Prime Minister has done something which is quite shocking. He has told the young people—not the children, but the young men and women in their twenties—"You have three or four years left." They will get into the attitude of mind in which they say, "Eat, drink and be merry, because in three or four years' time we shall have had it."
As a result of this attitude—of which the godfather is the Prime Minister—we

shall get the worst form of neutralism. I have a certain respect for the manly neutralism of the Swedes and the Swiss, who put their hands into their pockets and give of their leisure time to preserve their freedom and their way of life. I have no time at all for the kind of neutralism which I have sometimes seen expressed. I will not particularise what I have in mind, but I reject it because it is alien to our way of life. If there is one thing calculated to bring us down to disaster, it is that conception of neutralism.
From my reading of history, I believe that the people of this country have reacted properly whenever they have been faced with facts put to them honestly, as the Prime Minister put them honestly in his great moments in 1940 before he was captured by the Tory Party. I believe that the people would react again, but we want clear, honest statements and clear, honest action. We have not got them in the White Paper. Confusion of thought exists not only among members of my own party, but on the Government side too. If anybody doubts that, let him read the speech of one of the hon. Members for Portsmouth in the debate on the Navy not long after the Prime Minister's speech and see the effect it could have on the Government benches. Let him also see what has appeared in the Press since the Defence White Paper was published.
I do not believe that we have three or four years. That was a device by the Prime Minister. I concede that the Prime Minister's speech was a masterly political effort, for he realised that the Government's efforts were not very good and he therefore tried to elevate the discussion to the rarified air by ascending into the stratosphere. If we asked hon. Members on the Government side what the Prime Minister said, they could not tell us. They would say that it was a remarkable speech, but what it was about they could not say, except that we have three or four years to wait. I do not believe we have. That is not the way to talk to the British people. In the last year we have had a complete change in the situation, in which everything we stand for and hope for is challenged. It may be successfully challenged unless there is a very quick reaction.
My second approach is to realise that as a result of the last war our position in the world has changed. If we try to have a great Navy, a great Army and a great Air Force, added to that an adequate Civil Defence, and now try to make nuclear weapons we shall end up by getting absolutely nothing. We have therefore to choose our priorities.
I sat all through the Navy debate, prepared to listen to the experts saying that we must have cruisers, aircraft carriers, and so on. I accept that. We are now at the half-way stage; we have the Bill for the Army in terms of cash and manpower. What do we get out of it. The Army is out on the end of a limb, and we are building up 12 divisions which hon. Members on both sides of the House say can never be used as originally planned.
In these circumstances, is it not sensible to get back to fundamentals and look at things again? I am trying to prevent myself from quarrelling too early with the Minister in what I have to say. One of the great lines that the right hon. Gentleman ran in opposition was the use of colonial forces. That was the great story of the Tory Party then. They said, "This is a reservoir of manpower." It was not very long, say three months, before the right hon. Gentleman, as Secretary of State for War, said that that cock would not fight. The reason was that we were short of junior officers and N.C.Os.—the very people wanted in the colonial forces.
If we are thinking in terms of the cold war, which would make great demands upon us, or of continuing policing action in different parts of the world, then I should have thought that we should have looked at this problem. But the Secretary of State for War says nothing about the colonial forces. As hon. Members know, I am not one of his most ardent admirers, but I watch him very closely: and, therefore, I was not surprised to see in today's "Times" that General Templer had been appointed to report on the colonial forces. On the very day that the right hon. Gentleman was likely to be questioned, we are told in the Press that General Templer is going off to have a look at the colonial forces.
We had an important paper on this subject—West African Forces Conference (Colonial No. 304)—published in July of last year, and I think that my own party is rather remiss on this matter. This was a major document virtually setting up what was an Army Council for West Africa, leading us to believe that we could never find the officers and N.C.Os. ourselves, and making the suggestion that members of the Commonwealth should come in, and help to set up a Sandhurst in West Africa. But. from July of last year, when that paper was published, we have heard not one word on the subject until being told today that General Templer is going off. If he is filling in time until he becomes C.I.G.S., or whatever the Government have in mind for him, then I do not mind very much, because if the Government meant serious business, or had any successes to claim, I am certain that we should have heard more from the right hon. Gentleman today.
This is the fourth speech we have had from the Secretary of State on the Army Estimates, and the right hon. Gentleman should look at some of the things he said when in opposition. Pay was one of the things with which he used to try to throttle us in those days, and the colonial forces was another. So far as the colonial forces are concerned, all we have heard now is that General Templer is to make a report on them. Not a word about the Report of the West African Forces Conference, and I hope that influential hon. Friends of my own party will not be satisfied with the present state of things. I hope that before the Summer Recess we shall have a proper discussion on the subject of the colonial forces.
There is a committee of inquiry going on into the recent unfortunate happenings in Freetown, and when the report of that committee becomes available I think that once more we shall find that the responsibility rests on the shoulders of the right hon. Gentleman. I must say that I am full of alarm at the manner in which troops were rushed from the Gold Coast to Sierra Leone and how they behaved when they got there. I am surprised that we have not heard of the part played by the troops in those recent regrettable incidents in Freetown.
I want now to turn to the question of the Territorial Army and the question of Anti-Aircraft Command. I was extremely surprised during the course of the defence debate we had last week to find that nothing was said about this disbandment; and surprised to find that the right hon. Gentleman waited until today in order to tell us something of the organisation which was to flow from the abolition of this Command.
Nor did he tell us very much today. He said it affects the Royal Artillery, but that is fairly obvious. He said these men would be absorbed. But what about the promotion prospects of officers serving in Regular units and of Regular officers serving with Territorial units? This must have been a tremendous shock to those men. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that periods of reorganisation are bound to bring some hardships in their train, but we must remember that it is 20 months since the decision was announced that guided missiles would become an R.A.F. responsibility and four months since the Minister of Defence announced that Anti-Aircraft Command would go. It seems that the right hon. Gentleman has had plenty of time.
But I want to deal not only with that aspect of the matter. I want to deal with another aspect to which reference was made during the defence debate. It is, what takes the place of our anti-aircraft defences? The right hon. Gentleman is, again, on record about this. He seems to have forgotten what he said in his memorable speech of 10th March, 1952, the first time he came to the House as Secretary of State, when he came with all the bounce in creation. It was a very different Secretary of State on that occasion from the Secretary of State we saw today. He was a little timid, a little diffident, even a little shy today. In 1952 the right hon. Gentleman said:
Another problem is anti-aircraft equipment, particularly of this country. We have got new inventions of Radar and predictors and new inventions for increasing the rate of fire of guns. They are expensive and difficult to manufacture, but we cannot let up on that particular aspect until the quantity production of guided missiles is in sight."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 1042.]

One thing is quite certain—that the quantity production of guided missiles is not in sight; and yet Anti-Aircraft Command has been disbanded. We have had the White Paper on Military Aircraft and the statement by the Minister of Supply, who tried to tell the country and the world that we had the best night defence in the world. The argument of the Minister of Supply was a little different from that of the White Paper, because in the White Paper it was the "best defence," whereas when he spoke it was the "best defence system."
It reminded me, particularly as the right hon. and learned Gentleman is an accomplished lawyer, of the man in the dock at the Old Bailey who confessed to the judge that he had lost all his money, all his wife's money and all his employer's money by gambling on horses and who said that he had never backed a winner but, never mind, he had the best system in the world. That seems to sum up the right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument, because we have no guns, we have no guided missiles and, as I shall show in the debate on the Air Estimates, if I catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, we have no aircraft. It is a dismal picture.
I want to turn to the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, where he dealt with the question of manpower. Perhaps he will recollect that we have had previous discussions on this subject. I must tell him that he really is a corker; he either does not understand—and it would be uncharitable to suggest that, so I take it that he does understand—or, if he does understand, he comes here and tries to exploit the ignorance of hon. Members on the subject and the rather tiresome detail associated with it.
The first comment he made was one to which I personally took exception. He suggested that we on this side of the House took delight when recruiting figures were bad. I think that is rather a mean thing to say. I do not much mind; if he gets any satisfaction from it, well and good. But it is not true.
I remind the right hon. Gentleman that more than two years ago, when he announced with great glee the highest recruiting figures of this century—we were debating a Supplementary Estimate and many hon. Members, perhaps even the


right hon. Gentleman himself, will remember that debate—we pointed out to him that, although his figures looked all right on the surface, we must warn him of what was to come. There was no question of delight about it, and the idea that we are being wise after the event is absolute stuff and nonsense. In the course of those debates we tried—heaven knows how many times I tried—to get the right hon. Gentleman to accept the point of view he put across this afternoon.
Of course, there are only a certain number of men who find any delight in military life. If we put up the pay it would have an effect of perhaps a fraction of 1 per cent., and if conditions are bad it will go down. On the other hand, if the Royal Air Force manages to step up conditions that may be only at the expense of the Army. But the basis of this planning is not in terms of men at all. In assessing it no competent staff officer would look at it in terms of men recruited. What really matters is the number of man years. That is the point at which the right hon. Gentleman has broken down completely. I entirely agree that in 1951 he had a very difficult situation to face, but in my judgment—I have said it consistently—he found the wrong answer. He went for the three-year engagement. If one looks at the total number of man years recruited over the years 1950 to 1954, we find that in 1954 from the 13,000 men recruited he got 68,000 man years. That was internal recruiting, and in 1954 the bulk of the 68,000 recruited came out of the 26,000 man years from the five years with the Colours and seven years with the Reserve—the one engagement which the right hon. Gentleman has put on one side.
The difficult situation which faces the right hon. Gentleman and his successors—I emphasise the plural—is that once this step has been taken I frankly do not know the way out. Once we have introduced the short service engagement of three years, which gives only one extra man year, because the man who undertakes it would do two years' National Service in any case, it is very difficult to see the way back. But that is not the end of the story. If it was only a question of quantity it would not be so bad. What about the question of quality? Many hon. Mem-

bers opposite who have had far more years Regular commission service than I have had know that in every unit there are a number of people whom commanding officers would sooner not have. Before the war, when a man applied to re-engage he had to show that he was a fairly respectable and worthwhile man. It is true that in certain cases such as that of a sergeant with nine years service they had a right to re-engage, but the number of years for which a man had the right to re-engage was limited, and if a man was not an asset to a unit he was not allowed to do so. Now it is really a farce that right throughout the British Army anybody is given a statutory right to stay in the Army. The bad hats, malcontents or in efficients whom commanding officers would sooner be without can demand as a right that they be taken on. That is not all; if, for example, they stay on for 12 years the right hon. Gentleman gives them a bounty of £100.
A mistake was made—Ithink it was quite unwittingly made—when we allowed people in the Services to marry too early. I think the Army requires a number of single men. For part of my service I was married, and I know that there are occasions, particularly in the case of N.C.Os. when the Army wants all their attention, not merely to be using the sergeants' mess to have a drink and then go home to their wives. The regiment really needs to be their home. But now, by allowing men to marry much too young, this is the situation arising—and it concerns regiments in this country today.

Mr. George Thomas: Whose business is it? Does my hon. Friend not think that there are some things that are a man's own business, and not even that of the Army, when he gets married?

Mr. Wigg: I am only saying that one has not only to consider the rights of the individual but the efficiency of the Service. Before the war, a man could certainly get married if he wanted to and could get a marriage allowance, but he did not get the privilege of having a right to married quarters until he came on the married quarter roll. I am saying where the hon. Gentleman's soft heart will lead him. This is the situation of a Regular


battalion stationed in this country. It is at present fortunate enough to have a considerable number of married quarters, but it is shortly moving to a station where there are not so many married quarters, and that means that some men will not be able to get married quarters.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: As far as I can see, my hon. Friend is arguing that young soldiers must not get married. Does he want to increase the illegitimate birth rate?

Mr. Wigg: I am not saying anything of the kind. I am saying that the privilege of allowing young men—officers as well—to get married and have married quarters does, in fact, create tremendous hardship and works against the efficiency of the Army. I want to show how. It is impossible for the Army to guarantee married quarters to everyone. Someone has got to go without. In the past a man had an entitlement to a quarter: 100 per cent. in the case of a warrant officer, 50 per cent. for a sergeant, and so on. Now it is allotted on a points system, with the result that when units change from one place to another it is very likely that, because there are more married quarters where they are now than where they are going, a number of people will have to go out. Those who have to go out are senior N.C.Os., who will say, "Very good, if there are no married quarters, I am going back to civilian life," and if they do not say it, their wives will. This is, in fact, what is happening. The consequence is that the bill goes up and efficiency decreases. I am not pretending that I know the answer. I do not. but I still have family ties with the Regular Army, and this does not work for the well-being and happiness of the soldiers or their families, or for the efficiency of the Army.
I am making no party point. I am saying that both parties, by introducing what appeared to be a reform, have landed the Army in a very difficult situation, which is bound to get progressively worse, because the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. One will only get so many recruits anyway, and whatever is done in publicity and advertising will not increase it.
The best recruiting sergeant, in my judgment, both for officers and other ranks, is the contented ex-soldier. If he goes out fed up to the teeth, the link is broken. One of the things that is happening is that that link has been broken. Because of the conditions under which people lived in the inter-war years, and the way the Army treated them regarding pensions and the like, fathers are saying to their sons, "Whatever you do, do not go into the Armed Forces." That, of itself, is bound to create a most difficult situation. I was extremely amused to hear the right hon. Gentleman today talk about the married quarters and say, "Well, of course, between the wars both parties would not spend money on married quarters." That is not all the explanation. The explanation was that it was a class Army before the war, and those of us who lived in other ranks' married quarters were never visited or worried by those who lived in officers' married quarters. The differing standards were quite marked, and nothing was done about it when there were millions of men unemployed who could have put things right. The barracks were a disgrace, the married quarters were a disgrace. That is a legacy from the past, and it cannot be liquidated very simply.
Those of us who remember those days sometimes feel a little bitter about the conditions we were asked to accept, without any opportunity of protesting. The problem is one of tremendous complexity, and there is no easy way out of it. In the introduction of reforms we can spend money, and as a result we might make things much worse than otherwise would be the case.
I am sure that we cannot indefinitely sustain a period of two years' military service. We have heard different alibis put up at different times. Until this year, the alibi of the right hon. Gentleman has always been commitments. He said that we could not make a change because we had tremendous commitments, but that if we came out of the Middle East that might make a difference. I have never subscribed to that view, nor do I subscribe now to the view that National Service can be reduced drastically. As a result of the right hon. Gentleman's recruiting policy, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee.

West (Mr. Strachey): we have got two years' National Service round our necks, and it will stay round our necks for a very long time.
The right hon. Gentleman can come here and make speeches which satisfy hon. Members on his side of the House, but one year from now the test of his recruiting policy will be, not his speeches, but the length of National Service. He says in his Memorandum that recruiting has been moderately successful and is down by only 10 per cent. from last year. My guess is that it will be down a bit again this year. The Secretary of State says that he cannot give the information to show to what extent the three years' engagement has been successful and we must wait until May, but one thing which I am quite sure about is that the right hon. Gentleman's estimate—I must not say "hope"; he objects to that—of 33 per cent. of prolongations from three years onwards will not be the answer.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman has raised the matter of 33 per cent. Perhaps I should have left it until I wound up the debate. What I said—the hon. Member tries constantly to pin this on me—is that the optimum re-engagement rate from the point of view of the manpower structure of the Army would be 33 per cent. The hon. Member also said that recruiting was down last year by 10 per cent. That is quite false. It has remained absolutely steady. As I pointed out in my speech, it has remained steady at 25 per cent. The hon. Member went on to say that recruiting will be down this year. It is unwise to forecast what will happen, but for the first two months of this year it is up by 13 per cent. So practically every remark of the last few minutes, to which I have been paying attention, has been wrong.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman ought not to do this. The Statement on Defence for 1953 said that the Army would recruit 50,000 Regulars in that year. The Statement for 1954 revealed that the number recruited was 42,700. Then, the right hon. Gentleman's estimated number for 1954 was 40,000, and he got 36,000, excluding boys. These figures are beyond any doubt. It is no good the right hon. Gentleman simply getting the applause of his hon. Friends

behind him. The figures are in the Defence White Papers. We can trace them through. In actual fact, the right hon. Gentleman got 42,700, and now it is 4,700 less. If that is not 10 per cent., what is it?

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is speaking of different figures. I was trying to explain that the field for recruiting, as I said in my speech, is the National Service intake. I was pointing out to the hon. Gentleman that if one takes recruiting as a percentage of that field of National Service intake the recruiting of men on three-year engagement has remained absolutely constant for the last three years.

Mr. Wigg: I am pointing out that the Statement on Defence for 1954 said that the number of recruits was 42,700 and now it is down to 38,000, and that is down by 10 per cent. None of the arguments in the world will alter that. The right hon. Gentleman has now used the new word "optimum." In the past, I have been charitable and said that he hoped to get 33 per cent. extensions, because that was what he said and what his Under-Secretary at the time said in the same debate on 9th March, 1953. I am not saying that the right hon. Gentleman said he "hoped." He said that he wanted 33 per cent. I assumed charitably that he hoped he would get that percentage. It would have been grossly unfair to say the right hon. Gentleman did not expect his own policy to be successful.
The right hon. Gentleman introduced this policy and said, "In order that this policy shall work I want 33 per cent." I know that he has not obtained that 33 per cent. This afternoon the right hon. Gentleman once again falsified the record. He said something which would not deceive even the most junior subaltern in the War Office. The right hon. Gentleman had the audacity to talk about the extensions at 12 years. He said, in effect, "We had 'X' extensions at 12 years. That has gone up and is very good. "He omitted to tell the House that everyone who has studied this problem for a split second knows, that the longer a man remains in the Army the more he is inclined to take on. An average worked out over a considerable number of years has shown


a rate of prolongation of about 15 per cent. at three years, rising to 70 per cent. at 12 years. If the right hon. Gentleman had not got extensions from his 12-year men there would be no Army at all.

Mr. Head: I am afraid that the hon. Member is wrong again. It was not "from" the 12-year men, it was the prolongation "to" 12 years. I do not want to spoil the argument, but once again that is wrong.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman is not spoiling it at all. I want to pin the right hon. Gentleman to this—that he said that he wanted 33 per cent. Does he deny that he said that at the beginning of the debate on 9th March, 1953, and that his Under-Secretary said it again in that debate? What is his estimate of what he will obtain? The right hon. Gentleman must put the intelligence of the House at a very low level. He said this afternoon, "I have not the figures. It would need a special investigation. "Does the right hon. Gentleman tell me that he does not know how many men were transferred to the Army Reserve from November to 28th February? They have gone to the Reserve and he knows it.
Last Tuesday I was astonished to read in "The Times" and announcement of the recruiting figures for January. It is ages since there was an announcement in the Press of the recruiting figures for a single month. I knew, therefore, that they were up. In fact, they had risen by 51 over a year ago. We have an announcement when the figures favour the right hon. Gentleman but—

Mr. Head: They have always been announced monthly. I do not want to spoil the hon. Gentleman's wonderfully "factual" speech, but they have been announced over the last two years.

Mr. Wigg: All I can say is that they may have been announced, but the hon. Gentleman's public relations department has taken great care that they have not been published. The manuscript statement of recruiting figures which is available in the Vote Office is on a quarterly basis. We do not get monthly figures. This is the first month for ages which has shown an increase over the comparable

month of the previous year. There is a rise of 51. I do not complain. I am delighted. The more recruiting goes up the more substantial will the case become for cutting down National Service. All I am pointing out is that if the right hon. Gentleman could find out what the figures were for January, why could he not tell us in this debate the number of men transferred to the Army Reserve in the months of November, December, January, and February? He assures me that the figures are always sent out monthly. I am prepared to believe him, but if he can get information which suits him, why cannot the House be told the figures of the transfer to the reserve for the four months of men who enlisted on a three-year engagement? He knows the figures. One thing which is certain is that they are not 33 per cent. They will be nearer 15 per cent.
All I want to do is to expose the right hon. Gentleman. It is clear that he has dropped his colonial policy like a hot brick. That has gone. We have had the appointment of General Templer. We can draw our own conclusions from that. The right hon. Gentleman has no idea about the reorganisation of the reserve force. That is a subject for the future. Reorganisation of Anti-Aircraft Command, he said, would not take place until we had guided missiles. We have no guided missile. We have no gun defences. His recruiting policy is a shambles; but we still have the right hon. Gentleman. That means that he can score all the points he likes, but I make the same challenge tonight as I made a year ago. I said then, in effect, "One year from now we shall be even weaker than we are today." I say now that one year from today the Army will have gone down the slope, and every year which goes by—I will go further and say every month which goes by—makes it more difficult to bring it back, until, as General Gruenther has said, one passes the point of no return. We shall reach a point when we have on the one hand a sergeants' mess with three years' service, and on the other a host of people who are afraid to return to civilian life. When that has happened we may still have the right hon. Gentleman, but we shall have paid a lot of money and got no defence.

1.10 a.m.

Mr. Julian Amery: The unusually quiet tones in which the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) addressed the House belied the characteristic irresponsibility and inaccuracy of his remarks. He described the decision to commit four and a half divisions to the Continent of Europe in the hydrogen age as "a tethered goat, "and suggested that future generations would judge the decision as a crime. It seemed to me that he was here at variance with his right hon. Friends the Members for Dundee (Mr. Strachey) and Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), who several times proclaimed their belief in the necessity for a protective screen in Europe. I must leave it to the hon. Member and his right hon. Friends to sort this out among themselves. It will be part of the interesting process of putting Humpty Dumpty together again.
The right hon. Members for Dundee, West and Bassetlaw and other hon. Members opposite expressed regret that the Memorandum gave no indication of a possible reduction in National Service in the near future. I cannot help thinking that that expression of regret was a little disingenuous. I certainly did not find that it was supported by any very concrete argument.
There is a general consensus of opinion that we shall need ground forces if only to prevent local wars and incidents from becoming nuclear wars. There is also a very wide measure of agreement that we need to have a forward defence in Europe. I do not want to go over the arguments in favour of these two points, for they have been very fully developed by other hon. Members, but they go to show that the strain on our manpower will be considerable in the hydrogen bomb age as it has been in the past.
There is another aspect of the rôle of the ground forces which has received rather less attention, and I should like to say a word about it. If the deterrent power of the hydrogen bomb is to be effective, it is not enough just to have the bomb or the strategic aircraft. We have to have the bases from which those aircraft can be launched. We have a widespread network of bases stretching from the Mediterranean across the Middle East
to South-East Asia, and it has never been more necessary in our history to ensure their security than it is today.
The problem of ensuring the security of bases is two-fold. There is the problem of the local security of the area of the base itself. This will call for garrisons. There is also a rather wider point. We can only ensure the security of a base if we can ensure the security of the region in which it is situated. The security of bases in Cyprus, Iraq, Aden or Singapore will depend on the security of the Middle East as a whole and of South-East Asia as a whole.
The organisation of regional security is very largely a political matter, a question of winning the co-operation of the local governments and peoples concerned; but I think no political arrangement will endure very long in the face of hostile pressure unless it is underpinned, as it were, by the knowledge that ground forces are available to protect the area in question against local attack, hostile encroachment or infiltration. It is only if the local governments know, and can demonstrate to their peoples, that we should stand by them in the event of an attack that we can count on their support in the cold war.
This raises the question, how are we to ensure the security, as far as ground forces are concerned, of the Middle East and South-East Asian regions? Until the advent of the hydrogen bomb, there was a fairly simple and clear doctrine as to how the security of those overseas regions was to be attained. The War Office conception, if I understood it aright, was that there would be local garrisons defending the individual bases, then there would be a Strategic Reserve at home which could be shipped out or flown out to the threatened area in the event of an emergency, beyond that if it came to local war or full war, it would always be possible to call up the Territorial Reserve and send out Territorial Forces to reinforce the strategic reserve.
As several hon. Members on both sides of the House have pointed out, this conception is now out-of-date. If war should come, something could and should be done to fly out young men of military age to safer areas where they could be assembled and trained to fight another


day; but it is plainly out of the question to believe that we could mobilise the strategic reserves, still less the Territorial Reserve, and fly or ship it out of the country to a particular threatened area. The conclusion that we have to draw from this is, surely, that if we are to defend the Middle East or South-East Asia in a hot war we have got to be prepared to establish regional strategic reserves in the Middle East and in South-East Asia in time of peace.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Where are these regional strategic reserves coming from—from the United Kingdom?

Mr. Amery: I will deal with that in a moment. I do not pretend to be able to say where those reserves should be stationed or what their strength should be. This is a matter which will be largely determined by their function. The function of those regional reserves, as I see it, should be twofold—first, to serve as a fire brigade, as it were, to meet any local emergency which should arise, and secondly to be the nucleus around which Commonwealth and other forces could asssemble in the event of an emergency.
I have no idea, as I said, of what their precise number should be, but I see from the Army Memorandum that it is proposed to have, at any rate, one division in the Middle East. I do not know if that figure is large enough, but what is clearly essential is that such forces should be additional to the forces which are committed either to garrison duties or to internal security duties, as in the insurrections in Kenya and Malaya. They have got to be available for major emergencies, for attacks from outside, and not be absorbed in advance in dealing with day-to-day threats to law and order.
Plainly, if that is the pattern—and I do not see how we can escape from it—there is not much prospect in the near future of relieving the strain on our manpower. Indeed, if we are to discharge our responsibilities fully, it seems to me to be urgent that we should seek to make further economies in the use of manpower and also inquire whether there are no additional sources of manpower on which we could draw.
The advent of the hydrogen bomb may have reduced to some extent the risk of a general war—we all hope it has—but I think, as several hon. Members have remarked, that it may well lead to an intensification of the cold war. Already the cold war is imposing a very serious strain on the British Army, and there is plainly a danger that its intensification might so sap our military power that we would not have sufficient forces left to meet an external threat.
This prospect raises the question: Is the cold war being as efficiently conducted as it could be? It seems to me from the Army Memorandum that we have learned a good deal from experience in Kenya and Malaya; but I still cannot help feeling that there is too much of a tendency to regard the developments in Kenya and Malaya as an emergency which will soon be suppressed and which is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere. I do not think there is yet enough recognition that this type of resistance warfare is a distinct type of warfare that is likely to recur in the generation in which we live.
I happened to be associated in the late war, both on the staff and in the field, with resistance movements, and their organisation in Europe and in the Far East. My experience is—and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War can confirm this better than anyone—that much the greatest contribution which resistance movements make to a war effort is in tying down enemy troops. My recollection is that much the greatest contribution of the resistance movements which we sponsored—although there were sabotage operations and actual attacks were made—was in tying down enemy troops. They did not prevent the German exploitation of the countries they occupied, but they did absorb Hitler's strategic reserve in a critical moment.
We are, in a way, enduring that experience ourselves. The insurrections in Kenya and Malaya have not interfered with the economic production of either of those countries, but they are tying down far too many British troops.
Guerillas are easy enough to attack and disperse, but they are very difficult to crush. My own recollection, when I was on the side of the guerillas, is that


the presence of German troops deterred us from attacking some targets and obliged us to keep our numbers fairly small and restricted, but it never really threatened the existence of the guerilla movement. This was mainly because conventional forces are so organised that their powers of pursuit are rather limited.
Far more dangerous from the point of view of the guerillas were attacks by other guerillas. Indeed, the two or three British missions which were destroyed or captured in the course of the war were, without exception, I believe, captured not by regular enemy forces but by guerilla forces sponsored by the enemy. I recall particularly the destruction of the British mission in Albania, which was carried out by guerillas sponsored by the enemy. Towards the end of the war the Germans organised counter-guerilla groups, which were much more effective in threatening resistance movements than any action of their regular troops. The conclusion I draw from all this is that although we need Regular troops to guard fixed installations, including roads and vital targets—to hold the ring as it were—we also need counter-guerilla or raiding forces which can take the offensive.
The Army Memorandum recognises this fact, at least by implication. It describes how small patrols of three or four men are being used to chase bandits in Malaya, and describes the training of tracker combat teams, in quite small numbers, in Kenya. The Secretary of State told us that he thought that operations of this kind were good training for the type of warfare which Regular forces would have to face in the event of a hot war. I think that I understand what he meant, but I wonder if it was not rather an overstatement? The differences in equipment between troops having to fight in a hot war and troops chasing bandits or insurgents are very great, to begin with.
I appreciate the need for versatility, but, like the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser), I wonder whether the time has not come to recognise that infiltration and resistance is a distinct dimension of war which calls for the formation of forces specialised in that

type of warfare. It seems to me that what is needed is a combination of gendarmerie and what were known in the late war as the S.A.S. and the S.O.E. The functions of such forces would be the organisation of light, overland and airborne raids; the organisation of local home guards, and counter guerillas to fight against the insurgents; the scientific guarding of vital installations which can be guarded with far fewer men than Regular troops are apt to employ; and, not least important, the penetration and subversion from the inside of hostile movements. I remember that one of the greatest dangers confronting the different resistance movements in the war came from enemy agents infiltrating into the movements and breaking away certain portions of them.
The formation of specialised forces of this kind would make for economies in training, equipment and supply organisation. It might also help in the problem of recruiting. Such forces would appeal to a number of people who would not otherwise think of joining the Regular forces. Such forces would conduce to the more effective conduct of a cold war. They would also be very useful in preparation for a more general war. They would provide the training and create the organisation for just that type of raiding activity which might be most helpful in the broken back warfare that might come to pass.
We have a long tradition of this kind of warfare, and no one has more experience of it than my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State. I hope he will have time to talk on it when he winds up the debate.
This is one way in which war might achieve economies in the use of manpower. But even if we relieve the strain on Regular troops by substituting a specialised gendarmerie, there still would be need for troops to do garrison and guard duties. But here the question arises: need they be drawn from the troops which are intended one day to be pitted against the Regular Forces of the other side?
Ever since the independence of India, experts have been bemoaning the loss of the Indian Army. There can be no full substitute for it, partly because it was


paid for by India. The strain on manpower, however, might be mitigated by expansion of our colonial forces. Like other hon. Members I have been much encouraged by the news that General Templer has been appointed to look into the question.
I do not agree with the hon. Member for Dudley that all this is an alibi. It is the first move in the fulfilment of the plan which the Secretary of State developed with great foresight when he was in opposition.

Mr. Wigg: How can the hon. Member square what he is now saying with the statement made by the Secretary of State for War in his first speech in that office, when he dropped that plan like a hot brick?

Mr. Amery: The hon. Member may learn later that when one assumes office the circumstances do not always make it possible to fulfil one's ideas at once. One of the limiting factors of the military position was the shortage of officers, but that has to a very great extent been overcome. This obstacle indeed may well have seemed greater than it really was. I believe there is a large element in this country which would be attracted to join African forces but would not volunteer for service in the Regular Army. Service for British officers and N.C.Os. with African troops should be a life career. At present it is not. Most of the officers are on short attachments of two or three years. Some of them are National Service men with less than six months' service, this hardly gives the officers time to understand their troops, and still less time to the troops to learn to understand their officers. That has a serious effect on the relations between African troops and their officers.
I do not want at this late hour to go into all the aspects of an expansion of African forces. I believe, however, that it should be possible to raise two or three divisions from East and Central Africa alone, half of which might be available for service outside Africa.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: The hon. Member said he would answer the question about strategic reserves. Are they coming from this country?

Mr. Amery: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has not understood the drift of my argument. If we economised in the use of existing manpower by forming a gendarmerie to undertake internal security risks and if we also expanded the African Army, we would liberate a number of British troops now on garrison and guard duties, which could then constitute reserve formations, in the sense that they would not be committed and tied down as they are at the present time.
Opinions vary about the martial qualities of African troops, but experience in Malaya and Kenya in recent times has shown that they can be relied upon to give a very good account of themselves. After all, it is not a question of pitting them against highly trained Soviet troops, but of entrusting to them internal security commitments, thereby liberating our own Regular troops for their real task of preparedness to meet an attack from the outside.
The fundamental significance—indeed, the challenge—of the White Papers is that they have proclaimed the Government's intention of keeping Britain a world Power in this hydrogen age. The decision to make the hydrogen bomb is the crucial step in this. It calls for a series of consequential decisions about the organisation of the ground forces. The hon. Member for Dudley and the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), in a very remarkable article which they contributed to "The New Statesman and Nation," took the view that it was not within our strength to provide for all the contingencies which a world Power should meet. I disagree profoundly with that view; but I also recognise that it is only if we practice the maximum economy in the use of our manpower, and draw on all available extra sources of manpower that we shall be able to match our strength to our responsibilities and our dangers.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Mr. Michael Stewart.

Mr. Stephen Swingler: With great respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, you have called a Front Bench speaker, and I should like to ask, therefore, if it is still the tradition of the Chair that a Closure Motion will not be accepted during a debate on Estimates.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: So far as the Closure is concerned, I cannot accept that anyway.

1.30 a.m.

Mr. M. Stewart: I rose because I thought that it was well known that it is not within my power to exercise any limit on the length of this debate. Although it is perhaps proper to recollect that we shall have further opportunity for discussion of Army matters when the actual Votes come before us in Committee, and later on Report, I thought that was a matter upon which hon. Members could exercise their own discretion. I wondered if it might not be for the convenience of the House if I intervened at this stage and if, also, the right hon. Gentleman made some comment on the very many important points which have already been raised.
We are discussing tonight the Army Estimates and one section only of the whole problem of defence; but that section involves certain major considerations which affect defence as a whole; and, very briefly, I would remind the House of what some of them are. The first overwhelming consideration is that we are now living in a world armed with weapons of a destructive character the power and horror of which beggar description; that, in consequence, any proposals with regard to defence make no sense at all unless based on the assumption that mankind must seek to achieve, and seek very speedily while there is still time, three things.
The first of these is relief of international tension; the second, in so far as it can be achieved, some measure of disarmament; and the third, something which is perhaps very far off—some degree of reconciliation between the great Powers of the world. If those things are not done, no other preparations intended to secure the safety of this country or any other country will make any sense at all.
The whole and only purpose of defence measures, whether in the Army or in the other Services, is to give us some breathing space in which relief of tension, agreed disarmament and ultimate reconciliation may be sought. If those considerations of foreign policy and of

diplomacy are the considerations which are chiefly important in the long run, it is equally true that in the immediate present we must most urgently consider the needs of defence, because unless this country wields defence of a kind which will prevent it and its Allies from being the immediate victims of aggression, we shall have no opportunity to pursue the more long-term policies in the field of diplomacy on which, ultimately, the chance for mankind's future depends.
That is why we have to consider defence at all. It is a reason derived from the need to pursue peace in the field of diplomacy, but it is none the less a real reason. When I speak of "appropriate" defence, I would explain that I believe it has been almost common ground amongst speakers tonight, and amongst those who took part in the earlier debate on defence as a whole, that appropriate measures for this country mean measures connected with two things—the hydrogen deterrent, on the one hand, and the capacity to repel aggression in what is commonly called the cold war, on the other hand.
I use the phrase "cold war" as it has come commonly to be used, perhaps rather loosely, to mean anything from a small frontier incident to a campaign the size of the Korean campaign. The common feature of the two is that we know, while they go on, that neither side is prepared to commit its whole power and its whole destinies to the struggle. I shall use the term "cold war" throughout in that sense.
I believe that in planning our defences we have simply to look at those two things—our capacity to repel the cold war, on the one hand, and our capacity to possess and to wield the hydrogen deterrent, on the other hand. Both of those are, in a sense, deterrents, because the more effective we are in making it clear to an aggressor that he cannot succeed in the cold war, the less likely he is to embark on anything more, ambitious. As an even greater measure of deterrence, there is that terrible deterrent which can be used once and once only—the deterrent of the hydrogen bomb.
If we are to provide for those two things, I think it follows that we cannot also plan our defences on the assumption that we might have to wage a major


war with conventional weapons. That point was made effectively by the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall). Indeed, I think it is almost common ground, except for certain utterances which have fallen from members of the Government both in this debate and in earlier debates.
I think it is clear that we can have limited war with conventional weapons but that if major war comes, quite irrespective of what policies and declarations any Government enters into in advance, once the temperature has risen to the point of waging major war in which the nations begin to commit their whole forces and to gamble their whole destinies on the event, war will be waged by all the participants with all the weapons on which they can lay their hands. I believe that to be a fact, not an attractive fact, but a fact on which we have to base policy.
It is, therefore, a grave error of defence, in addition to hydrogen preparations, to try also to provide against a contingency so unlikely that it ought to be ruled out of calculation—the contingency of a conventional major war. If any proof of that were needed it is to be found in the comments of the right hon. Gentleman on the atomic weapons with which our troops in Europe are to be provided.
The right hon. Gentleman said that the use of those weapons was a political decision, but the decision to provide atomic guided missiles means that a political decision has already been taken. If our troops are to be equipped with those weapons it can only be on the assumption that if the troops are engaged in a major conflict those weapons will be used or, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) put it, land war is becoming nuclear. Major land war is bound to be of that character.
What follows from those premises? It is here I think that the whole defence policy of the Government, of which the Army Estimates are a part, is most vulnerable, for the Defence White Paper and the Memorandum on the Army Estimates, unless I gravely misunderstand them, accept and are based on the premises I have mentioned. But, having accepted

those premises, the Government resolutely refuse to draw the inevitable conclusions. The essential conclusion, surely, is one I have mentioned, that we cannot provide against major conventional war in addition to making the other far more important and obvious preparations.
It is true that one corollary which follows from the premises is the disbandment of Anti-Aircraft Command. The Government have at last grasped that, although I gathered from the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey), who speaks on these matters with some authority, that even in carrying through that necessary and indeed desirable step they have managed to do it in a bungling and clumsy manner. Since that verdict was passed on them by one of their own supporters, it is not necessary for me to labour it any further.
Another consequence is that we have to ask ourselves what is the meaning of all the talk about divisions, either actual or potential, in Europe? I agree with those of my hon. Friends who have said that the decision to have four divisions in Europe is a political decision and one on which this country could not go back except as part of a general re-appraisal by the West of what its policy for defence in Europe was. But it seems to me that our Government ought, with its N.A.T.O. Allies, to be asking that question.
If we look at what is said about divisions in Europe today we find repeated reference to the great screen of defence that would be thrown out. I think we must be more precise about that. Is it imagined that on some future occasion there will be a major conflict in which the bulk of the terrifyingly large number of Russian and satellite divisions in the East would be launched against us, and in which the forces of the West would try, with their far fewer divisions but armed with more formidable weapons to match it? Is it imagined that a land conflict of that kind would go on without developing into a hydrogen conflict which would make most of the arrangements for divisions in Europe out-of-date and irrelevant?
It seems to me that in that respect thought is hovering undecided, as if the Government have begun to think out the


implications of the invention of the hydrogen bomb but are not quite sure what conclusions they had come to on the point.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: Does not the hon. Member agree that one would also have to contemplate what would happen if those divisions were not there, and there had not been a war declared at all?

Mr. Stewart: That is possible, but what I am really wondering is whether the size of forces being maintained in the West, in Europe, is really related to their possible fire brigade work, or whether they are based on the assumption that one could wage a major conventional war with them. I do not believe that that has been properly thought out.
If there are doubts about the number of active divisions that should be maintained in Europe, what should one say about the possibility of reserve divisions from this country being transported across the Channel to take part in a European war in the future? The point was raised by my hon and learned friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) very forcibly, and was not answered. I think he is quite right to suggest that it is impossible to conceive of the sending of expeditionary forces across the Channel to take part in a major conflict in Europe in the future.
War could not develop on those lines, in the light of modern weapons, and we have to take up and develop more fully the idea that is in the Memorandum on the Army Estimates, that one of the functions of the Army is to engage in helping with Civil Defence, and, should the greatest disaster of all come, in endeavouring to re-establish some element of ordered life among such people as might be left alive in these islands. So again it seems that the Government's approach to this problem is that of a man who has seen half way to the conclusions but is still hovering uncertainly between the past and the present realities.
I wonder if the right hon. Gentleman has considered this. He spoke very rightly of the fact that after a war, and even perhaps after a hydrogen war, one of the duties of troops is to restore the bare framework of civilised life to make things go on at all. It is true that our troops have been engaged in that kind of

work in the country of a defeated enemy, but he is thinking of them now being engaged in that kind of work among their own countrymen. That is a task with very different political implications.
I do not dispute that the necessity might arise, but it is a very different problem from administration in the territory of a defeated enemy, and I am wondering what kind of training and instruction the right hon. Gentleman has in mind to fit officers and men in the Army for that kind of work. I agree that he could not be expected to have got courses of training of that kind in operation already, but it is clearly a question to which he must give his attention, and I hope that he may now, or later, be able to tell us something about it.
Another conclusion that seems to follow is that one really cannot talk in terms of a base in Cyprus, as if no one had ever invented the hydrogen bomb. The argument that has been applied to the base in Suez applies with equal force to that in Cyprus. It is sometimes supposed that we can exercise some kind of vaguely-defined policing function in the Middle East, that if there are British troops standing there as a kind of policeman on point duty to whom some agitated Middle Eastern Government can beckon, it will somehow have a stabilising effect.
The fact is that it has been rather easier to manage the politics of the Middle East since those troops were withdrawn. If it is really suggested by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke), or anyone else, that it is part of our duties to take on the policing of the frontier between Israel and the Arab States, I would advise him to think again.

Major Legge-Bourke: I would ask the hon. Gentleman to remember that this country, the United States and France are guaranteeing the frontiers.

Mr. Stewart: As the hon. and gallant Member has quite rightly remarked, we are concerned in a guarantee with other Powers as well, but one of the difficulties is that this country has been behaving again simply as if Britain, and Britain alone, were responsible for the political stability of the Middle East.
It might be a much happier world if this country, schooled by adversity, and


having learnt the lessons of patience and moderation, were in command of such power that it could lift up its hand and influence the whole course of world events by that means alone. But we are not living in that kind of world, and if we tried to behave as if we were we should hopelessly overstrain our Forces and end by doing nothing because we had tried to do too much.
Another consideration that we must bear in mind is whether, if we are to cut down—as, I think, we must—on anything that resembles preparations for a major conventional war, which, in my view, is not likely to occur, we have got to think in terms of a lighter and more mobile Army. I was interested to notice that this idea was played with in the Memorandum. Certain paragraphs on page 19 seem to suggest that official thought was moving in that direction; but lest it should be thought that official thought was moving too rapidly, a special dose of cold water was poured on the idea in paragraph 116.
I was very interested to notice that at the end of the right hon. Gentleman's speech—I thought it was one of the most important things he said—he spoke of a new type of organisation in the Army. Some of the phrases that he used to describe how the Army might operate in future were these. He said that the men would be living at a lower standard of life. I think I know what the right hon. Gentleman meant by that, but it requires perhaps a little further elaboration.

Mr. Head: I said that they could not take their standard of living with them.

Mr. Stewart: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman.
He said that there would be simplicity of weapons and fewer vehicles, and that divisional headquarters would be reduced or, in some cases, would disappear altogether. That seems to be not entirely in line with the conclusion of paragraph 116, but I do not complain of that.

Mr. Head: I am fairly sure that I said "headquarters," and not "divisional headquarters."

Mr. Stewart: I readily accept the right hon. Gentleman's correction.
Later in the year, in August and September, as the right hon. Gentleman said, we shall see a little more how that works out in practice. But I could have wished that the right hon. Gentleman's brief sketch could have been set out rather more fully and rather earlier for our consideration, in the Memorandum itself. Once again, the Government and the right hon. Gentleman seem to have caught a glimpse of the future but to be not quite sure how far they are prepared to walk towards it.
The hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) gave an interesting description of another way in which land forces ought perhaps to be reorganised to carry out certain of their tasks. Many of us would defer to the hon. Member's knowledge in that direction, although I think he would agree that, to do work of the kind he was describing, one of the things that is desirable to possess is the political support and agreement of the population among whom the work is done, and that the successful waging of the cold war is quite as much a matter of colonial policy as of the right organisation of forces.
I quoted the right hon. Gentleman's phrase "simplicity of weapons," and it might be convenient to say a word about the Belgian rifle. We have discussed it so much that I will be content to say only a word or two. I am obliged to comment on two aspects. In an article in the "Operational Research Quarterly" by someone who previously held the position of being in charge of operational research, Far East Land Forces, there is described the work of the Operational Research Society and its section at Singapore.
It says
Amongst other things, extensive trials were carried out on the E.M.2 ·280 rifle"—
that was the British rifle in its original form—
which was greatly liked and respected by all who saw it, and on the Belgian FN. rifle, which is to be adopted by the British Army but which received a much more mixed reception.
At the very least, there has always been great doubt whether the Belgian rifle was the superior weapon. The final argument that was always brought out to tilt the scale in favour of its adoption was that we should secure standardisation. The standardisation of the round was


secured anyhow and is really not in issue in this argument.
The question was the standardisation of the rifle. We have not got that, because there are now two versions of the Belgian rifle—what one might call the Continental and British versions. As was stated by the Minister of Supply quite recently, in a reply of engaging naivety, many parts of the two were interchangeable, the inevitable implication being that by no means all the parts were interchangeable.
The Secretary of State for War, in discussing the matter during an earlier stage, regarded interchangeability as of great importance, and he poured scorn upon my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) because he was not sufficiently aware of that, but today the right hon. Gentleman tried to reverse the argument and to suggest that it did not matter so much after all. The question is what is meant by standardisation. The right hon. Gentleman, I understand, has standardisation with Canada not only of the round but of the rifle. With whom else besides Canada has he got it, and on what evidence are his expectations based? If he cannot answer that question satisfactorily, the whole case for the Government's policy in this matter falls to the ground.
I shall refer briefly to National Service, because I have been arguing that the whole premise upon which our policy is based means that we must be economical and sceptical of any preparations for a major conventional war. The decision to make the H-bomb alone involves this country in very considerable expenditure of finance, skilled labour and materials. We then have to look for possible economies not merely of money but of men and resources.
What is the history of this matter? By the way, I would say to the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport) that nobody advocates the abolition of National Service at this time. What is in issue is the possibility of reducing the period. The period was raised from 18 months because of the Korean campaign. That campaign is now over. It was then said that in view of overseas commitments we must keep it at two years. A very large commitment—that of Egypt—has disappeared. It has been argued that if there could be some air

trooping we should save on the number of men in the pipeline, and that that might help to reduce National Service. The right hon. Gentleman painted a most optimistic picture of what is being done in air trooping.
It was suggested that under the previous Government the time of soldiers was grossly wasted. It was not said by the Secretary of State for War, but if I may borrow a magnificent phrase of the Prime Minister's, hon. and right hon. Gentlemen cannot entirely dissociate themselves from the feckless and crack-pate elements from which they draw their support. That suggestion about wasting time has been made in the course of political propaganda. Now we have a Government who, we are assured, are diligent in ensuring that time is not wasted. Furthermore, there are possibilities of developing the use of colonial manpower. It is also the duty of the Government to remind our Allies in N.A.T.O. that no other N.A.T.O. Power bears so great a burden as we do, and very few one so great.
These arguments have been advanced before, when we on this side of the House put the case for having an annual inquiry into this matter. I then suggested that we ought to have an annual inquiry so that every year the Government could be required to tell the House what they had done to try to reach agreement with our Allies in N.A.T.O. for a more fair sharing of this burden; what they had done to try to promote the use of colonial manpower; what they had done in the matter of economising on the number of men in the pipeline and securing the best use of their time.
It was decided that it was better not to put the Government to that work every year. I believe that from the nation's point of view it would be better if it were under the obligation to run the gauntlet every year to justify not cutting National Service from its present level.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Is the hon. Gentleman advocating reduction of the length of National Service, or reduction of the entry?

Mr. Stewart: I am advocating reduction of the length.
I was about to say that we have only spoken in terms of a reduction of six months, but we must be prepared to


defer to the Government's knowledge in this matter, if they will start to take the question seriously. Therefore, I say that if the right hon. Gentleman feels that six months, with the loss of 60,000 soldiers is too much, will he consider three months? If he cannot commit himself to that, is he prepared to have an inquiry by a Select Committee, or by other appropriate means, to find out how National Service men are used, and what reduction of National Service might reasonably be made? If he is not prepared to do any of these things, we shall find that year after year there will be a new reason why National Service cannot be cut. Korea has gone; Egypt has gone. This year it is a mixture of redeployment, strategic reserve, and the run-down of the Army which is produced against the case for a reduction. Unless the Government will take a firm political decision that some reduction, even if it is only three months, is to be made, there will always be some reason, with a wealth of expertise behind it, why nothing can be done. That is why the right hon. Member for Dundee, West was right when he said that with that way of dealing with the matter we would have it round our necks for ever, because it is bound up largely with recruiting.
I agree with the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) that the right hon. Gentleman is learning his lesson on that subject. The proposition that the dismissal of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) or the right hon. Member for Dundee, West from the War Office would produce a wealth of recruits immediately did not prove correct. It is now largely a question of prolongation, of getting men to prolong their service.
There are two other issues to which I will refer. One we debated on the Amendment. It was that if one wants men to stay a long time in the Army one must make it possible for their families to be properly educated. I trust that at the appropriate moment the hon. Member who raised that matter will get a better answer than that given earlier.
The other issue is housing. Recently we had a statement from the Minister of Housing and Local Government; but I will put a point to the Secretary of State which he can discuss with the Minister

of Housing. According to the Minister's statement, local authorities are to be told by circular that if an ex-Regular has been out of the Army for a year and is living in an authority's district, the authority ought then to treat that man as eligible for re-housing and simply take into account his housing need.
Unfortunately, that instruction is not well adapted to fit into the way local authorities run the matter. Some authorities deal with all housing on a need basis, with a points system, perhaps giving little attention to the time a person has been on the register. In such an area, an ex-Regular will get nothing which he does not possess. Other authorities deal with the matter on a time basis. All the instruction will give to an ex-Regular living in such an area is that at the end of a year he will at least be eligible to go on the authority's housing list. However, authorities of that kind have no scale for assessing and balancing needs, so that the suggestion that he should be treated according to need will have no meaning there.
Although this is a different field, it is again an example of the tendency of the Government to begin to look earnestly and intelligently at a problem and then to pause half way; but it may be that, in the light of experience, and with prodding from the Secretary of State for War and the other Service Ministers, the Minister of Housing and Local Government will have more to tell us about the matter later.
I conclude as I began. Essentially, the nations must try to get from relief of tension to agreement to disarmament and then, probably at the end of a long road, to reconciliation. In the meanwhile, we have to see not only adequate but appropriate defence. That means, in the case of this country, the hydrogen deterrent and competence in the cold war. That again means that we cannot afford to go on playing with—for we are doing no more—the kinds of defence that were appropriate only on the assumption that there was major conventional war.
Every now and again, in a paragraph here and a paragraph there in the Memorandum and, more promisingly, in certain parts of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, a spark of realism appeared; but the sparks were too few. All too often, not only in the Army Memorandum but


also in the other Service Memoranda, wherever a point of policy had to be decided, from the maintenance of aircraft carriers to the decision against a light and mobile Army in this Memorandum, the decision taken has been that which involved most expense, most adherence to convention, and most tenderness to the professional vested interests in the three Services. We must ask the Government to let more realism appear in their policy, and to follow out more logically and courageously the premises on which they correctly began their planning of defence.

2.8 a.m.

Mr. Head: I hope it will be for the convenience of the House if I make some remarks now on the many, and, in many cases, most interesting, speeches that we have had

Mr. E. Fernyhough: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Head: Does the hon. Gentleman wish to comment on my speech already?

Mr. Fernyhough: If I had been called before the right hon. Gentleman rose to reply, I should have commented on the speech which he made earlier. I want to ask him now whether, when he has finished, he will be packing his bags and leaving the Government Front Bench so that there will be no one left to reply to any of us who wish to speak later.

Mr. Head: With the permission of the House, my hon. Friend has a right to speak again to answer any points raised by hon. Members. On the Army Estimates last year there were some hon. Members who made speeches at about 5 p.m. and had them answered just in time for them to hurry off for lunch the following day, and that is not altogether satisfactory. Therefore, whatever may happen afterwards, I think there is something to be said for my rising now to answer some of the points which have been raised.
I would also remind hon. Members who are panting to make speeches that in the near future, by arrangement through the usual channels, there will be another opportunity to discuss the subject. The hon. Gentleman need have no great fear of going to bed with an in growing speech. He will have a further opportunity to make his speech.

Mr. Bellenger: And on Report.

Mr. Head: Yes, there will be other opportunities.
Having listened to the debate, I feel that there has been a greater measure of agreement on the major principles than I perhaps anticipated from the defence debate. I say "on the major principles." There is a great measure of agreement that we are right in attempting to prevent war by a deterrent. By and large, there is a good deal of agreement that if we are to avoid being committed to the absolute necessity of using atomic weapons, we must have a conventional shield in Europe and that there is a justification for retaining an adequate Army of the conventional type which can play its part in the event of either small conventional wars or wars of infiltration which may happen throughout the area in which our Colonial Empire runs around the world.
There have been, on the other hand, a great many points of disagreement, and the right hon. Gentleman will know that these debates are examined meticulously at the War Office when the Report comes in, and the proposals are considered very carefully. One of the subjects of disagreement has been the question of National Service. Some hon. Members have said that they doubt whether the Government are taking this matter seriously and that we have accepted National Service as a kind of permanent institution. I cannot convince hon. Members opposite in every way, but I ask them—what Government with the likelihood of a General Election before them would not take National Service seriously? Frankly, it is politically one of the most unpopular things there is, and to suggest that the Government say, "Oh well, two years National Service is all right; let us continue the same this year as before" is really quite wrong.
I was rather shaken by what the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) said. He spoke of vested interests and so on, but there is great unanimity in all the Service Departments, and certainly in the War Office, that if an Army could be run on a voluntary basis everybody would infinitely prefer it. But the job that the Army has got is to fulfil the commitments as they are assessed by the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, and so forth. What has


not been apparent in today's debate is any suggestion of how one can contrive and train a Regular Army of the size adequate for our present commitments together with, what I believe to be essentially a strategic Reserve. There has not been a constructive suggestion in that respect, and that is the problem which confronts the Government and which they wish to solve.
There is no Government which will ever have a policy other than of reducing National Service by as much as it can as soon as it can. The reduction of National Service is one of the very few aspects of defence in which there are a few votes. Otherwise, I do not believe there is a vote in the whole of the defence programme.
The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw asked me a number of questions which I will try to answer as briefly as I can. He asked me why the Minister of Defence announced the policy relating to Anti-Aircraft Command. That was because that announcement was inter-Service in character in so far as it included an announcement about the auxiliary squadrons. It was purely for that reason. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to know the inside story, it is this. I was going to make the announcement but the Air Force decided that they would like to do it at the same time, and it became an inter-Service matter. There was no arrière pensée or other such difficulty. 
The right hon. Gentleman said he had looked at the statistics carefully and that there were 170,000 men and only 127,000 had done part-time training. All the men concerned do their part-time training, and the gap betwen 170,000 and 127,000 was the gap between the end of the camp period and the end of the annual intake of part-time men. We do not, like the Air Force, have a number of men whom we do not bother with part-time training. They virtually all do it. That missing link, which the right hon. Gentleman spotted with a hawk-like eye, is that particular gap.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the production of the Sterling gun. I do not know where he got his figures, but the figures of production of the gun are far in excess of what the right hon. Gentleman told me. I do not want to give the exact figures in the House. As

a matter of fact, if the right hon. Gentleman will have a talk with me I can give him some indication of them, but for obvious reasons I do not want to give exact figures of production of that weapon. They are, however, very much in excess of anything he put before the House.

Mr. Bellenger: From this particular firm.

Mr. Head: I am not being specific about the firm in question. It may be that the firm is sticking to the number mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman, but there are other methods of making guns besides getting them from this firm, and we are not going to proceed on the basis of rearming the British Army with a gun at the rate of 10,000 a year.

Mr. Bellenger: If the Secretary of State will answer the question more precisely he will satisfy me. If the production is adequate, is he going to place the orders and see that he gets these weapons, whether it be from this firm alone or with the assistance of Royal Ordnance Factories?

Mr. Head: The orders are placed.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) made a speech concerning some of the difficulties and problems of National Service men, and their discontent. I should never deny—and I never have, at any time—that many of the men who are called up for National Service dislike it intensely and gain little profit from it. We try to do what we can in the matter, but I do not think that there is any solution of that problem. I do not know whether my hon. Friend has read or heard of a very interesting investigation into National Service which was carried out by Tube Investments. They found that the men called up could be roughly divided into three parts. The first part consisted of the best men, and it was found that they returned to civilian life even better than when they left it. The second were the middle men, who had improved a little but not so much as the best—and the worst third not only had not improved but in many cases had deteriorated.
That is an interesting and significant fact, but it remains true that the men least suited to National Service—the men who perhaps because of their character


or their past, or for other reasons are up against it—not only do not gain but may suffer a bad and lasting effect. It is a difficult problem for the Army, and also a difficult social problem for the nation. I have considered the matter very carefully, but I cannot say that a hard and fast solution has been found. Hon. Members must realise that we are given all the bad boys.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) made some remarks about the necessity of having troops in the Middle East. That was also the subject of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), who has given us a good deal of his views about the Middle East at varying times within the last few months. I do not think that at 2.20 a.m. the House would wish me to diverge into a long debate upon the strategic considerations on having troops in the Middle East, but I would point out that British influence in the Middle East has been of great importance, and we have a commitment in the area, in that in its general defence N.A.T.O. extends up to a line which ends with the Turks. Troops in that area not only form a part of that N.A.T.O. defence but implement the guarantees which we have, notably with Jordan.
They are of very great importance to the pacification of a very volatile situation between the Arab world, Israel and other interests in the Middle East. I do not believe that the presence of that division in time of peace does anything but decrease the likelihood of an explosion, and in war it is extremely well placed, strategically, to play its part, within the general N.A.T.O. structure, in the defence of that area.
The right hon. Gentleman said that Episkopi was terribly vulnerable, but if we went round the world to any of our headquarters, like Singapore and Hong Kong—I shall not say London—almost any place of concentration would appear vulnerable. We must have headquarters somewhere. We must not vacate everything on the basis that there will be a thermo-nuclear bomb for every one of them. I do not believe that the headquarters in Episkopi is more vulnerable than a great many other headquarters we have had established for a long time but upon which so much attention has not been focussed.

Mr. Strachey: Would the right hon. Gentleman or his staff consider whether it may not be necessary in the future so to organise armies that they do not have these nerve centres, which are very useful while they are not vulnerable but, when they are, may completely dislocate the whole Army if those nerves and sinews are in one place? I do not pretend that I know the solution, but the point is worth looking at.

Mr. Head: It is a question of the merits of dispersion against the disadvantages that it brings. These weapons can only be dropped in a certain number of places. Beyond a certain number, we get to the limit of the number of bombs of that type that can be dropped. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is a conflict between the merits of dispersion and of concentration, and I doubt whether any other country has such a problem in that regard as we have.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) made an interesting speech about the cold war. He discussed the Army, with reference to its integration and co-operation with other forces, particularly from the Colonies. That is a department of which he has had much experience. I know he has been both to Malaya and to Kenya, and has seen the Army, the colonial forces and the Security Forces working together. His speech was of particular interest to us, especially in the light of the inquiry which General Templer is carrying out. I am not trying to butter him up, but I assure my hon. Friend that General Templer will read that speech, will take an interest in it, and will have a lively appreciation of his experience, knowledge and information on these matters.
I thank the hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu)—who is not now in the House—for the speech he made on the hospitals. It was effectively helpful and instructive. The hon. Member paid a tribute to the Royal Army Medical Corps, and I agree with him that they have done a wonderful job. I do not think that the Secretary of State or anybody in the War Office think that the military hospital buildings are all that they ought to be. I was obliged to the hon. Member, in his interesting and helpful speech, for taking such an impartial and factual view of the tour he did of our hospitals.


My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey), who is a great expert on anti-aircraft matters, indicated in a speech of great argumentative power that the War Office had made a pretty good mess-up of disbanding Anti-Aircraft Command. The only thing he omitted from his speech was how he, as Secretary of State, would have disbanded it. There was not a single word on that subject.
It is never easy to disband anything. If a command is disbanded it always has, and rightly so, engendered a lot of rage. I have seen the whole process of disbandment, with its incredible complication of lists which have to be got out, and the innumerable conferences which have to be held, and I would ask my hon. Friend that, since he can handle this matter so well, he should lend his assistance next time we have to disband a unit so that we can profit by his knowledge.

Mr. Ian Harvey: I should like to point out to my right hon. Friend that in an Adjournment debate some 14 months ago I ventured to suggest that this was a process which would have to be embarked upon and that something should be done then in order to avoid a last-minute rush but that I was then told, in effect, by my right hon. Friend who is now Minister of Works that there was no intention of disbanding.

Mr. Head: What I said in my speech today was that one cannot start before, and in anticipation of, the announcement, because the decision involves consultation with Territorial Army Associations and the Honorary Colonels, and there would be the most fearful rows if any statement were made prior to an announcement in this House. We had to wait, and I defy any hon. Member, or anybody else, to have got this out very much more quickly than we have done.
The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), as usual, delivered himself of a most direct and strong speech, during which he urged the reduction of the term of National Service, as other hon. Members have done. I have already stated that any Government are with him in this, but the first obstacle, and a major one, is the commitments which we have and the number of Regulars whom we

can recruit. He also cast a fly over me, and over my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air—who is not here, but who will no doubt read the remarks in HANSARD—by asking why the Army should not run its own air transport. I think that my best answer to that is: I have no comment.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Devon, North (Brigadier Peto) made a helpful speech in which he mentioned, first, a matter with which I am in entire agreement, namely, that what might be termed club life helps to keep men in the Army.

Mr. Simmons: Could I remind the right hon. Gentleman about my point concerning military hospitals and their integration into the National Health Service, and whether the beds in military hospitals are fully occupied?

Mr. Head: Yes, about the medical services I should explain that for all three of the Services there is a large scale inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Waverley. That is considering the whole question of medical services, and I cannot anticipate the results; but there is no doubt that the recruitment, and the general future of these services is a major issue. I cannot say more at the moment, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that we must await the result of that inquiry.
I was saying that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Devon, North had reminded us that club life helps and that men like to stay together. Nobody is more averse to cross-posting than I, and I do assure him that I will do what is in my power to keep it to the minimum. He also said that he wondered why we had not started a contributory pension scheme for officers. The answer is that it is open to any officer to undertake the equivalent of a contributory scheme by taking out a normal insurance policy. That would be exactly equivalent to anything which the War Office could start. The only advantage which the officer would gain if the War Office started a scheme would be if the Government made an added contribution, and our policy at the moment is that all the Government's contribution should go into retired pay, leaving the officer to take out an insurance policy for the equivalent of a contributory pension.

Brigadier Peto: In the case of industry, men are bound to contribute. No officer would take out an insurance policy; he would prefer to buy something quite different.

Mr. Head: It would be very difficult for the War Office to force officers to take out contributory pensions. I do not know how firms do it. Possibly it is done because they do not necessarily give a pension, as is given in the case of an officer. An arrangement is therefore made, perhaps, which allows a firm to discharge its obligation, not by giving a pension but by automatically making a deduction from the man's emoluments. We have no statutory right to force an officer to take out an obligatory, contributory pension.
My hon. and gallant Friend said that he thought the publicity about the officer's career was bad. I do not know whether he has seen—and if not I 'will send him a copy by early post this morning—a document which has recently been produced which is known as "The Queen's Commission." It is a good document which is sent to all schools.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), as usual, made one of the best speeches in the debate. It was a very thoughtful speech, most deep in its thinking, and it raised some interesting and some controversial points. To me it was a most interesting speech and I intend to read it. I am not trying to butter the hon. and learned Gentleman up. I found it indeed a most interesting speech.
He made a number of comments which we could debate between us and on which we could detain the House for a long time. Probably it would save a lot of time and be more useful if we had the debate in private. There is one controversial remark which he made which I cannot let pass unanswered, however; he said that only 10 per cent. of the strength of a division were riflemen. I do not know how he worked that out, for the strength of a division at the moment is about 16,000 men, which gives 1,600 riflemen in a division on his calculation. That is about three battalions. He will have to explain that to me, perhaps behind Mr.Speaker's Chair rather than by argument across the Floor.

Mr. Paget: There are only 25 per cent. of riflemen in a rifle battalion.

Mr. Head: We shall have to do the percentages later in the morning on another day.
The hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) who, if anyone, has a right to speak in the debate, said that publicity for the Army was bad. My answer is that publicity for the Army has always been bad. We have made attempts to improve it, but the finest publicity for the Army—it is rather a late hour for me to say this—can come from the Press. I say this with the utmost feeling: I wish the Press paid more attention to the Army's good deeds, especially overseas, than it pays to the bad deeds in the more squalid establishments where people get into serious trouble.
One should not take this too much to heart, however, because, when the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) started a serious alarm about the recruiting failure and about nobody joining the Army, it was taken up prominently in one of the newspapers and I was very worried about it; but, although for two days it had banner headlines, the following week was one of the best weeks we have had. So the effect of publicity is not always entirely predictable

Sir E. Errington: Will my right hon. Friend particularly bear in mind the tattoos, because I think they have a tremendously good effect?

Mr. Head: I agree with my hon. Friend, but the trouble, especially with the Aldershot Tattoo, is that they make a large demand on manpower. It is very difficult with the number of troops we have in this country and with the training of National Service men, to stage a tattoo. I could see a large tattoo taking place, and hon. Members in this House asking why so-and-so joined the Army and spent six months making cardboard scenery for a tattoo?
The hon. Member for Gloucestershire (Mr. Philips Price) has gone to bed so perhaps I shall be able to communicate with him in another way than by replying now.
My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) talked about the difficulty of any reinforcements for the Army going to Europe. I meant to acknowledge and 1 do acknowledge now that in the event of a nuclear war the likelihood of any large reinforcements


being transportable rapidly to Europe is, and always will be, remote. I do not think any plan can bank on the fact that large numbers can be transported to Europe.

Mr. John Hall: I was mainly concerned about the ability to reinforce our troops anywhere in the world during the cold war—ability to reinforce them quickly in those circumstances.

Mr. Head: I am sorry, I misunderstood my hon. Friend.
During the cold war, I would not entirely agree, because we have two sources of reinforcement in a cold war. Supposing there were an incident in the Middle East, there are Reserves there who would go immediately to the seat of the trouble. They would be replaced by troops from the Strategic Reserve in this country who could be flown out. That does provide a fairly rapid means of reinforcement. There have been a certain number of incidents in which that technique has been used.
The hon. Member from Dudley made a long speech in which he made a number of assertions, most of which were familiar to me in the past, but he also made a number of critical remarks about the question of men being married too young.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.

Mr. Head: He has an ally in the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes).

Mr. Hughes: No.

Mr. Head: Oh, then I have an ally in the hon. Member for South Ayrshire.
All I say to the hon. Member for Dudley is that that was a decision made during the time of the previous Government. Generally I do not believe that the main difficulty over separation and the married quarters problem is due to that reason. Of the men wanting married quarters in the average battalion now a comparatively small number are in established stations and without married quarters. The difficulty has decreased in the last three or four years, and a great deal of the credit goes to the previous Government. With the dent which has been made in the problem of provision of married quarters, the difficulty is much less.
My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North made an interesting and characteristic speech about general questions in the Middle East. I felt in strong agreement with him on the points he raised about having mobile strategic reserves available in those areas. The whole problem in the Army today is to get an adequate force to a place of trouble quickly enough to nip that trouble in the bud, and that is what we have in mind in planning an airlift and a strategic reserve in this country. Even so, we cannot be too quick in these matters.
I am not making a party point, but I cannot help feeling that, if in the past we had had a strategic Reserve and an airlift, and a good intelligence and security service throughout, many troubles which have now boiled up into some major trouble might have been nipped in the bud. I believe that an ability to move quickly to a source of trouble will in future be a great asset to the Army.
My hon. Friend made some remarks about the S.A.S., a unit in which the Under-Secretary and I have a particular interest, so it is well represented on the political side of the War Office. I believe it is a significant unit in the sense that it is capable of operating independently, relying entirely on air drop, and can be dropped almost anywhere.
It is of great use in the cold war, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that both of us have a sympathy with it, that recently the numbers have been increased in Malaya, that I think there will probably be still further contributions to it in Malaya, and that the technique and use to which it has been put in that country has been of great value. As some hon. Members know, these are now, I think, the only airborne troops in the world who jump straight out of the aircraft into the tops of trees, to which they tie a rope, and then lower themselves. Any hon. Member who has been to Malaya and knows the conditions there will know that that is a very dangerous manoeuvre.
The hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart), who wound up the debate made the thoughtful type of speech that we would expect. He made some controversial points and some accusations against the Government. He even went so far as to say he thought there was in the Government a glimmering of sense.
But the special point he made concerned the general question of National Service, and I would repeat that the Government's intentions here are, and will, remain absolutely clear: that continual pressure will be put on the Secretary of State for War and the War Office all the time to justify up to the hilt their requirements for National Service, and I can assure him, from personal experience, that that has happened constantly. I am equally certain that it will also happen in the future, and I realise fully my own responsibility in so far as, unless I am satisfied that the National Service period is absolutely justified, in the light of the size of the Army and its commitments, then I am failing entirely and seriously in my job.
I would apologise for having been so long, and would also like to thank hon. Members for many very useful speeches which they have made in this debate. It is entirely in the hands of hon. Members how long it is to go on. I would like to remind hon. Gentlemen competing that we have another fixture in the near future, at which there will be an opportunity for them to speak again. The Under-Secretary will no doubt reply to any points of importance that are made, and I hope it has been for the convenience of the House that I have summed up the speeches which have so far been made.

2.44 a.m.

Dr. A. D. D. Broughton: The subject under discussion tonight is one of such great importance that I regard it as unnecessary to apologise to the House for continuing the debate after the Minister has spoken.

Mr. G. Thomas: Not at all. He should not have spoken then.

Dr. Broughton: I will try to console hon. Members opposite who are wanting to go to bed at this very late hour, by saying that my speech will be a short one, that it will take no more than a few minutes. I wish in the first place to thank the Secretary of State for War for his courtesy in allowing me, in company with other hon. Members of this House, to visit British troops in Germany in January of this year. My colleagues and I sent the Minister a Report, in which we told him of our observations and opinions, and we hope that he found the Report useful. I found the tour interest-

ing and instructive, and I am appreciative of the Minister's kindness in arranging the visit for us.
As the delegation has given a Report to the Minister, and as hon. Members will be aware, through the medium of the Press, of the salient features contained in that Report, there is no need for me to repeat its contents in detail.

Mr. Fernyhough: Can my hon. Friend say whether the Report has been published as a White Paper? I have been to the Vote Office to try to get a copy, and am told that there is not one.

Dr. Broughton: I understand that the Report was not published as a White Paper, but that the Secretary of State for War gave permission to the leader of the delegation to hand copies of it to the Press. I understand that that was done, and in quite a number of newspapers I saw lengthy accounts of the Report that we had sent to the Minister.
All that I wish to do in my short speech is to underline a few of the points that we mentioned in the Report. First, it would not be out of place to pay a further tribute to the welfare workers operating in Germany. In particular, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Catholic Mothers' League, the Salvation Army, the Church Army, Toe H, the Methodist and United Board Churches, the Church of Scotland and the Women's Voluntary Services are all carrying out most useful work, and I was pleased to find that these voluntary welfare services are greatly appreciated by a large majority of the troops in Germany.
Of the complaints to which we drew the Minister's attention—they were very few in number—I would say that the most serious was the grievance of wives about the high cost of living.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: N.A.A.F.I. prices.

Dr. Broughton: The wives find it difficult to manage when they have to pay overseas prices on home service rates of pay. As a further example of this problem, I should like to quote from a letter which I received from the wife of a sergeant serving in Austria. The letter is dated 17th January, 1955, and reads:
It is with interest that I have read several articles in national newspapers during the past few days. I refer to interviews between


Service wives and personnel and yourself and other Members of Parliament visiting B.A.O.R.I think that perhaps it is a pity that the tour was not extended to the forgotten few of B.T.A. Like the wives of B.A.O.R., our big grumble is the cost of living, especially the N.A.A.F.I. prices. These are even higher here in B.T.A. as we have the extra freightage charge from Germany to bear. I could give dozens of examples of the difference between the prices of certain articles in the United Kingdom and out here in B.T.A., from cleaning materials to canned goods and children's clothing.
Worried and disgruntled wives cannot be raising the morale of our troops in Germany and Austria. I hope that the Minister is giving this difficult problem his very careful consideration and that a solution will be found before very long.
I should like to turn the attention of the House for a moment to the National Service men who are serving in Germany. Sending our young men into the Armed Forces for two years is like paying an insurance premium. It is something which we do not like doing but which we regard as necessary for the sake of security The purpose of putting National Service men in the Army is to teach them and to train them to be soldiers. Bearing that in mind, my first inquiries in Germany were directed towards finding out what kind of a soldier the National Service man is making.
I asked officers of all ranks from subalterns to generals, and I asked many senior N.C.O.s, and, without exception, I was told by them that the National Service man is a really good soldier. On one occasion, when I was having conversation with a lieutenant-colonel who commands a famous fighting regiment, and who wears the ribbons of several campaign medals and the Distinguished Service Order, I asked him how he would feel if he had to go into action the following day with the unit which he commanded, 50 per cent. of the men being National Service men. He replied without hesitation that he would feel confident of success because the National Service men were fine fellows and good soldiers.
Many of these men are away from home for the first time. They have to learn to be efficient soldiers. They have to conduct themselves in a foreign country and on ex-enemy territory in a manner becoming British soldiers. They are in

the front line of defence in the event of aggression from the East. Their duties and responsibilities are certainly not light. Most of them do not like being soldiers but they accept their obligations philosophically and even cheerfully. I was pleased to find that not only are they making splendid soldiers but their behaviour in Germany is very good. It ought to go out from the House that we appreciate the service which the National Service men are giving to the country, and that we are proud of the way they are carrying out their difficult but essential duties.

3.0 a.m.

Mr. George Thomas: Three o'clock in the morning is not the best time to address the House, especially when I know that hon. Members want to go home. [Interruption.] I know that there is little prospect of that for a few hours, because many points have yet to be raised. I am sorry that the Secretary of State for War has gone, because as yet in the debate I have heard no protest against the idea of our defence system being based on possession of the hydrogen bomb.
I want to register my protest, because it is not in the best interest of the British people, or of the world. I recognise that there is no difference between the parties about accepting the necessity to produce the bomb in this country as a deterrent. We are told that Russia and America possess the hydrogen bomb, and that if we are to be a world power independent of America, and if our defence is to be assured, we shall need the hydrogen bomb. The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) asked when the hydrogen bomb would be used. It is a dangerous question to ask these days.

Mr. Simmons: I was talking about the atomic weapon mentioned in the Minister's Memorandum, and asked whether the atomic weapon had now become a conventional weapon, and when it would be used.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): I hope that the hon. Member is going to relate his argument about the bomb to the Army Estimates.

Mr. Thomas: I shall endeavour to do so, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, because I realise that I shall be in trouble if I do not.


From both sides of the House there have been long discussions about the cold war, about the nature of the cold war, and about the effects of the hydrogen bomb when it is used. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) made a powerful speech, in which he said that clearly we had decided that in another war this island will be regarded as a war expendable. By that I assume that he meant that we are prepared to give up this island, that it becomes untenable. The hon. and learned Member said that the only role of the Army is to provide a government for this island after a possible hydrogen-bomb war, and that even the talk of Civil Defence is ludicrous; that the Army which is being trained for Civil Defence can only be used for salvage; namely, to shield off the contaminated area, if necessary with machine-guns.
That is the picture which has been presented to the House and, I gather, accepted by the Government Front Bench.

Mr. Wigg: Approved.

Mr. Thomas: I congratulate my hon. and learned Friend on the speech he made. It is about time that the Government were honest with the people. It is clear that there is no defence for anyone in these islands if there is a hydrogen-bomb war.
One would have thought that if, in any case, we are to be blown to dust and our people destroyed, that is the worst risk that we can run if we give a moral lead to the world and say that we shall not make the hydrogen bomb and shall not regard it as a prime factor in the defence of these islands. I suggest that the very possession of the hydrogen bomb makes our position more dangerous and not safer, for it is clear that if the hydrogen bomb is to be used in anger by any country, it will be used in anticipation and not by way of retaliation.
No one will be permitted to return the favour of the hydrogen bomb, for its effects are so terrible that whoever uses it will have to make sure that there is no reply coming to him. That being so, the hydrogen bomb, which is apparently the cardinal feature of our defence, or is to be, will have to be used in anticipation of a blow being struck against this country. That is going to expose us to terrible danger, for apparently the

deciding factor in the use of this terrible weapon is going to be fear. When we are most afraid that somebody else will anticipate our use of the bomb, we shall have to let it go lest others use it first upon us.

Mr. Wigg: My hon. Friend has falsified the argument a little. He himself has said that there is no defence for us. If there is no defence for us, there is no defence for other people. Therefore, if we possess the bomb—we recognise that there is not defence to it—what about its use as a deterrent? That is the argument that he has to meet.

Mr. Thomas: My argument is that the weapon is not a defence but an offence and it is only of advantage to him who is offensive. It is likely to be used when people are most afraid. If terrible tension is created between the major Powers of the world and it seems that war is likely to break out, who believes that 48 hours' notice of a major war will be given in the future? The very possession of the bomb invites the enemy to use its weapon upon us lest we seize the advantage.
We have reached a point where good morality is good business and good politics. It has not always been regarded as such. However, it is clear that somebody somewhere has got to call a halt to this nuclear weapons arms race. Are we giving notice to the world, on both sides, that, whatever weapons are produced in the nuclear sphere, we are in the race with the next terrible weapon, the cobalt bomb or the hydrogen-uranium bomb, which is, I think, the one recently exploded by the Americans? It is a suicidal race. There will be no defence but only growing insecurity as a result of our following the policy which apparently both sides of the House are bent upon pursuing.
It may be said that this House is the custodian of the people's safety, that we have no right to leave the people of these islands defenceless, and that responsible government calls upon us to swallow principles in the name of expediency and that what is expedient is what is right. It is said, "It is expedient to have these arms. We will trust in God, but we shall keep our powder dry because our trust is not too great, and God might let us down."
I do not want to lecture the House on my theology, which may not be acceptable, certainly not on the Army Estimates at this time in the morning, but I suggest that we are exposing the people of these islands to the use of a weapon which depends upon emotion rather than upon thought. Fear works in strange ways, and it is both immoral and unwise for us to devote our talent and our time to the production of this weapon. The production of the hydrogen bomb ought to have changed our attitude to the military machine.
Many of my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite have referred to the question of conscription. The other day I asked the Secretary of State for War how many grade 3 men were called to the Colours, and I learned that the numbers were over 8,000 last year, 8,000 the year before and 7,000 plus the year before that. I want the Under-Secretary to tell us whether the War Office propose, in this hydrogen-bomb age, to keep dragging these invalids, these grade 3 men, into the Forces. The War Office will know that it has taken forcibly, by the power of law, from his home in Cardiff a young fellow with emphysema and asthma because the safety of the realm apparently requires his presence at Catterick.
There is something wrong with the War Office when it feels that it has to drag into the Forces these unfit people who, by their own standards, ought not to be there. These boys will never be good soldiers. They will never be of much use to the War Office, and I suggest that sheer common sense and the love of economy ought to be enough for the War Office to send these people back home.
All that I have waited all these hours for was to register my protest about the hydrogen bomb, and to make it perfectly clear to my hon. Friends, as I do to the Front Bench opposite and to those whom I have the privilege of representing in this House, that I believe that something new and terrible has come amongst us that we have no moral right at all to use, that no one, even by way of retaliation, ever has the right to use a weapon which might destroy a nation. Having made that protest, I leave the matter to the House.

3.18 a.m.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: I, if no one else, am very grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) for the speech which he has just made, because I believe that he has brought this debate back to reality. I remember that in 1951, when we started the great rearmament programme, £4,700 million was going to give us the security that we felt we needed. We spent the money.

Mr. Swingler: Not all of it.

Mr. Fernyhough: Well, we have spent at least nine-tenths of it.

Mr. Swingler: Actually, only just over £4,000 million out of the £4,700 million was spent. Therefore, the over-estimate of the Service Departments in 1951 amounted to £700 million.

Mr. Fernyhough: The point is that that programme and that expenditure was supposed to give us security. The danger was going to be between 1951 and 1954. Now we find that we are no longer secure. We find, in the words of the Prime Minister, that we have two, three or four years in which to reach international understanding, and that if we fail goodness only knows what may happen.
We are told that our friends across the Atlantic have the hydrogen bomb, and that we are going to make it. If the truth were told I believe that the Government already have the hydrogen bomb. The fact that they have it was indicated by the language used by the Secretary of State today. He said that in a nuclear war we should have no ports to use, and that troops stationed at home would have to restore order.

Mr. Wigg: My hon. Friend must not take too much notice of the language used by the Secretary of State, which is always akin to that of a Boy Scout. If there is one person who does not know whether or not we have the hydrogen bomb it is the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Fernyhough: I thought from the language which he used in introducing the Estimates that we had got it.
The Government, in their own simple way, have tried to assess the damage that would accrue to this country in the event of its being dropped here. If one is dropped here, we shall have "had it."


One thing that is perfectly clear is that there is no defence against it. No matter how much money is spent, we cannot guarantee either security or immunity to our people. Whatever war we may be engaged in the future, it is crystal clear that there will be no victors; there will be only vanquished. It is now a case of peace or perish; of co-existence or no existence.
In the struggle against Communism, the outlook of those who have been in charge of our affairs has been completely wrong. In 1941, when the Germans attacked the Russians, we were told that the Russians would not last six weeks; that theirs was a cardboard army which would collapse at the first impact with the enemy. It was our intelligence service which made these estimates upon which we based our initial judgments. We were grossly wrong.

Mr. Garner Evans: Would the Prime Minister have said that he would support the Russians at that time if he had thought that theirs was only a cardboard army?

Mr. Fernyhough: When we were standing alone and looking for assistance from any quarter we would have welcomed the support of anybody. But it was said that the Russians were so weak that they would collapse at the first impact of meeting the enemy.
In 1950, we asked our intelligence service, "What are these fellows capable of?" and this time, knowing the grave mistake which they had made on a previous occasion in ridiculously underestimating the strength of the Russian forces, the intelligence service swung to the other extreme and over-estimated it to such an extent that we have had to bear an economically disastrous burden, which, up to now, has failed to give us the security that we sought, and that we thought we had got. It is difficult to understand why, if we have been so weak and they have been so strong, the Russians have stayed their hand, and have made no advance, and why they have waited for us to get overwhelming military power on our side.
I believe that the Russians will deliberately make as many alarms as possible so that the Western Powers undermine their own economies in the building up of huge military systems, because that will create the conditions under which the Communist philosophy

can thrive and can make recruits. That will ultimately mean that, even in the West, where we ought to be strongest, they will have their fifth column, because of the deterioration of conditions arising out of the heavy arms burden.
Paragraph 18 of the Memorandum deals with the position in Malaya, and says:
The end of the emergency is not yet in sight. Although the situation has improved, there is no room for complacency, and I cannot yet foresee any reduction of the number of troops committed to operations in Malaya.
We were told originally that in 1948 there were 3,000 rebels in Malaya, but in the last seven years we have had tens of thousands of troops in that area. We are told that though the end cannot be foreseen there is no possibility of reducing the number of troops engaged in the operation. Does it not strike the War Office that there is something wrong with our Malaya policy, and that victory there will not be won in the military field? We cannot give the people of Malaya social and economic advance so long as the present struggle goes on.
Paragraph 16 of the Memorandum says:
Recently a Malayan engineer unit has constructed several miles of road through virgin jungle to link up a series of riverside villages, helped by the villagers themselves.
If we were doing far more of that sort of thing, we should win the struggle more quickly than by trying to wipe out the rebels there. The same applies to Kenya. Every time the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs speaks, the Kenya expenditure has gone up. The expenditure this year is greater than last year, when it was higher than the year before. Despite the increase, there is no sign of the struggle coming to an end.
We are doing the wrong thing. If we had spent on social and economic development in the previous five years in Kenya what we are now compelled to spend for military purposes, I believe that the position in Kenya would have been very much better and the need for armed forces there would have been non-existent.
I turn now to that part of the report which deals with the Army of the Rhine, and I should like to ask, what is the position of our troops under the agreement which has been negotiated with


the Federal Republic of Germany in relation to the occupation machinery? Can we be told whether, once Germany becomes an independent and sovereign nation, our troops will be there as their guests? What happens to our serving men? Will they be turned out of the German houses which they now occupy, and which are paid for through the costs of occupation?
Can we be told if the duty-free facilities of the N.A.A.F.I., which tend to protect the Service man's wife from the higher prices which obtain today in Germany, will be withdrawn? Can we be told if those privileges will still be obtainable by our people in the Rhine Army? Could we be told if the special travel concessions on German railways which our men now enjoy will be continued or whether they will be withdrawn? Can anything be said as to whether our men will still be immune from the power of the German courts, and whether they will still be able to buy the cheap petrol which they now obtain, or whether they will have to pay the high prices which the Germans have to pay?
Could we be told, if the answer to all these questions is in the negative, whether the boys serving in Germany will then be looked upon as having a home posting? I ask that because, obviously, their position will be very materially worsened once the new agreement comes into operation, unless one of two things happens: either that the Government negotiate an agreement covering all these points, or that such additional concessions are made to these men as will recompense them for the facilities and advantages which they lose when the agreement comes into operation.
I turn to another matter. In the Memorandum, the Secretary of State for War makes it clear that he is highly delighted and satisfied with the number of officers he has in the Army. The problem seems to be in the matter of other ranks; and I should imagine that anyone very concerned about the state of the other ranks would ask why is it that in the case of officers all our needs are met, whereas in the case of the Regular other ranks there is this great deficiency.
I should have thought that the answer is very simple. In the main, the officers are on a reasonable standard, and have reasonable conditions, and reasonable facilities. For the ordinary Service man, the position is vastly different. The right hon. Gentleman does not move in my circles; probably I meet only the ordinary rankers, for I have many friends who are National Service men, and I want to tell the right hon. Gentleman frankly that if he wants these boys to become Regulars he must do something about their pay, their conditions and the petty, irksome restrictions which are placed upon them.
If some of the commanding officers in charge of National Service men were in charge of the industrial establishments of this country, there would be strikes every day. They ought to be sent to a centre where they have had a course on personnel management and personnel relationship, because, in view of some of the things which these boys are made to do, it is no wonder that they are glad when the end of their period of service is reached, and no wonder that in no circumstances are they prepared to sign on for even an extra day.
In these days of the hydrogen bomb, does the right hon. Gentleman think it still sensible to give the raw recruit the type of boots which are issued in the Army and then make him spend hour after hour on the rough leather until it is as smooth and shiny as a mirror? But that is still being done. A boy who had been in the Army for about three months came to see me the other day and told me what he had to do to get those boots up to the standard demanded. He told me what happened about the belt which he wore. The recruit is issued with a belt, but the edge is rough and he is expected to rub and rub and rub until the surface is fiat. Some boys are so sick of doing this that it has been the cause of some concern.
If the Army wants these boys to have a flat belt, why not issue them with one instead of having reasonable, decent and intelligent lads, who have been doing decent jobs where intelligence and common sense are required, doing this sort of thing? If it is thought that that is the way to make them enthuse over Army life, let me assure the right hon. Gentleman that it is the way to make them so


sick and fed up and "browned off" that they are the worst possible recruiting and advertising agents for the Army. That is something which could be put right at no cost. The difficulties could be liquidated without inconvenience to any one—except for the inconvenience to the pride of those who want to shout at and dragoon men about something which does not matter.
The next question which I want to put to the right hon. Gentleman concerns suppers. It is not a very big item, but these boys get only 28s.a week when they first join, and out of it they have to meet several commitments which make substantial inroads into it. I am told that if a man wants a supper in the barracks or in the canteen—after he has had his evening meal at five o'clock—he has to do something for it; or, alternatively, he is marked, and the cook takes it out of him in one way or another. Usually these men have their last meal at 5 o'clock, and they have breakfast at 6 o'clock in the morning. It ought to be possible for them to get a snack or supper in the canteen without having to do a fatigue merely because they happen to be about the barracks at that time.
Another question in regard to manpower is that of batmen. Mr. Percy Cudlipp in the "News Chronicle"—a reliable journalist—said:
A National Service man at Catterick Camp told a reporter this week that although he had passed a course as a drill instructor he had given no drill instruction. For eight months he had been a batman in an officer's home. His tasks include house-cleaning, washing the officer's wife's 'scanties,' cleaning her shoes, making her afternoon tea and acting as butler when there are guests.
Another batman at Catterick Camp, he said, regularly takes out the officer's child in its pram.
I had a case brought to my notice a fortnight last Friday in which a National Service man is acting as a batman and doing the domestic duties in the home of an officer while the officer's wife is going out to work. I do not mind her going to work, but I do object to her having a National Service man to do the chores which she ought to be doing

Mr. Swingler: Have details of these cases been given to the Secretary of State for War? What answer has been made by the War Office to complaints about them?

Mr. Fernyhough: I am giving details of the cases mentioned by Mr. Cudlipp now. If the right hon. Gentleman wants particulars of the other case, he can be supplied with them.

Mr. Head: I do not know whether it would be any help to the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) to know that there is a very strict ration of batmen and control of those who are entitled to a batman, or half a batman. I should be very interested to see particulars of these cases. I would also point out that any batman who does not like being a batman can demand to go back to duty. He has that right; therefore I am always a little doubtful about some of these stories.

Mr. Fernyhough: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that if he is doubtful and looks up the records he will see what happened during the war. I had two officers' batmen staying with me and I agreed to take up their case. They were making tea in the morning, doing a bit of shopping, washing and doing all manner of things. This was at a time when the country was engaged on a so-called life and death struggle. Has that sort of thing been wiped out? Of course not. My own brother-in-law in Germany had to do a bit of it. I know it still goes on, and will go on until we get a Minister at the War Office who says that that is not the purpose for which National Service men are conscripted.
We have to face the fact that the great struggle with which the world is confronted is not a military struggle. It is largely a struggle for men's minds, a struggle for men's souls. I believe that struggle will be won in the social and economic field rather than in the military field. As far as I am concerned, I believe that the greatest evil which confronts humanity today is not Communism but the twin evils of poverty and disease, which were largely responsible for the movement to which I belong coming into existence.
I should like to feel that this nation, knowing full well that there is no defence in the hydrogen bomb age, and that if ever nuclear war breaks out this island is finished, would now give a clear lead to a world ridden by fear, and say: "We recognise that today tens of thousands are still dying because of poverty and disease, and for our part we, as a


nation, will now start the greatest battle in which mankind has ever engaged—to remove from the whole world the poverty and disease which still threatens millions in many parts of it."

3.36 a.m.

Lieut-Colonel Marcus Lipton: The last reserves are now about to be thrown into this battle of the Army Estimates. If I may say so, the speeches which have been made since the right hon. Gentleman half wound-up the debate were quite as good as those made beforehand.

Mr. G. Thomas: Would my hon. and gallant Friend give way, because I did say that the Minister was not here, and I see that I did him an injustice, which I am glad to correct.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: The Minister did come back, but as soon as I rose to my feet he retired. Perhaps he will make a third appearance, who knows? No. he is definitely disappearing now.
I would say that my hon. Friends the Members for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) and Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) did bring the House back to the fundamental, harsh realities of the problem with which we are faced, and as my hon. Friend, the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) pointed out, the Government have not faced up to the logical consequences of the admissions with which they started, namely, that we are living in the hydrogen-bomb age, and that, as my hon. Friends the Members for Cardiff, West, and Jarrow pointed out, the use of the hydrogen bomb involves nothing less than mutual suicide.
To the extent that people or nations do not wish to commit mutual suicide, and to that extent only, is the hydrogen bomb likely to serve as a deterrent, and the House has already decided in the defence debate that the hydrogen bomb would be used in certain circumstances which have not yet been too clearly specified. If my hon. Friends are dissatisfied with that decision, the debate must be continued outside, so that perhaps a four-Power conference may be called at an early date, which will tackle these problems. So far as the House is concerned, the issue has been settled, and the House has come to the conclusion that,

in certain circumstances, the hydrogen bomb should be used.
I endeavoured to find out from the Minister of Defence a few days ago whether he could give us any information about the number of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons held by the American forces in this country. His reply was not without significance. He said he was not in a position to give that information. Had he been able to give that information he would probably have said it was not in the public interest to disclose it. That I would have expected, but the fact that he says he was not able to give that information seems to indicate that he has not been given that information. How is—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): It would be out of order if he did give it. It has nothing to do with these Estimates.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lipton: What I am trying to find out from the Under-Secretary is how we are supposed to decide upon the extent to which hydrogen bombs or atomic weapons are to be used by the British Forces if we do not know to what extent stocks of these nuclear weapons already exist in this country.
We are supposed to be part of N.A.T.O. To the extent that we have integrated our Forces with those of either the Americans or of other countries of Western Europe, we should be able to effect economies. If, however, we are continuing our own defence policy and continuing to produce our Service Estimates quite irrespective of what those other countries are doing, one of the primary objects for which N.A.T.O. was formed is not being properly fulfilled. That must inevitably mean a certain amount of wastage and overlapping. That is the only point that I seek to make on this aspect.
I should have liked to have taken part in the difference of opinion which has manifested itself between the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) and the Secretary of State for War on the disbandment of Anti-Aircraft Command. I speak with some little feeling on the subject, because for a little while during the war I was associated with one of the "ack-ack" divisions. Having heard the Secretary of State's reply, the weight of the argument seems to me still to rest with the hon. Member for Harrow, East.
The position seems to be that for a variety of reasons, the War Office is being very dilatory in letting the Territorial A.A. regiments concerned know what their future is likely to be. Some of those A.A. regiments will cease to exist. The tragedy is that we have had large numbers of men tied up in one form of defence, and in their case the future is wrapped in obscurity, which must inevitably create a feeling of dismay and despondency. I hope that the War Office, in association with the Territorial Army associations or whatever other bodies have to be consulted, will soon let all these officers and men know what their future rôle is to be.
At the moment, it looks as if the War Office is changing over from something, however imperfect it may be, to nothing at all, and that is not a situation which can be accepted with equanimity. There is a hiatus between the exit of the A.A.Command and the weapons it formerly employed and the entry and use of the guided missile.
We do not know exactly when guided missiles will be forthcoming in sufficient quantities, and at the moment, apparently, we do not possess a missile, let alone a battery. We are sending a few people over to the United States in April to practise on the "Corporal" Mark II atomic gun, and perhaps a little while after that a few more people will be let into the secret and be provided with the modern methods by which it is hoped that this country will be defended.
At the moment, one of the things which we know is that we have four divisions in Germany and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) pointed out, goodness knows what their rôle will be if and when major nuclear war breaks out. It will be quite impossible for them to be reinforced from this country. It will be impossible to bring them back here. It will not be possible for them to advance after the territory towards the East has been atomised or hydrogenised. Therefore, we are making the worst of all possible worlds.
As Field Marshal Sir John Harding pointed out in August last year,
If anyone thinks a Territorial Army division can be made battle-worthy within two or three weeks of mobilisation, I believe that they are deluding themselves.

The idea apparently is that if trouble breaks out these four divisions in Germany will be reinforced by Territorial Army divisions. Goodness knows when they will materialise, because on the authority of no less a person than Field Marshal Sir John Harding, it will be very much longer than two or three weeks before they can be put into the field.
We have not been given the information we should like to have on that point. By accident I came across some words uttered by the present Prime Minister in this House on the 13th May, 1901.One or two sentences of what he said then are still relevant. He was talking about expenditure upon the Army when the House was being asked to vote £13 million. He said:
If this vast expenditure on the Army were going to make us absolutely secure, much though I hate unproductive expenditure I would not complain; but it will do no such thing. The Secretary for War knows, none better than he, that it will not make us secure, and that if we went to war with any great power his three Army corps would scarcely serve as a vanguard. If we are hated they will not make us loved; if we are in danger they will not make us safe. They are not enough to irritate; they are not enough to over-awe. Yet while they cannot make us invulnerable, they may very likely make us venturesome.
Bearing in mind the speech made by Field Marshal Lord Montgomery on 21st October, it may well be that Territorial divisions will never get to the battlefield. If the War Office wants to be quite sure of reinforcements reaching anywhere in time, it certainly looks as if they will have to be Regular Army reinforcements. We have about 400,000 men at our disposal in the Army. That number is quite inadequate for duties in Europe, police work in other parts of the world and the creation of a strategic reserve at home.
It is obvious that the setting down of four divisions in Germany is a purely political decision which was made because in no other way could the adherence of France to the European Defence Community have been secured. That adherence has not yet been achieved and is still not very certain of achievement. On top of that, a new obligation has been imposed upon the Army to provide something in the way of Civil Defence. It is common knowledge that Civil Defence arrangements in this country have not been adequate. Public-spirited men and women have volunteered and done their


best in the last few years, but, faced with the possibility of hydrogen-bomb warfare, the existing Civil Defence arrangements are woefully inadequate. Therefore, the Army has to come to the rescue.
It appears to me that the main justification for continuing National Service is that at the end of the purely National Service period these men will be switched to the job of Civil Defence and will be engaged in the mobile defence columns. Goodness knows where the senior officers and N.C.Os. will be found, because at the moment they are not available for Reserve battalions and the Army Emergency Reserve. I suppose that one of the ideas of the Government is that officers and N.C.Os. who will become surplus as we dispense with the Anti-Aircraft Command units will perhaps volunteer for service in these mobile defence columns.
Those words might be used again in this Army debate 54 years afterwards, because we have not been given additional security by reason of the reluctance of the Government to face up to the consequences of the new age. If, when it comes, the war is to be a brutal affair, decisive in 30 days or thereabouts, what is the sense of amassing a vast Reserve for the mobilisation and training of which 90 days will be needed? That is the dilemma facing the Government, a dilemma to which they have given no satisfactory reply.
We are still faced with a shortage of key men in the Services. It is useless to have masses of National Service men if the War Office is unable to retain the services of key men, especially among the senior N.C.Os. Although at present we have about half the Army in the United Kingdom, we still have no strategic Reserve to speak of which could be quickly flown to any part of the world in which its services might be needed.
There is to be an experiment some time in August which will show whether we can dispense with divisional headquarters, corps headquarters, and all the paraphernalia which is likely to become more and more unnecessary in modern warfare. That is a long time ahead. In the meantime we do not seem to be doing anything to create smaller formations, not cluttered up with all these supplies, or dependent on distant bases, with which some of us are only too familiar.
Those are some points which I think have been worrying people interested in the future of the Army and of the other two Services. It is vital that the men serving in the Army should feel that they are doing a useful job. The Secretary of State, in his White Paper, pays a deserved tribute to the fortitude and endurance of the men in Malaya who are fighting in the most filthy conditions in which it is possible for men to serve.
There is no disputing the fact that if the National Service man or the Regular Service man is given a job to do, he does it as well as anybody would. It is the people who are kept hanging about here with no useful job to do who become demoralised and fed up, and become the worst advertisement for the Army. It is they who are the deterrent to recruiting.
No matter how much the War Office spends on publicity, no matter how many high-powered publicity experts it uses, whether paid or in an honorary capacity, it cannot get over the basic difficulty which will continue to exist so long as the men serving in the Army—officers, N.C.Os. or privates—will not advise any of their friends or relatives to follow in their footsteps by joining the Army.
Even if the Under-Secretary is unable to deal with all these points now, I hope that he will at least ensure that some consideration is given to them, because upon the solution of these problems depends whether we get any value at all for the vast sums of money that are now being spent.

3.56 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: We have had a very long sitting, but we have to remember that we are being called upon to approve Estimates amounting to more than £521 million.
In a few weeks' time we shall have a Budget in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be talking about the need for economy and restraint, and hon. Members in all parts of the House will be talking about the burden of taxation. As is the tradition, we shall probably have two or three all-night sittings on the Finance Bill arguing about 3d. off here and 6d.off there and odds and ends of that kind.
However, it is now, when we are spending the money, that the House should be really interested in the bill


which has to be paid. If the House were to be a little more interested when the Estimates are being submitted and the bills are being passed, the Chancellor's duty would not be so onerous and the problems of taxation would not be so difficult. I always approach these debates from the point of view of the Member of Parliament who has to approve expenditure by the Government, and when we are asked to approve expenditure of a sum of about £530 million we are entitled to scrutinise it very carefully indeed.
I have criticised Army Estimates for a number of years, while the Labour Government were in power and since the present Government took office. I remember the great debates that we had in 1951 on the rearmament programme. I remember the arguments put forward by the spokesmen of the Government of the day. Hon. Members who figured in those debates argued that we needed a three-year rearmament programme so that at the end of that time we should be able to negotiate with the Russians from strength. That was in 1951.
I remember a speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) who was then Under-Secretary of State for War. In 1951, he said that in 1954 we should be able to negotiate with the Russians from strength. It is now 1955, and my hon. Friend is now telling us in the Press and in the House that we have spent more than £4,000 million and yet we are practically unarmed.
The Prime Minister says that in three years the Russians will be able to negotiate with us from a position of strength. Every year this country has become more insecure, and today it is anybody's guess as to what should constitute the best military policy for this country. There are no experts in this matter.
I asked the Secretary of State for War a question—probably it was an impertinent question—and he said that I did not know a great deal about these matters. But neither does anybody in these days. We all start from this position of almost complete ignorance. I have been reading a series of articles by one of the best-known military writers of the day, who is read in this country, in America, Germany and all over the world. I refer to Captain Liddell Hart who, in the "News Chronicle" on 1st March, wrote:
All military knowledge is now useless.

Nobody can say that, from a position of superior knowledge and as a result of experience in the last war, he has any greater authority than the rest.

Mr. Head: It puts the hon. Gentleman in a very strong position.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, it puts me in a very strong position. We all approach this matter from the position of relative ignorance, and I am now negotiating from strength.
We have been called upon to find £530 million. After having listened to nearly every speech in this debate, I am beginning to wonder what the debates will be like next year and the year after. I have been preaching pacifism in this country for about 40 years, but the hydrogen bomb has succeeded in making more, perhaps not abstract pacifists, but potential pacifists, than all the preaching of anti-war agitators has ever done. It is beginning to have its effect.
I read from Captain Liddell Hart's article in the "News Chronicle" that:
There is a tremendous gulf between current military planning under N.A.T.O. and the scientific realities of warfare in the atomic age. Since the advent of the H-bomb the gulf has been growing wider into a suicidal chasm.
He goes on to say:
But although the logic of the situation is extremely clear, it will not be easily accepted. Vested interests are sure to oppose any re-planning and redistribution that follows out the logical conclusion. The reluctance of these interests will be enforced by a cautious reluctance to abandon any form of defence even though these provide no real safety.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) asked about the position of the strategic Reserve. It is rather curious that the strategic Reserve is to be concentrated in the most vulnerable part of Western Europe. The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)—I do not know where he has gone; he is not here now—spoke about a Dunkirk. But at Dunkirk the men knew that when they reached this country they would be coming back to safety. If there is a Dunkirk this time they will come back to a radioactive ruin.
Both the Secretary of State for War and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton played around the subject of what would be the Army's rôle after that had happened. Presumably the Army is to be concentrated in this


country. There is now a new word for the Army. It is called a gendarmerie. But to call it by a different word is not to solve the problem.
If half a dozen hydrogen bombs were dropped half the country would be in ruins, and in those circumstances we are asked to consider what would be the rôle of the Army. The Secretary of State became angry when I intervened earlier and wanted him to be a little more explicit. I should not rely too much upon the Army in a situation like that. We know what happens to armies which are disorganised and which no longer fulfil their traditional rôle. In Russia, in 1917, the front collapsed and a revolutionary situation arose, which led to Communism.
I would ask hon. Members who hate Communism to remember that if this country is devastated by war and the civil population is required to be mown down by machine guns—which was the prospect envisaged by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton—the Army may mutiny; there may be a revolution, and Communism may emerge at the end of it. All these great military preparations, which have been taken in order to preserve freedom, may end in military Communism, which is the worst form of Communism.
That argument applies also to Western Europe. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South-East (Mr. D. Healey), who is one of the Labour Party's authorities upon international affairs, and is a very strong supporter of the rearmament of Germany, has often argued that we should be mainly concerned with America, and that the Continent of Europe is something rather remote from us. I wonder what effect such a statement is likely to have upon the people of Germany. When mention is made of the likelihood of atomic artillery being used in Germany I do not wonder that a very strong feeling exists among Germans that this attempt to give them new armed forces will not be very pleasant for them.
If I were a German, and read the speeches which have been delivered by hon. Members on both sides of the House in this debate, I should say that my country's rearmament would be the worst thing that could possibly happen

to it. What will happen to our soldiers in Germany? Presumably they will not be able to come back here, because of the state of affairs which will exist here, and if any of Western Europe survives, a revolutionary situation will arise there also. The idea that we are saving this world from Communism by going through this process of rearmament requires further examination.
I listened respectfully to the point of view of my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons). I do not see that we are justified in sacrificing human beings all over Europe just because we may dislike Communism. Everybody in this House may dislike Russian Communism and say that he would prefer to die rather than to live under a Communist regime, but we have to consider that millions of people in this country and in Western Europe would prefer to live under a Communist regime.
I have seen the Communist regime as it exists in most countries which have Communist Governments, and I do not like it. I have seen it in China, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, and although I should prefer to live under a democratic institution I would rather see a dictatorship of that kind, even in this country, than see the whole fabric of our industrial life dissolve, with nobody knowing what might emerge at the end of it.
In the light of that argument, pacifism is not sentimental and Utopian, but practical. People are beginning to say that there is something in it after all, and I make no apology for being a pacifist. That is a far more logical position than that of the official Labour Party. If the Labour Party had been in power there would have been the same bottlenecks and shortages of aircraft, guns and all sorts of things, because these are mainly technical.
The real criticism of the Government, as of the last Government, is that they have a foreign policy which makes a huge armaments bill necessary. Now we have reached a cul-de-sac in which the experts do not know what to do. For a time they tried to retreat from it. But when we read what Lord Montgomery and General Gruenther said—

Mr. G. Thomas: And General MacArthur—

Mr. Hughes: —we realise that the world will be destroyed unless we become pacifists.
If war develops into a hydrogen-bomb war, the whole of Western civilisation will be in danger. I do not agree with M. Molotov that capitalism and not Communism will be destroyed. There is great danger for both of them. The essential element for safety is international agreement. That is why I look forward to a four-Power conference. These huge expenditures do not get us nearer to a solution, although I do not blame the Service Ministers. Until we fundamentally change our policy we shall have to find these huge sums every year.
The second basic factor is that the building up of large Forces every year merely wastes many thousands of millions of pounds which could be better spent. War is now either antiquarian or lunacy. I think it is both. I have armed myself with a good many war quotations from Captain Liddell Hart. A fortnight ago there was a very interesting article in the "Spectator," one of a series of articles. It was by the leading expert of "The Times"—Mr.Cyril Falls. This series was headed "Can Britain Fight?" The fact has emerged today, and it has emerged pretty clearly, that despite all the suggestions and ideas about the future rôle of the Army and what part the Army will fulfil in the next war, the Army has no rôle but to disintegrate. There will be a revolutionary situation, to which I have already referred, and I should not like to be in the shoes of those who have to be in charge when war breaks out.
These are the realities which we have to face. Attempting to re-arm Germany is irrelevant now that Russia and the United States have the hydrogen bomb. The hydrogen bomb is the enemy of all humanity—Communist or capitalist, black or white. We are in an age when all strategy is in the melting pot. Captain Liddell Hart refers to the vested interests; and there are vested interests in the War Office, just as there are vested interests at the Admiralty. The Air Ministry is full of them.
We have gentlemen in high positions engaged on some technical aspect of war preparation, and they will always find excuses for spending huge sums every year. The Admiralty will come along and ask for aircraft carriers or submarines.
So far as the Army is concerned, we were told last year about tanks; this year it is atomic artillery, and the vested interests in the Service Departments come forward every year with a demand for more money.
Service Ministers stand at the Dispatch Box and put forward plausible cases in support of very large expenditure, and until the House decides that it will control this expenditure by facing up to the Service Ministers, there will be no real progress. After all, it is an old subject of controversy in our political life. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) has quoted what the present Prime Minister said in 1901; but there was a controversy involving his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, before him.
Lord Randolph Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, and he got into trouble with the War Office because he said "You are wanting too much money for the Army." There was a ferocious quarrel between Lord Randolph Churchill, the Chancellor, and the then Secretary of State for War who, I believe, was Mr. Broderick; and the Chancellor lost. The history of politics throughout the years is mainly concentrated on the struggle between the so-called Defence Ministries and the great conglomeration of vested interests which surround them.
What we have to try to do in this House is to get democratic control over the vested interests and over foreign policy, and to do our best to compel the Government to face the hard fact that the old days of diplomacy and of negotiating from strength are no longer with us; that the methods used then are no longer applicable to the world of today.
If we cannot force the Governments in all countries to accept that view, then the only alternative is catastrophe; and catastrophe, as the Prime Minister has pointed out to us, is very near. It was, I believe, another Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, who was asked what were the chances of survival for the human race, and he replied, "Fifty-fifty." That is the stark reality today.
We think we are doing our duty to our constituents, to this country and to the whole world by exercising our rights as Members to criticise these Estimates, and


the policies which lie behind them, with the utmost vigilance. I believe that we are doing this duty and that we shall have to do it year after year until we have hope that new ideas are coming which will enable us to spend the money which we are now spending on armies and weapons on more useful and constructive things.
It is nine years since I first opposed these Estimates. It will not be so for another nine years. In the next few years—probably in the next two or the next three years—the fate of humanity will be decided. We in this country must realise that we are in the most vulnerable place in Western Europe. We have become America's Heligoland in Western Europe. It is our duty to the people of this island not only to see that we avoid war but also to see that there is no possibility of war. We shall not do this by re-echoing the old catchwords, by coming along with the old platitudes, but by asking the House to face the grim realities.

4.22 a.m.

Mr. Stephen Swingler: It is evident that Parliament is increasingly critical of the Secretary of State for War. It is critical of his handling of commitments, of his failure to recruit volunteers, of his broken promises on conscription, and of his way of creating and liquidating units.
In this debate we have had a powerful contribution from my pacifist friends. I am glad that the Secretary of State was in the House to hear some of the contributions because I hope the Government will take heed of what was said. In my opinion, the present defence policy and the present development of science is making more pacifists. When we find a state of affairs in which weapons have been developed against which there is no defence—and it is now generally admitted that there is no defence against them—and when we find that our strategic policy is based upon a threat to commit national suicide, it is natural that many people are driven to the conclusion that there is no sense at all in military preparations.
I do not agree with my pacifist friends in the conclusion which they draw; I do not believe that the unilateral renunciation of the H-bomb or any other bomb by this country would lessen the tension or

remove the threat of devastation from Britain, but I say that unless the Government have the statesmanship and the stature to rise to the situation they will inevitably multiply the number of pacifists in the West.
Unless the Government appreciate the gravity of the nature of the present defence policy, appreciate that extraordinary political and diplomatic measures are required to meet the situation, appreciate the insistent demand for high-level talks, and refrain from provocative and useless military measures which accentuate tension, then they will be responsible for spreading defeatism and despondency.
In his speeches the Prime Minister dramatises these developments. The Prime Minister has a great aptitude for depicting the possible doom of civilisation, but when we listen to the spokesmen of the Navy, of the Army—and I expect the same will be true of the spokesmen of the Air Force—we find a very different situation. Instead of basing themselves on the categorical assumption put into the White Paper on Defence that aggression will have to be met by thermonuclear weapons, instead of drawing conclusions from that, the Secretary of State for War announces "Business as usual."
Much the same arguments, much the same plans and policies, commitments and manœuvres are described to us. By so doing, and by playing down the threat of hydrogen-bomb war, the nature of it and the implications of it—political and strategic—the Army's spokesmen and the spokesmen of the other Services create a false impression both abroad and at home which increases the danger of tension for this country.
I want to turn in particular to the subject of conscription. To my mind, there was no more unsatisfactory and unconvincing part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman than the part which he devoted to conscription. I protest at Parliament double-crossing the nation on conscription. We have now reached a serious situation where the people of this country have been sold down the river on this subject.
What are the facts? After the Second World War it was recognised, as the Secretary of State more or less admitted today and yesterday, that conscription was an undesirable, an expensive, an uneconomic and an elaborate


system of raising an Army, but, because the country had just come through a long war, because of the pull of full employment in industry and because of the necessity of building up what were then called "masses of trained reservists" in preparation for a possible repetition of the Second World War, it was necessary to continue the system of conscription.
Any hon. Member can look up the debates in 1946, 1947 and 1948 and see that those were the arguments. They were the arguments of the present Secretary of State, that the system was only to be justified because it was necessary to build up masses of trained reservists. I want to know how many hon. Members believe today in the necessity for building up masses of trained reservists, or having this tremendous manpower, and these colossal sums of money devoted to training enormous numbers of potential divisions for a repetition of the Second World War, whereas in fact we are presented in the White Paper with the assumption of a third world war on a quite different pattern.
In the second place, it has been argued that this system was necessary, and in particular that the extension from 18 to 24 months' training for conscripts that occurred in 1950 was necessary because of commitments. The arguments in the last few years, as distinct from those from 1945 to 1948, have been that this conscription must be continued for a little longer because of the Korean war, because of the tension in the Middle East, and because of other commitments. The Korean war has ceased. Troops have been and are being withdrawn from Korea. Moreover, other commitments have been substantially reduced.
The Government were eventually forced, in these last 12 months, to face the facts on Suez, in spite of the colossal delay. Troops have been withdrawn from other parts of the world. Indeed, the Secretary of State for War comes forward and admits that there has been a substantial reduction in commitments. It is very difficult for most hon. Members to justify, in terms of the assumptions of the White Paper, many of the commitments to which the Secretary of State still holds.
There is no hon. Member who has really advanced in this debate any proper justi-

fication for the commitments in Cyprus in terms of a thermo-nuclear war. Any attempt at justification by the Secretary of State seemed to be complete nonsense: merely the argument that we should multiply targets for the hydrogen bomb. No one has brought forward any real argument why, if what the Prime Minister said about the Suez base was correct in relation to a possible thermo-nuclear war, that does not apply to Cyprus and to many other commitments as well. But it is clear, from what the Secretary of State said, that the commitments have been sufficiently reduced to enable immediate consideration to be given to the fulfilment of the pledges given in 1950.
I want to protest again, with all the vigour I have, at the fact that no mention is made by Ministers of the pledges that were given. Now it is assumed that they can treat two years' conscription as they like. That is what the Secretary of State assumes: that they can say: "We should like to reduce it, we should be popular if we did, and might cull a few votes at the Election, but, on the other hand, we have these commitments; we must have these divisions in Germany to look after the Germans," and so on.
But I want to remind those who are in charge of the Services that they, as much as my right hon. Friends, are committed to the reduction to 18 months. If they will look up once again the speech of the present Lord Chancellor, speaking from these benches on behalf of the official Opposition in 1950, when the period of conscription was extended from 18 months to two years, they will see that what they are now doing is breaking the pledge which was definitely given to the people. Since this combines with the fact that the commitments have been reduced, and it is admitted that this pledge could be fulfilled, this creates the impression in the country, and certainly in many parts of the House, that there is no intention on the part of the War Office to reduce this period of National Service.
The Secretary of State thought he made a great argument because he justified himself on the grounds of the unpopularity of the measure he was selling to the House. He said that we on this side do not believe that it is absolutely


necessary to have the two years' conscription, and that he would make himself popular if he reduced it. The right hon. Gentleman does not seem to be aware that some of us know something about the inertia and extravagance of the Army Council. When the Minister comes to the Box to say that he cannot now, in 1955, reduce the period of conscription, the War Office indicts itself for failing to take the necessary measures to be able to fulfil the pledges that were given in 1950.
The argument is now moved on to the third plane: that is, the lack of recruiting. First, we were told that we must have conscription for the purpose of Reserves, then for commitments, and now because the right hon. Gentleman cannot get the recruits—

Mr. Wigg: He never will.

Mr. Swingler: —although we have probably more than we have ever had before. The Secretary of State tries to wrap up the recent falling off in recruiting. He is unable to give any indication that he will get more recruits or will get anything like the number that he says he needs to reduce the period of conscription. Therefore, he gives to the country no indication whatever of any possibility, so long as he is in charge of the Army, of ever reducing the period of conscription.
What does the Secretary of State say in regard to recruitment? Apart from being complacent about it, apart from challenging my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), and trying to pretend that there has not been much reduction and that quite a lot of men have extended their service, and apart from arguing about the statistics, all the rest that the right hon. Gentleman says on the subject suggests that he is very sceptical of getting any more recruits unless the period of conscription is increased.
The Secretary of State's argument was virtually that he can only get more recruits for the Regular Army if more men are called up in a system of conscription. He is forced to use the whip of conscription as a means of stimulating recruitment. He is in a vortex of circumstances. He cannot reduce the period of conscription, and he has to use it as

a means of getting more volunteers. But the Secretary of State knows quite well that conscription is one of the great millstones that hangs round his neck, is one of the reasons that prevents the Army Council from modernising the Army, and prevents the Army from pulling itself together.
One of the reasons why there is not the money substantially to improve the conditions of service and the pay and allowances is the very expensive and elaborate apparatus of conscription. Everyone in the Administration must know that. So long as there is this expensive, uneconomical and elaborate apparatus of conscription, there will not be the money so to improve the conditions of service and pay as substantially to increase the number of volunteers. The right hon. Gentleman is caught up in that vicious circle.
The Secretary of State and the present Administration have no positive or constructive policy to bring to the House that promises any relief to the nation from this burden, which has weighed down upon the young men and upon the national economy for so long. It is a crying shame, and it is one of the most powerful reasons why this Administration should go.

4.40 a.m.

Mr. F. Maclean: During the last phase of the debate the discussion has tended to centre round the hydrogen bomb, and the opinions expressed have mainly come from the pacifist point of view. It has been suggested that the Government have sought to play down the hydrogen bomb. That is quite certainly not the case. Neither my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, nor my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister did anything of the kind.

Mr. Wigg: Of course.

Mr. Maclean: That was not my impression.
The fact remains that none of us likes the hydrogen bomb. We respect the sincerity of the views which have been expressed by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas), and other hon. Members who expressed their detestation of the bomb. We share that detestation. It is a subject


upon which one has to take a point of view, and the view taken by the majority of hon. Members is that there is less likelihood of war as a result of the existence of the bomb. That, after all, is what we are trying to effect.
The hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) said that it is a matter of peace or perish. I entirely agree, but the question is how we can secure peace. The view of the Government is that we are more likely to get peace if we deter a potential enemy from attacking us by possession of the hydrogen bomb. That is a subject which one could discuss for hours from both points of view, but even when one has such fascinating combinations as the hon. Member for South Ayrshire, General MacArthur and Captain Liddell Hart, and even when one hears the conclusion announced that all military knowledge is useless, it would not be profitable if I were to pursue that argument any further at 4.45 a.m. Therefore, I will go on to deal with some specific points raised by hon. Members.
The hon. Member for Batley and Morley (Dr. Broughton) mentioned a Report which he and other hon. Members of the Parliamentary delegation to Germany sent to my right hon. Friend on their return. That report is a most valuable document. I think that I am right in saying that we are in general agreement with the greater part of it. It is being studied carefully by my right hon. Friend. He is considering the recommendations which were made and how far it is practicable to implement them. The tribute which the hon. Member for Batley and Morley paid to the National Service men in Germany was most gratifying, and I am sure that it will be received with great pleasure, not only by the National Service men themselves but by all concerned with them in the Army,
The hon. Member for Cardiff, West mentioned the number of grade 3 men who are kept in the Army. They are kept there because, in spite of their not being top grade from the health point of view, they are nevertheless able to do useful work which does not involve 100 per cent. physical fitness. They are thus able to release for more active tasks men who are fitter.

Mr. Fernyhough: Can the hon. Gentleman say why, if calling up grade 3 men is to continue, men of this category who

volunteer for the Regular Service are turned down, and are subsequently sent for under the National Service Act? Is not that stupid?

Mr. Maclean: The reason is that we require a higher standard of fitness in a man who is going to make the Army his career than we do in a man who is simply going to do two years' National Service.
The hon. Member for Jarrow also raised the question of the future of the British Army of the Rhine after the change of status of Germany. That matter is under negotiation. Therefore it would not be proper for me to say more than that our troops in Germany will be in the same position as they would be in any other N.A.T.O. country. In regard to matters like price privileges, arrangements will be made for them to continue, or a local overseas allowance will be paid in lieu of them. In any case, the soldier will not suffer.
The hon. Member also mentioned suppers. They are a matter on which I feel strongly. I have not had mine yet. When I was a private soldier, it was not always easy to get supper. It was not always easy to get a meal after 5 p.m. When I went to the War Office I made inquiries, and was glad to find that suppers are now generally available. If the hon. Member knows of cases in which individual soldiers have not been able to get suppers from the cookhouse—they will not get free suppers from the canteen—I shall be pleased to investigate.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman appears to have made an important statement. Will he be good enough to confirm that he is giving a firm undertaking on behalf of the Government that no soldier, or soldier's family will be worse off after Britain becomes responsible for the cost of the occupation of Germany?

Mr. Maclean: There will be compensation for any losses incurred.

Mr. Wigg: That applies to the soldier and his family? They will get a personal service allowance, or something like that?

Mr. Maclean: They will get the overseas allowance, or the present arrangement will continue.
We have had quite a good debate. Perhaps I might now turn to points raised


by the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton).He mentioned the disbandment of Anti-Aircraft Command and asked why there had been such a long delay in reaching, and publishing, a decision. The reason has been given by my right hon. Friend.
It was that it was thought desirable, from everyone's point of view, to get the views of the associations and of the various other organisations, and of units, before taking any firm decision. It was thought that that was preferable to simply imposing a solution. We wanted to get the local point of view. It seems to me that it was well worth doing that, even if it did mean taking a little longer. In any case, a final decision will be made known in the very near future.
The hon. and gallant Member also raised the question of the mobile defence columns, and asked where the officers and N.C.O.s were to come from. The mobile defence columns will be part of the Army Emergency Reserve, and the officers and N.C.O.s will, it is hoped, be volunteers from the Territorial Army. As the hon. and gallant Gentleman suggested, it is hoped that a number from Anti-aircraft Command may volunteer for this extremely important service. It may even be possible for all the officers and N.C.O.s of disbanded units to volunteer en bloc.
Those are the main points which have been raised since my right hon. Friend spoke, and as it is now after 4.50 a.m. I will not—

Mr. Swingler: Has not the hon. Gentleman a word to say on the subjects of recruiting policy and the reduction in the period of National Service? The reduction in the period of National Service is one of the most important matters affecting the Army, but we heard very little about it from the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State made no reference at all to the pledge which was given to reduce the period to 18 months. Can we at least have an assurance from the Under-Secretary that the pledge given by the leaders of both political parties has not been overlooked?

Mr. Maclean: The whole question was dealt with in considerable detail and at considerable length by my right hon. Friend, who made it perfectly clear that

we on this side of the House do not like conscription any more than hon. Members opposite do, and that we realise that it is extremely expensive economically and that it goes against the traditions of this country. My right hon. Friend also said that it was only natural that any Government would get rid of it if they possibly could, and that the reason why we keep it is that, in spite of all those reasons—in spite of the fact that we should get rid of it if we could—our present commitments make it simply impossible to do so.

Mr. Wigg: Surely the hon. Gentleman can reaffirm the pledge given by the Lord Chancellor or say that the Government have departed from it. Surely we are entitled to that reassurance.

Mr. Maclean: We have already made it clear that it is our intention to reduce the period or get rid of conscription altogether as soon as our commitments make it possible, but at present our commitments do not make it possible.

Mr. Wigg: Then the Government do stand by the pledge to reduce the period of service from two years to 18 months? Is that so? Will the hon. Gentleman make that clear? It is very important indeed.

Mr. Head: Perhaps I might answer that question. I said in my speech—I thought I made it quite clear, and the Government have announced it twice in defence debates—that it is our policy to reduce National Service as much as possible as soon as possible, and that remains the Government's policy today.

Mr. Swingler: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that the pledge to which my hon. Friend is referring is that which was given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and which was endorsed by the present Lord Chancellor on behalf of the then Conservative Opposition in 1950, when conscription was lengthened from 18 months to 24 months, that it was a temporary measure because of the Korean emergency? That was the pledge, and it was implied that as soon as the Korean emergency came to an end there would be a reduction in the period of service to 18 months.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member cannot now make a second speech.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1955–56

VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 523,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.

4.55 a.m.

Mr. Wigg: Will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to answer a simple question? Do the Government stand by the pledge given by the Lord Chancellor, or do they not?

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman has referred to a pledge made some time ago. He has not quoted it, and he cannot expect me offhand to reply to his question. If he will be good enough to read it out, I will deal with it. I have not heard the particulars of the pledge to which he alludes, and he cannot expect me, without reference to the particulars of the pledge, to state my views or give any undertaking in respect of it. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be more explicit.

Mr. Swingler: I am astonished by what the right hon. Gentleman has said, because it was only a very short time ago that I asked him a Question in the House in relation to the cost of reducing the National Service period by six months. In a supplementary question, my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), who was Secretary of State for War at the time when conscription was lengthened to two years in 1950, reminded the right hon. Gentleman that pledges were given by the leaders of both political parties during the debates in the House in 1950 that this was a temporary measure relating to the Korean emergency. The pledge was given by my right hon. Friend. One of my hon. Friends is now engaged in looking up the quotation, and I can soon send it to

the right hon. Gentleman. I am sorry that I have not got it with me, but I thought that it was sufficiently well known for it to be unnecessary to bring the relevant copy of HANSARD with me.

Mr. Head: I thought that the hon. Gentleman had got the actual quotation with him. The reason why I wanted particularly to hear what the present Lord Chancellor on behalf of the then Opposition said, was that I thought the hon. Gentleman implied that the pledge was that National Service would be reduced from two years to 18 months on the termination of the Korean crisis. It is my recollection that no such pledge as that was given.
My recollection is that the pledge was that, as this period had been increased to two years because of the situation which obtained at the time, it was not the intention of either side of the House, either the Opposition or the Government, to retain an exceptional measure of that nature unless the situation at the time fully justified it. That, as I understand it, was the pledge.
I have tried to point out that we consider that the present international situation, the present state of the foreign situation, necessitates the retention of this period of National Service.

Mr. Swingler: I agree that it would be wrong of me to suggest that the pledge was given in categorical terms that conscription would be reduced as soon as the Korean armistice was announced.
The pledge that was given by the present Lord Chancellor on behalf of the Conservative Opposition when my right hon. Friend was Secretary of State for War was that this extension of National Service to two years from 18 months was regarded as a purely temporary measure. It was made clear by the then Government that it had only been necessitated by the Korean emergency. It was the Korean war which had forced them to extend the period from 18 months to two years. Therefore, it was the natural expectation that the time when this pledge would be fulfilled was when the commitment in the Korean war had come to an end.
The pledge was not the specific terms that with the Korean armistice National Service would be reduced to 18 months.
But several months have now passed since the Korean armistice. The pledge then given that this was a temporary measure introduced because of the outbreak of the Korean war, which added to the then Government's commitments, can be fulfilled, because the Government's commitments have now been reduced. That is admitted by everybody. It is mentioned in the Defence White Paper. The commitments in respect of Korea and the Suez have been reduced, as have others.
5.0 a.m.
I see that some of my hon. Friends are engaged in searching through copies of the OFFICIAL REPORT. I am sorry that they have not yet found the quotation, but I can assure the Committee that it is there. I have quoted it a number of times in articles, and it was quoted during last year's debates. We shall soon produce it for the benefit of the Secretary of State, and it will be seen that the Conservative Opposition was committed to the view that the introduction of two years' conscription was a temporary measure, related to the emergency caused by the outbreak of the Korean war.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: I think that the Committee will be indebted to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply, who appears to have come to the rescue of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War. I am sorry; it appears that that is not the case. The Secretary of State has not succeeded in locating the pledge. I feel sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) will be able to produce the reference if he is given a little time, but if the right hon. Gentleman desires to intervene now I shall be very glad to give way.

Mr. Head: Perhaps I may speak again, with the leave of the Committee. It seems to me that we are turning this

discussion into a farce if we spend our time searching for something in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I am not trying to shirk the issue, but it would be nice to know the precise wording of the pledge.

Mr. Wigg: It is contained in the OFFICIAL REPORT of 15th September, 1950. Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, as he then was, said:
I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) to consider whether he should press this new Clause in the circumstances of today. I should like to say for myself and for those who sit with me that we feel just as strongly as anyone who has given expression to the same view that this proposal should not be a permanent part of our national set-up. I will not go into the past—we have our own claims, but I am certainly not going into them again—but we feel as strongly as anyone else that what we aim at and want is a strong Regular Army."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th September, 1950; Vol. 478, c. 1504–5.]

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman has created something of a storm in a teacup. As far as this pledge is concerned—and I feel that I was justified in asking for chapter and verse about it—I can confirm it absolutely to the full on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.

Resolved,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 523,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956.

To report Resolution and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. Legh.]

Report to be received this day; Committee to sit again this day.

ADJOURNMENT

Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Legh.]

Adjourned accordingly at five minutes past Five o'clock a.m.